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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses an interdisciplinary problem in the context of engineering,
computer science and economics: In a large scale networked system, how can we
achieve a desirable equilibrium that benefits the system as a whole? We approach
this question from two perspectives. On the one hand, given a system architecture
that imposes certain constraints, a system designer must propose efficient algorithms
to optimally allocate resources to the agents that desire them. On the other hand,
given algorithms that are used in practice, a performance analyst must come up
with tools that can characterize these algorithms and determine when they can be
optimally applied. Ideally, the two viewpoints must be integrated to obtain a simple
system design with efficient algorithms that apply to it.
We study the design of incentives and algorithms in such large scale networked
systems under three application settings, referred to herein via the subheadings:
Incentivizing Sharing in Realtime D2D Networks: A Mean Field Games Perspective,
Energy Coupon: A Mean Field Game Perspective on Demand Response in Smart
Grids, Dynamic Adaptability Properties of Caching Algorithms, and Accuracy vs.
Learning Rate of Multi-level Caching Algorithms. Our application scenarios all entail
an asymptotic system scaling, and an equilibrium is defined in terms of a probability
distribution over system states. The question in each case is to determine how to
attain a probability distribution that possesses certain desirable properties.
For the first two applications, we consider the design of specific mechanisms
to steer the system toward a desirable equilibrium under self interested decision
making. The environments in these problems are such that there is a set of shared
resources, and a mechanism is used during each time step to allocate resources to
ii
agents that are selfish and interact via a repeated game. These models are motivated
by resource sharing systems in the context of data communication, transportation,
and power transmission networks. The objective is to ensure that the achieved
equilibria are socially desirable. Formally, we show that a Mean Field Game can be
used to accurately approximate these repeated game frameworks, and we describe
mechanisms under which socially desirable Mean Field Equilibria exist.
For the third application, we focus on performance analysis via new metrics to
determine the value of the attained equilibrium distribution of cache contents when
using different replacement algorithms in cache networks. The work is motivated
by the fact that typical performance analysis of caching algorithms consists of de-
termining hit probability under a fixed arrival process of requests, which does not
account for dynamic variability of request arrivals. Our main contribution is to define
a function which accounts for both the error due to time lag of learning the items’
popularity, as well as error due to the inaccuracy of learning, and to characterize
the tradeoff between the two that conventional algorithms achieve. We then use
the insights gained in this exercise to design new algorithms that are demonstrably
superior.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We have become increasingly dependent on large scale networked systems that
are used to allocate shared resources so as to benefit the largest possible set of users.
These systems include societal networks that are crucial to the functioning of society
such as those used for data communication, transportation and power transmission.
In each such network, resource allocation decisions have to be made based on the
current state of the system, either in a distributed or centralized manner, and the
net result is probability distribution over the states of the system. Typically, the
decision makers are individual users who might make choices by using algorithms
that maximize their individual utilities. In many problems, we have an asymptotic
scaling regime in the number of decision makers that each try to maximize their own
value over a set of choices. A fundamental question that we aim at answering in this
thesis is whether it is possible to design incentive schemes such that the resulting
equilibrium distribution of system states is a desirable one in terms of maximizing
user utility.
We are also dependent on engineered systems in which the designer has the free-
dom to select a decision algorithm, which must then select between large number of
choices each of whose value is unknown. An example of such a system is content
caching wherein the popularity of different items of content is unknown apriori and
continually changes. Here, as each request arrives, a caching algorithm must take a
decision on which item to evict in order to make room for the newly cached item.
The decision rule creates a distribution over the combination of content items in
the cache, with different distributions resulting in different probabilities of finding a
desired item in the cache. A basic problem that we wish to solve in this thesis is that
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of determining a rule that will achieve a desired tradeoff between ensuring a high hit
probability at equilibrium versus quickly converging to the equilibrium distribution.
While in the first problem, we have limited control over the distribution of decision
makers’ states and can only try to modify their behavior using incentive schemes, in
the second we have full control over the decision rule but only have limited knowledge
about the distribution that generates the arrival process of requests. An underlying
theme in both trains of thought has to do with generation of equilibrium proba-
bility distributions, with system value being tied to some function of the resultant
distribution. Attaining desirable equilibria is the goal of our work.
1.1 Overview and Main Contributions
In the first part of this thesis, we describe our results on achieving desirable
equilibria under a repeated game framework in societal networks. The mean field
game (MFG) framework is a promising approach towards studying societal networks,
which typically have a large number of agents, and where any subset of agents has
infrequent interactions. Here, agents model their opponents at any particular in-
teraction through an assumed distribution over their action spaces, and play the
best response action against this distribution. We say that the system is at a mean
field equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action turns out to be a sample drawn
from the assumed distribution. Our objective is to ensure that the achieved MFE
is socially desirable. We consider two scenarios in which we wish to attain such a
desirable MFE.
Realtime D2D Streaming Networks : In Section 2, we consider the problem of stream-
ing live content to a cluster of co-located wireless devices that have both an expensive
unicast base-station-to-device (B2D) interface, as well as an inexpensive broadcast
device-to-device (D2D) interface, which can be used simultaneously. Our setting is
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a streaming system that uses a block-by-block random linear coding approach to
achieve a target percentage of on-time deliveries with minimal B2D usage. Our goal
is to design an incentive framework that would promote such cooperation across de-
vices, while ensuring good quality of service. Based on ideas drawn from truth-telling
auctions, we design a mechanism that achieves this goal via appropriate transfers
(monetary payments or rebates) in a setting with a large number of devices, and
with peer arrivals and departures. Here, we show that a Mean Field Game can be
used to accurately approximate our system. Furthermore, the complexity of cal-
culating the best responses under this regime is low. We implement the proposed
system on an Android testbed, and illustrate its efficient performance using real
world experiments.
Societal Networks and Electricity Usage: In Section 3, we consider the problem
of a Load Serving Entity (LSE) trying to reduce its exposure to electricity market
volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid setting. We focus on the
day-ahead electricity market, wherein the LSE has a good estimate of the statistics
of the wholesale price of electricity at different hours in the next day, and wishes
its customers to move a part of their power consumption to times of low mean and
variance in price. Based on the time of usage, the LSE awards a differential number
of “Energy Coupons” to each customer in proportion to the customer’s electricity
usage at that time. A lottery is held periodically in which the coupons held by all
the customers are used as lottery tickets.
Our study takes the form of a Mean Field Game, wherein each customer models
the number of coupons that each of its opponents possesses via a distribution, and
plays a best response pattern of electricity usage by trading off the utility of winning
at the lottery versus the discomfort suffered by changing its usage pattern. The
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system is at a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if the number of coupons that the
customer receives is itself a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We show
the existence of an MFE, and characterize the mean field customer policy as having
a multiple-threshold structure in which customers who have won too frequently or
infrequently have low incentives to participate. We then numerically study the sys-
tem with a candidate application of air conditioning during the summer months in
the state of Texas. Besides verifying our analytical results, we show that the LSE
can potentially attain quite substantial savings using our scheme. Our techniques
can also be applied to resource sharing problems in other societal networks such as
transportation or communication.
In the second part of this thesis, we explore the construction of desirable equilib-
ria for content distribution using caching algorithms. Caching algorithms typically
follow Markovian dynamics, with a decision on what to cache and evict being made at
each time based on the current cache content and arriving request. Hence, a caching
algorithm generates a Markov process over the occupancy states of the cache. Perfor-
mance analysis of caching replacement algorithms usually consists of determining the
stationary distribution of this process, and using it to calculate the hit probability
at the cache under either a synthetic request data, or by using a trace observed in a
real system. However, this approach loses all notion of dynamically changing request
popularities, and does not allow us to compare the performance of each algorithm
with the best possible. We consider adaptability of such caching algorithms from
two perspectives: the accuracy of learning a fixed popularity distribution; and the
speed of learning items’ popularity. We wish to study the adaptability of caching
algorithms by defining a function that accounts for both the error due to time lag
of learning items’ popularity, as well as error due to the inaccuracy of learning. Our
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goal is to obtain such a characterization over multiple existing algorithms, and to
develop new ones.
Algorithms on Simple Caches : In Section 4, we analyze the performance of conven-
tional caching algorithms such as LRU, FIFO and RANDOM, as applied to simple
(single-stage) caches. We first determine the stationary distributions of these al-
gorithms, and compute the distance between the stationary distributions of each
algorithm with that of an algorithm that has knowledge of the true popularity rank-
ing. We adopt the well known Wasserstein distance to compare the distance between
distributions by taking the generalized Kendall’s tau distance as the cost function.
We call this metric as the τ -distance, which correctly represents the accuracy of
learning the request distribution. We next use the mixing time to study the evolu-
tion of the Markov chain associated with caching algorithm to understand its rate
of convergence to stationarity. We use a triangle inequality bound and combine the
τ -distance and mixing time with appropriate normalization to obtain a new metric,
called learning error, which represents both how quickly and how accurately an al-
gorithm learns the optimal caching distribution. This allows us to determine how
well each algorithm would perform after it has learned for a certain time interval.
Algorithms on Multi-level Caches : Multi-level caches have been shown to improve
the hit probabilities of conventional caching algorithms through numerical studies.
However, it is unclear how the number of levels and the partition of total cache
size across these levels impacts the performance. In Section 5, we explore the value
of multi-level caching by first considering a particular topology called a linear cache
network. As the name suggests, the linear cache network consists of a stack of caches,
potentially of different sizes and at different distances from the content requesting
site. In such a network, an item enters via the first cache and moves up to a higher
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cache whenever there is a cache hit on it, with a replacement algorithm determining
which item should be replaced. We desire to understand the replacement algorithm
from the perspective of how the division of cache levels impacts both the stationary
hit probability and the rate of adaptation to a changing request distribution, through
the τ -distance and mixing time metrics mentioned above. A main finding is that
multi-level caches are a good way of increasing the accuracy of a caching algorithm
for a given cache size, but at the expense of increasing the mixing time. Motivated
by our analysis, we propose a novel hybrid algorithm, Adaptive-LRU (A-LRU) that
learns both faster and better the change in popularity. We show numerically that
it outperforms all other candidate algorithms when confronted with a dynamically
changing synthetic request process, as well by using real world trace files.
We conclude with a brief summary of the main results of this thesis, and provide
discussion on the future research directions in Section 6.
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2. INCENTIVIZING SHARING IN REALTIME D2D NETWORKS:
A MEAN FIELD GAME PERSPECTIVE
2.1 Introduction
There has recently been much interest in networked systems for collaborative
resource utilization. These are systems in which agents contribute to the overall
welfare through their individual actions. Usually, each agent has a certain amount of
resources, and can choose how much to contribute based on the perceived return via
repeated interactions with the system. An example is a peer-to-peer file sharing net-
work, wherein each peer can contribute upload bandwidth by transmitting chunks to
a peer, and receive downloads of chunks from that peer as a reward. Interactions are
bilateral, and hence tit-for-tat type strategies are successful in preventing free-riding
behavior [26]. More generally, collaborative systems entail multilateral interactions
in which the actions of each agent affect and are affected by the collective behavior
of a subset of agents. Here, more complex mechanisms are needed to accurately
determine the value of the contribution of each individual to the group.
An example of a collaborative system with repeated multilateral interactions is
a device-to-device (D2D) wireless network. Suppose that multiple devices require
the same content chunk. The broadcast nature of the wireless medium implies that
several agents can be simultaneously satisfied by a single transmission. However, they
might each have different values for that particular chunk, and may have contributed
different amounts in the past to the transmitting agent. Furthermore, D2D systems
undergo “churn” in which devices join and leave different clusters as they move
around. How then is an agent to determine whether to collaborate with others, and
whether it has received a fair compensation for its contribution?
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Our objective in this section is to design mechanisms for cooperation in systems
with repeated multilateral interactions. As in earlier literature, we assume that
there exists a currency to transfer utility between agents [7, 93], and our goal is to
determine how much should be transferred for optimal collaboration. We focus on
wireless content streaming as our motivating example. In particular, as shown in
Figure 2.1, we assume that all devices are interested in the same content stream,
and receive a portion of chunks corresponding to this stream via a unicast base-
station-to-device (B2D) interface. The B2D interface has a large energy and dollar
cost for usage, and the devices seek to mitigate this cost via sharing chunks through
broadcast D2D communication.1
Internet
Figure 2.1: Wireless content distribution via multiple interfaces [4].
A content sharing system is described in [4], in which the objective is to achieve
live streaming of content synchronously to multiple co-located devices. The system
architecture of that work forms an ideal setting for studying mechanism design in
1Note that, as we describe in greater detail later in this section, it is possible to enable the usage
of both the 3G (unicast) and WiFi (broadcast) interfaces simultaneously on Android smart phones.
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which multilateral interactions occur. The setup is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Here,
time is divided into frames, which are subdivided into T slots. A block of data is
generated by the content server in each frame, and the objective is to ensure that
this block can be played out by all devices two frames after its generation, i.e., data
block k is generated in frame k − 2, and is to be played out in frame k. Such a
strict delay constraint between the time of generation and playout of each data block
ensures that the live aspect of streaming is maintained.
B2D block (k) B2D block (k+1) B2D block (k+2)
frame kframe k-1frame k-2
create block (k)
D2D block (k)D2D block (k-1) D2D block (k+1)
create block (k+1) create block (k+2)
play block (k-2) play block (k-1) play block (k)
Figure 2.2: Streaming architecture [4] in which each block must be delivered within
two frames after its creation.
Upon generation of block k (in frame k− 2), the content server divides it into N
chunks and performs random linear coding (RLC) over these chunks [28]. The server
unicasts some of these coded chunks to each device using its B2D interface. This
number is to be kept small to reduce B2D usage. Next, in frame k − 1, the devices
use the broadcast D2D network to disseminate these chunks among themselves. At
the end of frame k − 1 the devices attempt to decode block k. If a device i has
received enough coded chunks to decode the block, it plays out that block during
frame k. Otherwise, i will be idle during this frame. The use of RLC results in two
desirable system features. First, the server can unicast a fixed number of chunks to
the devices in each frame over a lossy channel (Internet plus B2D link) without any
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feedback. Second, the devices do not need to keep track of what chunks each one
possesses while performing D2D broadcasts.
The notion of quality of experience (QoE) here is delivery-ratio denoted by η,
which is the average ratio of blocks desired to the blocks generated [42]. For instance,
a delivery ratio of 95% would mean that it is acceptable if 5% of the blocks can be
skipped. A device can keep track of its QoE thus far via the “deficit” incurred upto
frame k, which is the difference between the actual number of number of blocks
successfully decoded by frame k and the target value ηk. In [4], it was shown that,
assuming complete cooperation by the participating devices, it is possible to design
a chunk sharing scheme whereby all devices would meet their QoE targets with
minimal usage of the B2D interface. But how do we design a mechanism to ensure
that the devices cooperate?
The setting of interest in this section is that of a large number of D2D clusters,
each with a fixed number of agents, and with all clusters interested in the same
content stream. Examples of such settings are sports stadia, concerts or protest
meetings, where a large number of agents gather together, and desire to receive
the same live-stream (replays, commentary, live video etc.) Devices move between
clusters as agents move around, causing churn. The objective of our work is to
develop an incentive framework wherein each device truthfully reports the number
of chunks that it receives via B2D and its deficit in each frame, so that a system-wide
optimal allocation policy can be employed. Such an incentive framework should be
lightweight and compatible with minimal amounts of history retention. Finally, we
also desire to implement the system on Android smart phones and measure its real
world performance.
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2.1.1 Related Work
The question of how to assign value to wireless broadcast transmissions is in-
triguing. For instance, [43] considers a problem of repeated interaction with time
deadlines by which each node needs to receive a packet. Each node declares its
readiness to help others after waiting for a while; the game lies in choosing this time
optimally, and the main result is to characterize the price of anarchy that results.
However, decision making is myopic, i.e., devices do not estimate future states while
taking actions. In a similar fashion, [93] propose a scheme for sharing 3G services
via WiFi hotspots using a heuristic scheme that possesses some attractive properties.
Here too, decision making is myopic. The question of fair scheduling at a base sta-
tion that uses the history of interactions with individual stations in order to identify
whether they are telling the truth about their state is considered in [52]. However,
since the devices in our network undergo churn and keeping track of device identities
is infeasible, we desire a scheme that does not use identities or history to enable
truthful revelation of state.
2.1.1.1 Perfect Bayesian and Mean Field Equilibria
The typical solution concept in dynamic games is that of Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE). Consider a strategy profile for all players, as well as beliefs about the
other players’ types at all information sets. This strategy profile and belief system is
a PBE if: (i) Sequential rationality : Each player’s strategy specifies optimal actions,
given her beliefs and the strategies of other players; (ii) Consistency of beliefs : Each
player’s belief is consistent with the strategy profile (following Bayes’ rule). PBE re-
quires each agent to keep track of their beliefs on the future plays of all other agents
in the system, and play the best response to that belief. The dynamic pivot mech-
anism [11] extends the truth-telling VCG idea [56] to dynamic games. It provides
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a basis for designing allocation schemes that are underpinned by truthful reporting.
Translating the model in [52] to the language of [11], it is possible to use the dynamic
pivot mechanism to develop a scheme (say FiniteDPM) with appropriate transfers
that will be efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible and per-period indi-
vidually rational; note that while this scheme would use the identities of the devices,
it will not need to build up a history of interactions. We omit the details of this as
it is a straight-forward application of the general theory from [11].
Computation of PBE becomes intractable when the number of agents is large.
An accurate approximation of the Bayesian game in this regime is that of a Mean
Field Game (MFG) [44, 49, 58]. In MFG, the agents assume that each opponent
would play an action drawn independently from a static distribution over its action
space. The agent chooses an action that is the best response against actions drawn
in this fashion. The system is said to be at Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if
this best response action is itself a sample drawn from the assumed distribution,
i.e., the assumed distribution and the best response action are consistent with each
other [47,64,69]. Essentially, this is the canonical problem in game theory of showing
the existence of a Nash equilibrium, as it applies to the regime with a large number
of agents. We will use this concept in our setting where there are a large number of
peer devices with peer churn.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work that considers mechanism
design for multilateral repeated games in the mean field setting. One of the important
contributions of this section is in providing a truth-telling mechanism for a mean-
field game. In the process of developing the mechanism we will also highlight the
nuances to be considered in the mean-field setting. In particular, we will see that
aligning two concepts of value—from the system perspective and from that of the
agents—is crucial to our goal of truth-telling.
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2.1.2 Organization and Main Results
We describe our system model in Section 2.2. Our system consists of a large
number of clusters, with agents moving between clusters. The lifetime of an agent is
geometric; an agent is replaced with a new one when it exits. Each agent receives a
random number of B2D chunks by the beginning of each frame, which it then shares
using D2D transmissions.
In Section 2.3, we present an MFG approximation of the system, which is accurate
when the number of clusters is large. Here, the agents assume that the B2D chunks
received and deficits of the other agents would be drawn independently from some
distributions in the future, and optimize against that assumption when declaring
their states. The objective is to incentivize agents to truthfully report their states
(B2D chunks and deficit) such that a schedule of transmissions (called an “alloca-
tion”) that minimizes the discounted sum of costs can be used in each frame. The
mechanism takes the form of a scheme in which tokens are used to transfer utility
between agents. A nuance of this regime is that while the system designer sees each
cluster as having a new set of users (with IID states) in each time frame, each user
sees states of all its competitors but not itself as satisfying the mean field distribu-
tion. Reconciling the two view points is needed to construct a cost minimizing pivot
mechanism, whose truth-telling nature is shown in Section 2.4. This is our main
contribution in this section. The allocation itself turns out to be computationally
simple, and follows a version of a min-deficit first policy [4].
Next, in Sections 2.5–2.6, we present details on how to prove the existence of
the MFE in our setting. Although this proof is quite involved, it follows in a high-
level sense in the manner of [47, 69]. For the ease of exposition, the details of the
proof are provided in Appendix A. We then turn to computing the MFE and the
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value functions needed to determine the transfers in Section 2.8. The value iteration
needed to choose allocation is straightforward.
We present details of our Android implementation of a music streaming app used
to collect real world traces in Section 2.9. We discuss the viability of our system in
Section 2.10, and illustrate that under the current price of cellular data access, our
system provides sufficient incentives to participate. Finally, we conclude in Section
2.11.
2.2 Content Streaming Model
We consider a large number of D2D clusters, each with a fixed number of agents,
and with all clusters interested in the same content stream. We assume that a cluster
consists of M co-located peer devices denoted by i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}2. The data source
generates the stream in the form of a sequence of blocks. Each block is further
divided into N chunks for transmission. We use random linear network coding over
the chunks of each block (with coefficients in finite field Fq of size q). We assume
that the field size is very large; this assumption can be relaxed without changing
our cooperation results. Time is divided into frames, which are further divided into
slots. At each time slot τ , each device can simultaneously receive up to one chunk
on each interface.
B2D Interface: Each device has a (lossy) B2D unicast channel to a base-station.
For each device i, we model the number of chunks received using the B2D interface
in the previous frame by a random variable with (cumulative) distribution ζ, inde-
pendent of the other devices. The support of ζ is the set {0, 1, · · · , T}, denoted by
T. The statistics of this distribution depend on the number of chunks transmitted
by the server and the loss probability of the channel. In [4], a method for calcu-
2Our analysis is essentially unchanged when there are a random but finite number of devices in
each cluster.
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lating statistics based on the desired quality of service is presented. We take the
distribution ζ as given.
D2D Interface: Each device has a zero-cost D2D broadcast interface, and only
one device can broadcast over the D2D network at each time τ . For simplicity of
exposition, we will assume that the D2D broadcasts are always successful; the more
complex algorithm proposed in [4] to account for unreliable D2D is fully consistent3
with our incentive scheme. Since each D2D broadcast is received by all devices, there
is no need to rebroadcast any information. It is then straightforward to verify that
the order of D2D transmissions does not impact performance. Thus, we only need
to keep track of the number of chunks transmitted over the D2D interfaces during a
frame in order to determine the final state of the system.
Allocation: We denote the total number of coded chunks of block k delivered to
device i via the B2D network during frame k − 2 using ei[k] ∼ ζ. We call the vector
consisting of the number of transmissions by each device via the D2D interfaces over
frame k − 1 as the “allocation” pertaining to block k, denoted by a[k]. Also, we
denote the number received chunks of block k by device i via D2D during frame
k − 1 using gi[k]. Due to the large field size assumption, if ei[k] + gi[k] = N, it
means that block k can be decoded, and hence can be played out. For simplicity
of exposition, we develop our results assuming that the allocation is computed in a
centralized fashion in each cluster. However, we actually implement a distributed4
version on the testbed.
Quality of Experience: Each device i has a delivery ratio ηi ∈ (0, 1], which is the
minimum acceptable long-run average number of frames device i must playout. In
the mobile agents model, we assume that all devices have the same delivery ratio η for
3We will discuss this at the end of Section 2.6.1.
4At the end of Section 2.6.1 we will argue that the distributed implementation is also consistent
with our incentive scheme.
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simplicity. It is straightforward to extend our results to the case where delivery ratios
are drawn from some finite set of values. The device keeps track of the current deficit
using a deficit queue with length di[k] ∈ K. The set of possible deficit values is given
by K =
{
kη−m : k,m ≥ 0,m ≤ bkηc}, where for x ∈ R, bxc = max{k ∈ Z : k ≤ x}
is the largest whole number that x is greater than. Note that K is a countable set and
the possible deficit values are all non-negative. In fact, by the well-ordering principle
K can be rewritten as {dn}n∈N with dn an increasing sequence (without bound) such
that d1 = 0. We will use this representation to enumerate the elements of K. If a
device fails to decode a particular block, its deficit increases by η, else it decreases
by 1 − η. The impact of deficit on the user’s quality of experience is modeled by a
function c(di[k]), which is convex, differentiable and monotone increasing. The idea
is that user unhappiness increases more with each additional skipped block.
Transfers: We asume the existence of a currency (either internal or a monetary
value) that can be used to transfer utility between agents [7, 93]. In our system, a
negative transfer is a price paid by the agent, while a positive value indicates that
the agent is paid by the system. Such transfer systems are well established; see for
instance a review in [7]. Transfers are used by agents either to pay for value received
through others’ transmissions, or to be compensated for value added to others by
transmitting a chunk. We assume that the transmissions in the system are monitored
by a reliable device, which can then report these values to decide on the transfers.
In practice we use the device that creates each ad-hoc network as the monitor.
An allocation policy maps the values of the B2D chunks received and deficits as
revealed by agents, denoted by θˆ[k] := (eˆ[k], dˆ[k−1]), to an allocation for that frame
a[k]. Given an allocation, agents have no incentive to deviate from it, since an agent
that does not transmit the allocated number of chunks would see no benefit; those
time slots would have no transmissions by other agents either. The fundamental
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question is that of how to incentivize the agents to reveal their states truthfully so
that the constructed allocation can maximize system-wide welfare.
2.3 Mean Field Model and Mechanism Design
Our system consists of JM agents (or users) organized into J clusters with M
agents per cluster. As mentioned earlier, time is slotted into frames. At the end of
a frame, any agent i can leave the system only to be replaced by a new agent (also
denoted by i) whose initial deficit is drawn from a (cumulative) distribution Ψ with
support K. This event occurs with probability δ¯ = (1 − δ) independently for each
agent, so that the lifetimes of the agents are geometrically distributed. As described
in the previous section, we assume that the number of chunks received via B2D for
agent i in frame k, denoted by ei[k], is chosen in an i.i.d. fashion according to the
(cumulative) distribution ζ, with support T; one such distribution is the binomial
distribution. In addition to the agents having geometrically distributed lifetimes,
we also allow mobility in our set-up. In particular, in every frame we assume that
all the agents are randomly permuted and then assigned to clusters such that there
are exactly M agents in each cluster. Using this system as a starting point we will
develop our mean-field model that will be applicable when the number of clusters J
is extremely large.
The mean field framework in Figure 2.3 illustrates system relationships that will
be discussed below. The blue/dark tiles apply to the value determination process
for mechanism design, which will be discussed in this section. The beige/light tiles
are relevant to showing the existence of an MFE on which the mechanism depends,
which will be discussed in Sections 2.5–2.6.
The mean field model yields informational and computational savings, since oth-
erwise each agent will need to not only be cognizant of the values and actions of all
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agents, but also track their mobility patterns. Additionally, the mean field distri-
bution accounts for regenerations, which do not have to be explicitly accounted for
when determining best responses.
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Figure 2.3: The mean field system from perspective of agent 1.
There is, however, an important nuance that the mean-field analysis introduces:
when there are a large number of clusters, each cluster sees a different group of
agents in every frame with their states drawn from the mean-field distribution, but
even though each agent interacts with a new set of agents in every frame, it’s own
state is updated based on the allocations made to it, so that the differing viewpoints
of the two entities need to be reconciled while providing any incentives.
The number of chunks received over the B2D interface and the deficit value
constitute the state of an agent at the beginning of a frame. At frame k we collect
together the state variables of all the agents in system as θ[k] = (e[k],d[k− 1]). Our
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mechanism then aims to achieve
W (θ[k]) = min
{a[l]}∞l=k
E

J∑
j=1
∞∑
l=k
δl−k
∑
i∈sj [l]
vi(asj [l], θi[l])
 , (2.1)
where j = 1, 2, · · · , J is the number of clusters in the system, sj[k] is the set of agents
in cluster j at frame k, asj is the allocation in cluster j and vi(asj [l], θi[l]) is the value
that agent i makes from the allocation in frame k. For agent i set ji[k] to be the
cluster he belongs in during frame k, i.e., i ∈ sji[k][k]. Note that the probability of
remaining in the system δ appears as the discount factor in the above expression.
Given the allocation in each cluster, if agent i does not regenerate, then his deficit
gets updated as
di[k] = (di[k − 1] + η − χi(aji[k][k], θi[k]))+, (2.2)
where (·)+ = max(·, 0), whereas if the agent regenerates, then di[k] = d˜i[k] where
d˜i[k] is drawn i.i.d. with distribution Ψ. Here,
χi(a, θi) = 1{ei+gi(a)=N} =

1 if ei + gi(a) = N
0 otherwise,
(2.3)
where χi(.) is 1 if and only if agent i obtains all N coded chunks to be able to
decode a block, gi(a) is the number of packets agent i can get during a frame under
the allocation a (where we suppress the dependence of a on θ). We specialize to
the case where the value per frame for agent i with system state θ and vector of
allocations a is given by vi(a, θi) = c
((
di+η−χi(a, θi)
)+)
if there is no regeneration
and vi(a,θi) = c(d˜i) otherwise, where d˜i is i.i.d. with distribution Ψ and c(·) is the
holding cost function that is assumed to be convex and monotone increasing.
As there are a large number of clusters, in every frame there is a completely
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different set of agents that appear at any given cluster. The revealed states of these
agents will be drawn from the mean field distribution. Hence, from the perspective
of some cluster l, the revealed state of the agents in that cluster Θˆl will be drawn
according to the (cumulative) distributions [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to the
deficit, and ζ pertaining to the B2D transmissions received by that agent. Note
that the support of ρ is K while the support of ζ is T, and ⊗ indicates the i.i.d
nature of the agent states. Whereas from the perspective a particular agent i, the
revealed states of all the other agents in that cluster will be drawn according to
Θˆ−i ∼ [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1]. These facts will simplify the allocation problem in each
cluster and also allow us to analyze the MFE by tracking a particular agent.
First, we consider the allocation problem as seen by the clusters. Pick any finite
number of clusters. In the mean-field limit, the agents from frame to frame will be
different in each cluster, therefore the allocation decision in each cluster can be made
in an distributed manner, independent of the other clusters; this is one of the chaos
hypotheses of the mean-field model. This then implies that the objective in (2.1) is
achieved by individual optimization in each cluster, i.e.,
W (θˆ[k]) =
J∑
j=1
Wj(θˆsj [k]), (2.4)
where we recall that θˆsj [k] is the revealed state of agents in cluster j at time k and
Wj(θˆsj [k]) = min{asj [l]}∞l=k
∞∑
l=k
δl−k
∑
i∈sj [l]
vi(asj [l], θˆi[l]). (2.5)
Under mean field assumption, the method of determining value does not change from
step-to-step. The value function in the mean-field is determined by the first solving
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the following Bellman equation
Wˆ (θˆ) = min
a
M∑
i=1
vi(a, θˆi) + δE
{
Wˆ (Θˆ)
}
(2.6)
to obtain function Wˆ (·), where θˆ is the M -dimensional revealed state vector (with el-
ements θˆi) and the future revealed state vector Θˆ is chosen according to [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ],
and thereafter setting Wj(θˆsj [k]) = Wˆ (θˆsj [k]) for every j = 1, 2, . . . , J . This obser-
vation then considerably simplifies the allocation in each cluster to be the greedy
optimal, i.e., determine (multi)function
a∗(θˆ) = arg min
a
M∑
i=1
vi(a, θˆi), (2.7)
and for j = 1, 2, . . . , J we set a∗sj = a
∗(θˆj).
Next, we consider the system from the viewpoint of a typical agent i; w.l.o.g let
i = 1. Any allocation results in the deficit changing according to (2.2) and the future
B2D packets drawn according to ζ, whereas the state of every other agent that agent
1 interacts with in the future gets chosen according to the mean field distribution.
Then the value function (of the cluster) from the perspective of agent 1 is determined
using
W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1)) = min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θˆi′) + δE
{
W˜ (1, (Θˆ1, Θˆ−1))|a, θˆ1
}
. (2.8)
Here, θˆ−1 represents the revealed states of all the agents in cluster except 1, Θˆ−1 ∼
[⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], and for Θˆ1, the deficit term is determined via (2.2) (setting θi = θˆi)
while the B2D term follows ζ. This recursion yields a function W˜ (1, ·) which applies
to all agents. Using this function, one can also determine the allocation that agent
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1 expects his cluster to perform, namely,
a˜(θˆ1, θˆ−1) = arg min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θˆi′) + δE
{
W˜ (1, (Θˆ1, Θˆ−1))|a, θˆ1
}
. (2.9)
Using the two allocations a∗ and a˜ we can write down the value of agent 1 from
the system optimal allocation and the value of agent 1 in the allocation that the
agent thinks that the system will be performing. For a given allocation function a(·)
(for the state of agents in the cluster where agent 1 resides at present), we determine
the solution to the following recursion
V (a(θˆ), θ˜1) = v1(a, θ˜1) + δE
{
V (a(Θˆ1, Θˆ−1), Θ˜1)
}
(2.10)
to get function V (·, ·), where θ˜1, is an arbitrary state variable, the deficit term of
Θ˜1 follows (2.2) while the B2D term is generated independently (setting θi = θ˜i),
a is an arbitrary allocation, the B2D term is generated independently, and Θˆ−1 is
chosen using the mean-field distribution. Notice that θ˜1 = θ1 would yield the true
value of allocation a to agent 1. By the cluster optimal allocation (what the cluster
actually does), agent 1 gets V (a∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1), θ1) whereas from the perception of agent 1
he thinks he should be getting V (a˜(θˆ1, θˆ−1), θ1) (based on what he thinks the cluster
should be doing).
2.3.1 Transfer
We will use the different value functions to define the transfer for agent 1 depend-
ing on the reported state variable θˆ1 such that the transfer depends on the difference
between what he gets from the system optimal allocation and what he expects the
system to do from his own perspective. Using this logic we set the transfer for agent
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1 as
p∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1) = V (a∗(θˆ), θˆ1)− V (a˜(θˆ), θˆ1) +H(θˆ−1)− (W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1))− V (a˜(θˆ), θˆ1)).
(2.11)
where H(θˆ−1), following the Groves pivot mechanism, can be chosen using the re-
cursion
H(θˆ−1) = min
a−1
∑
i 6=1
vi(a−1, θˆi) + δE
{
H(Θˆ−1)
}
, (2.12)
where Θˆ−1 ∼ [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], and a−1 is used to denote an allocation in a system
in which agent 1 is not present.
The Clarke pivot mechanism idea ensures that the net-cost of agent 1, V (a∗(θˆ), θˆ1)
−p∗(θˆ1, θˆ−1), equals W˜ (1, (θˆ1, θˆ−1))−H(θˆ−1). This is simply the value of the system
as a whole from the viewpoint of agent 1, minus a function only of θˆ−1. As in the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, such formulation of net-cost naturally promotes
truth-telling as a dominant strategy at each step.
2.3.2 Allocation Scheme
The basic building block of our mechanism is the per-frame optimal allocations
that solve (2.1). We will now spell out the allocation in greater detail. First, we
observe that the allocation problem separates into independent allocation problems
in each cluster that have the same basic structure. Therefore, it suffices to discuss
the allocation problem for one cluster.
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From (2.7), the objective in this cluster is
min
a
M∑
i=1
c((di[k − 1] + η − χi(a[k], θi[k]))+). (2.13)
An optimal allocation is determined using the following observations. First, we
partition the agents into two sets, ones who cannot decode the frame even if they
never transmit during the T slots of the D2D phase and the rest; the former agents
are made to transmit first. After this we determine agents who have extra chunks
(number of slots that they can transmit on such that there is still time to decode
whole frame) and make these agents transmit their extra chunks. After all the extra
chunks have been transmitted, it is easy to see using the properties of the holding
cost function that agents are made to transmit in a minimum-deficit-first fashion in
order to prioritize agents with large deficits. This is summarized in the follow lemma.
Lemma 1 The algorithm delineated in Algorithm 1 provides an optimal greedy al-
location.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Mean Field D2D Allocation Rule
At the beginning of each frame k − 1, given the arrivals (e1[k], ..., eM [k]):
Partition the devices into sets S = {i ∈ {1, ...,M} : N − ei[k] ≤ T, ei[k] +∑
j 6=i ej[k] ≥ N} and Sc.
If S = ∅, none of the agents can decode the block. Else,
Phase 1) Let all the agents in Sc transmit all that they initially received for the
next T1 = min{
∑
i∈Sc
ei[k], T} slots.
If there exists time and a need for more transmissions,
Phase 2) Let each agent i ∈ S transmit up to (ei[k]+T−N)+ of its initial chunks.
Phase 3) While there exists time and a need for more transmissions, let devices
in S transmit their remaining chunks in an increasing order of their deficit values.
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2.4 Properties of Mechanism
2.4.1 Truth-telling as Dominant Strategy
Since we consider a mean-field setting, we will assume that deficit of agent i
changes via the allocation while the deficits of all the other agents are drawn using
the given distribution ρ. The e values are generated i.i.d. with distribution ζ. Based
on the system state report θ[k] at time k, we assume that the mechanism makes the
optimal greedy allocation a∗[k] from (2.7) and levies transfers p∗[k] from (2.11) that
uses the allocations from the agent’s perspective from (2.9). We can then show that
truthfully revealing the state, i.e., (d, e) values at the beginning of every frame is
incentive compatible.
Definition 1 A direct mechanism (or social choice function) f = (a, p) is dominant
strategy incentive compatible if θi is a dominant strategy at θi for each i and θi ∈ Θi,
where a(·) is a decision rule and p(·) is a transfer function.
Theorem 1 Our mechanism {a∗[k],p∗[k]}∞k=0 is dominant strategy incentive com-
patible.
2.4.2 Nature of Transfers
We now determine the nature of the transfers that are required to promote truth-
telling. We will show that the transfers constructed in (2.11) are always non-negative,
i.e., the system needs to pay the agents in order to participate. In other words,
each agent needs a subsidy to use the system, since it could simply choose not to
participate otherwise. Thus, the system is not budget-balanced. We will show later
how the savings in B2D usage that results from our system provides the necessary
subsidy in Section 2.10. Given these transfers, we will also see that our mechanism
is individually rational so that users participate in each frame.
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Lemma 2 The transfers defined in (2.11) are always non-negative.
The proof of individual rationality follows along the same lines as Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Our mechanism {a∗[k],p∗[k]}∞k=0 is individually rational, i.e., the volun-
tary participation constraint is satisfied.
We remark that not participating in a frame is equivalent to free-riding, and our
transfers ensure a lower cost is obtained when participating. However, as the net
payment to the users is non-negative5, we will not immediately have budget-balance.
For the broader class of Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible mechanism, [8] shows that
only under the assumption of “independent types” (the distribution of each agent’s
information is not directly affected by the other agents’ information), budget can be
balanced ex-interim. However, in our system, each agent’s information will have an
impact on the other agents’ information through the allocation. Nevertheless, using
the same technique of an initial sum being placed in escrow with the expectation
that it would be returned at each stage (i.e,. interim), our system may be budget-
balanced. Details using current prices of B2D service are provided in Section 2.10.
2.4.3 Value Functions and Optimal Strategies
We will now show that the value function given by the solution to (2.6) is well-
defined and can be obtained using value iteration. Similarly, we will show that both
the value function and the optimal allocation policy from a agent’s perspective, given
by (2.8) and (2.9) respectively, exist and can also be determined via value iteration.
5While we don’t prove it, we expect the transfer to be positive if the agent transmits, but we
also note that it need not be zero if he doesn’t, owing to the translation of viewpoints mentioned
earlier.
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Define operators T1 and T2 by
T1w(θ) =
M∑
i=1
vi(a
∗(θ), θi) + δE {w(Θ)} , (2.14)
T2w˜(1, (θ1,θ−1)) = min
a
M∑
i′=1
vi′(a, θi′) + δE {w˜(1, (Θ1,Θ−1))|a, θ1} , (2.15)
using (2.6) and (2.8), respectively.
Theorem 2 The following hold:
1. There exists a unique W (θ) such that T1W (θ) = W (θ), and given θ for every
w ∈ RM+ , we have limn→∞ T n1 w = W (θ);
2. There exists a unique W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)) such that T2W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1))
= W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)), and given (θ1,θ−1) for every w ∈ RM+ , we have limn→∞ T n2 w
= W˜ (1, (θ1,θ−1)); and
3. The Markov policy a˜((θ1,θ−1)) obtained from (2.9) is an optimal policy to be
used in cluster j1[·] from the viewpoint of agent 1.
2.5 Mean Field Equilibrium
In the mean-field setting, assuming the state of every other agent is drawn i.i.d.
with distribution ρ× ζ, the deficit of any given agent evolves as a Markov chain. We
start by showing that this Markov chain has a stationary distribution. If this station-
ary distribution is the same as ρ, then the distribution ρ is defined as a mean-field
equilibrium (MFE); we use the Schauder fixed point theorem to show the existence
of a fixed point ρ. Using the regenerative representation of the stationary distribu-
tion of deficits given ρ and a strong coupling result, we prove that the mapping that
takes ρ to the stationary distribution of deficits is continuous using a strong coupling
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result. Finally, we show that the set of probability measures to be considered is
convex and compact so that existence follows.
2.5.1 Stationary Distribution of Deficits
Fix a typical agent i and consider the state process {di[k]}∞k=−1. This is a Markov
process in the mean-field setting: if there is no regeneration, then the deficit changes
as per the allocation and the number of B2D packets received, and is chosen via
the regeneration distribution otherwise. The allocation is a function of the past di,
the number B2D packets received and the state of the other agents. The number
of B2D packets received and the state of the other agents are chosen i.i.d in every
frame. This Markov process has an invariant transition kernel. We construct it by
first presenting the form given the past state and the allocations, namely,
P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k − 1] = d, ei[k] = e, a) = δ1{(
d+ηi−χi(a,(d,e))
)+
∈B
} + (1− δ)Ψ(B),
(2.16)
where B ⊆ R+ is a Borel set and Ψ is the density function of the regeneration process
for deficit. In the above expression, the first term corresponds to the event that agent
i can either decode the packet using D2D transmissions or not, and the second term
captures the event that the agent regenerates after frame k. Using (2.16) we can
define the one-step transition kernel Υ˜ for the Markov process as
Υ˜(B, d) = P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k − 1] = d) = δ
∫
1{(
d+ηi−χi(a∗((d,e),θˆ−i),(d,e))
)+
∈B
}
× d(⊗ρM−1 ×⊗ζM−1)(θˆ−i)dζ(e) + (1− δ)Ψ(B).
(2.17)
For later use we also define the transition kernel without regeneration but one ob-
tained by averaging the states of the other users while retaining the state of user i,
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i.e.,
Υ(B|d, e) =P(di[k] ∈ B| no regeneration, di[k − 1] = d, ei[k] = e)
=
∫
1{(
d+ηi−χi(a∗((d,e),θˆ−i),(d,e))
)+
∈B
} × d(⊗ρM−1 ×⊗ζM−1)(θˆ−i)dζ(e).
(2.18)
The k fold iteration of this transition kernel is denoted by Υ(k).
Lemma 4 The Markov chain where the allocation is determined using (2.7) based
on choosing the states of all users other than i i.i.d. with distribution ρ× ζ and the
number of B2D packets of user i independently with distribution ζ, and the transi-
tion probabilities in (2.16) is positive Harris recurrent and has a unique stationary
distribution. We denote the unique stationary distribution for the deficit of a typical
agent by Πρ×ζ; the dependence on Ψ is suppressed. The expression of this stationary
distribution Πρ×ζ in term of Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|D,E) is given as,
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)), (2.19)
where D = {Dk}k∈N is the deficit process, E = {Ek}k∈N is the B2D packet reception
process, and EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) =
∫
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|d, e)dΨ(d)dζ(e).
2.5.2 Agent and Cluster Decision Problems
Suppose that each agent has common information about the distribution for the
deficit ρ ∈ M1(K) (where M1(K) is the set of probability measures on K); this is
one of the mean-field assumptions. We further assume that ρ ∈ P where
P = {ρ|ρ ∈M1(K) with finite mean}. (2.20)
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We will also assume that the regeneration distribution Ψ ∈ P . From Section 2.4, the
best strategy for each agent is to truthfully reveal its state based on the transfers
suggested in each frame as per (2.11). Then each cluster simply maximizes the
system value function by choosing the greedy optimal allocation based on (2.7).
2.5.3 Mean Field Equilibrium
Given the distribution for deficit ρ and the station distribution Πρ×ζ , we have the
following definition.
Definition 2 (Mean field equilibrium). Let ρ be the common cumulative distribution
for deficit and telling-truth is the optimal policy for each agent in every frame. Then,
we say that the given ρ along with the truth-telling behavior constitutes a mean field
equilibrium if
ρ(d) = Πρ×ζ(d),∀d ∈ K. (2.21)
2.6 Existence of MFE
The main result showing the existence of MFE is as follows.
Theorem 3 There exists an MFE of ρ and truth-telling policy such that ρ(d) =
Πρ×ζ(d), ∀d ∈ K.
As mentioned earlier, we will be specializing to the space M1(K), its subset P
and further subsets of P . The primary topology on M1(K) that we will consider
is the uniform norm topology, i.e., using the l∞ norm given by ‖ρ‖ = maxd∈K ρ(d).
Another topology onM1(K) that we will use is the point-wise convergence topology,
i.e., {ρn}∞n=1 ⊂ M1(K) converges to ρ ∈ M1(K) point-wise if limn→∞ ρn(d) = ρ(d)
for all d ∈ K; it is easily verified that the convergence is the same as weak convergence
of measures. Also, define the mapping Π∗ that takes ρ to the invariant stationary
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distribution Πρ×ζ(·). Let P ′ ⊂ P . We will use the Schauder fixed point theorem to
prove existence which is given as follows.
Theorem 4 (Schauder Fixed Point Theorem). Suppose F(P ′) ⊂ P ′, F is continu-
ous and F(P ′) is contained in a convex and compact subset of P ′, then F has a fixed
point.
Note that from the definition of P , it is already convex. Then in the following
section, we will prove that under the topology generated by the uniform norm, Π∗ is
continuous and the image of Π∗ for a specific subset P ′ is pre-compact.
2.6.1 Steps to Prove MFE Existence
We first need to prove the continuity of Π∗ with the uniform norm topology.
For this we will start by showing that for any sequence ρn → ρ with ρn, ρ ∈ P in
uniform norm, Π∗(ρn)⇒ Π∗(ρ) (where⇒ denotes weak convergence). Finally, using
some properties of M1(K) we will strengthen the convergence result to prove that
Π∗(ρn)→ Π∗(ρ) in uniform norm too.
2.6.1.1 Continuity of the Mapping Π∗
We will restrict our attention to subset of probability measures P(F ) ⊂ M1(K)
such that
P(F ) =
{
ρ ∈M1(K) :
∑
d∈K
dρ(d) ≤ F
}
, (2.22)
where F is a given non-negative constant; in other words, probability measures with
a specified bound on the mean and not just a finite mean. We will assume that the
regeneration distribution Ψ ∈ P(F ′) for some F ′. Later on we will specify the values
of F and F ′ to be used.
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We start with the following preliminary result that establishes compactness of
sets like P(F ) in the uniform norm topology; note that convexity is immediate.
Lemma 5 Given a sequence of non-negative numbers {bn}n∈N such that limn→∞ bn =
0, then C = {x : |xn| ≤ bn ∀n ∈ N} is a compact subset of l∞ and sequences of
elements from C that converge point-wise also converge uniformly.
One can also use the Cantor diagonalization procedure to show sequential compact-
ness in the proof above.
We have an immediate corollary of this result.
Corollary 1 The set of probability measures P(F ) on K is a compact set of l∞ for
every F ∈ R+.
Proof For any ρ ∈ P(F ), p(d1) ≤ 1 and by Markov’s inequality for n > 1
p(dn) ≤
∞∑
k=n
p(dk) ≤ F
dn
, (2.23)
with limn→∞ Fdn = 0. Using Lemma 5 the result follows.
Next, we present a coupling result from Thorisson [86, Theorem 6.1, Chapter 1].
This result will be used in proving continuity of the stationary distribution of the
deficit process under the topology of point-wise convergence and in strengthening
the convergence result.
Theorem 5 Let {ρn}∞n=1 ∈M1(K) converge weakly to ρ ∈M1(K), then there exists
a coupling, i.e., random variables {Xn}∞n=1, X on a common probability space and a
random integer N such that Xn ∼ ρn for all n ∈ N, X ∼ ρ and Xn = X for n ≥ N .
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This result shows that weak convergence of probability measures on K is equiva-
lent to convergence of probability measures in total variation norm, and hence, also
in uniform norm.
Next we show that Πρ×ζ ∈ P(F ) whenever ρ ∈ P(F ).
Lemma 6 If ρ ∈ P(F ) for F ≥ δη
1−δ and the regeneration distribution Ψ ∈ P(F ′) for
F ′ ≤ F − δη
1−δ , then the stationary distribution of the deficit process of any specific
user Πρ×ζ ∈ P(F ).
Next we show continuity properties of the mapping Π∗.
Theorem 6 The mapping Π∗ : P(F ) 7→ P(F ) is continuous in the uniform topology.
In addition, Π∗ has a fixed point in P(F ).
Theorem 7 The MFE is unique.
As mentioned earlier, we constrain our analysis to the case of D2D transmissions
being error-free. We give a discussion on generalizing the D2D transmission model
in [61].
2.7 Passage to the Mean Field Limit
We gave an overview of the finite agent system in Sections 2.1.1.1 (description of
FiniteDPM) and 2.3. Here, we briefly discuss the passage between the finite agent
system and the mean field model that we have used throughout the section. As
in other literature on repeated games under the mean field setup [47, 69], we have
considered the system with an infinitely large number of agents at finite time. It
is straight-forward to follow the steps in [47, 69] to prove convergence of the finite
agent system to the mean-field model in our context. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the study of mean field games as time also becomes infinitely large is
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currently open. There has been recent work in non-game-theoretical settings (using
a fixed policy) studying the question of the conditions required to ensure that the
mean field model is indeed the limiting case of the finite system when time becomes
asymptotically large [10, 16]. In the case of our system, the set of measures that we
consider is tight, since they are all stochastically dominated by a fictitious system
in which no D2D transmissions happen and the agents’ deficits simply increase and
then they regenerate. Furthermore, we showed in Theorem 7 that the MFE, which
is efficient, dominant strategy incentive compatible and per-period individually ra-
tional, is unique. We believe that these two properties might aid us in characterizing
the equilibrium as time becomes large, and we defer this problem to future work.
2.8 Value Determination
We now turn to computing the system value from the viewpoint of a cluster and
also a typical agent (say 1). Here, we suppose there are M = 4 agents in each
cluster, and all have η = 0.95, δ = 0.9995. Hence, each agent spends an average of
2000 frames in the system before leaving. A new agent has a deficit drawn uniformly
at random from the interval [0, 13]. Each agent needs to receive N = 10 packets to
decode the block, and there are T = 8 time slots in each frame. We wish to determine
the value function from the perspective of the cluster and from the perspective of
agent 1, using (2.6) and (2.8).
The following observation is useful to determine the allocations a∗ and a˜. It is
straightforward to find a∗, since it simply follows Algorithm 1. Now, consider a˜. It
is simple to see that it too would follow Phases 1 and 2 of Algorithm 1. Then, from
the perspective of agent 1, after the completion of these two phases, there are only
two classes of allocations–those in which he transmits and those in which he does
not. Now, since all the other agents that agent 1 comes in contact with in the future
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are drawn from [⊗ρM−1,⊗ζM−1], the allocation should follow a greedy minimization
with respect to the other agents. Thus, we only need consider two allocations while
conducting value iterations: min-deficit-first with agent 1 (identical to Phase 3 of
Algorithm 1) and min-deficit-first without agent 1 (just set aside agent 1 in Phase 3
of Algorithm 1).
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Deficit
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 F
re
qu
en
cy
Figure 2.4: Deficit distribution.
We first run the system according to Algorithm 1, and use the results to find
the empirical deficit distribution, denoted by R. This is identical to the Mean Field
deficit distribution. The empirical distribution of deficit R, is shown in Figure 2.4.
We find that deficit lies in the range 0− 13.
With η = 0.95, the (countable) deficit set is {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, ...}. With a deficit
range of 0 − 13, there are totally 260 potential values for deficit. For the number
of B2D chunks received e, we take values 3, 4 and 5 (uniformly). Therefore, there
are totally 2604 × 34 states in the system. Using R to represent the MF deficit
35
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
0
2
4
6
8
10 x 10
4
Iteration Round
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
s
State 1
State 2
State 3
Figure 2.5: Convergence of value iteration.
distribution, and a linear holding cost function, we run value iteration; we present
an example for a few states in Figure 2.5. We thus obtain the mean field value
functions.
The empirical distribution of the average discounted transfers over the lifetime of
each device is shown in Figure 2.6. The average transfer is 18039. We will discuss the
economic implications of this observation after describing the Android experiments
in the next section.
2.9 Android Implementation
We now describe experiments on an Android testbed using a cluster size of four
Google Nexus 7 tablets. We modified the kernel of Android v 4.3 to simultaneously
allow both WiFi and 3G interfaces to transmit and receive data.
Our system consists of a server application on a desktop that codes data and sends
it to the tablets over the Internet, an Android app that receives data over Internet on
a 3G interface and shares it over the WiFi interface, and a monitor that keeps track
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Figure 2.6: Transfer distribution.
of the state of the system and generates a trace of events. The server initializes each
tablet in the system with a randomly selected number of chunks. Additionally, churn
is emulated in the system by making the application on the tablet reset randomly
with a probability δ¯ = 5× 10−4 (i.e., δ = 0.9995).
We set the frame duration as 500 ms. Since we have δ = 0.9995, this means that
the average duration that a device spends in the system is 1000 seconds. We use an
MP3 music file as the data, and divide it into blocks, with the blocks being further
divided into chunks. Chunks are generated using an open source random linear
coding library [2], using field size 256 and 10 degrees of freedom per block. Hence,
a block is decodable with high probability if 10 chunks are received successfully.
Each chunk has an average size of 1500 Bytes, and has a header that contains the
frame number it corresponds to as well as its current deficit. The system maintains
synchronization by observing these frame numbers.
The allocation algorithm proceeds as suggested by Algorithm 1. We approximate
the three phases by setting back-off times for D2D access. Devices that cannot com-
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plete (i.e., Phase 1 devices) should be the most aggressive in D2D channel access. We
set them to randomly back-off between 1 and 5 ms before transmission. Devices that
can afford to transmit some number of chunks (Phase 2) should be less aggressive,
and transmit chunks by backing off between 1 and 15 ms. Finally, each device enters
Phase 3, and modulates its aggressiveness based on deficits. Each device normalizes
its deficit based on the values of deficits that it sees from all other transmissions, and
backsoff proportional to this deficit within the interval of 5 to 15 ms. The average
error in value due to a back-off based implementation is about 10− 15%.
We conducted experiments to determine the stable delivery ratio achieved using
D2D for different B2D initializations per frame. We present some sample deficit
trajectories in Figure 2.7. The random resets emulating peer churn are visible as
sharp changes in the deficit. We found that on average, B2D transfer of 4 chunks to
each device is sufficient to ensure a delivery ratio of over 0.95. Hence, it is easy to
achieve a 60% reduction in B2D usage, while maintaining a high QoE.
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Figure 2.7: Sample deficit trajectories. We have used δ = 0.98 in this run to illustrate
frequent resets, which cause sharp decreases or increases.
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2.10 System Viability
We saw in Section 2.8 that the average transfer to each agent is positive, meaning
that the agents need to obtain some kind of subsidy in order to use the system. What
kind of subsidy should they be given? The Android experiments indicate that each
agent is able to save 60% of the B2D costs when participating in the system. Would
this be sufficient?
The price of B2D service is currently $10 per GB across many US cellular
providers. Suppose that we consider music streaming at a rate of 250 kbps cor-
responding to our Android system. If each device uses only B2D communication (no
D2D at all), the cost of spending 1000 seconds in the sytem is 31.25 cents. The per
frame communication cost is 0.0156 cents, and we can consider this to be the value
of each frame to the agent.
The experiments in Section 2.9 indicate that the agents have to utilize their
B2D connection for at least 40% of the chunks to maintain the desired QoE. Hence,
the value that can potentially be received by participating in the D2D system is
0.6× 0.0156 = 0.00936 cents per frame. Let us assume a linear deficit cost function
that takes a value of 0.00936 cents at deficit value of 15. In other words, if the agent
were to experience a deficit of 15 or above in a frame, it gets no payoff from that
frame. Using this linear transformation, we can translate the average transfer of
18039 (the value found in Section 2.8) over the entire 1000 seconds into a total of
11.26 cents. Thus, if each agent saves at least 11.26 cents, it has an incentive to
participate in the D2D system. The actual saving is 0.6 ∗ 31.25 = 18.75 cents (60%
of the B2D costs) per agent, which is well above the minimum required saving.
The situation is still better for video streaming at a rate of 800 kbps. A similar
calculation indicates that a 16 minute video costs about $1 using pure B2D, while
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the B2D cost in the hybrid system is only 40 cents, yielding a savings of 60 cents
per agent. However, a saving of about 36 cents per agent is all that is needed to
incentivize them to participate.
In a full implementation, each agent would place an amount (eg. 36 cents for a
16 minute average lifetime) in escrow with the monitor upon connecting. Each agent
would receive transfers according to our mechanism, and, on average, would receive
its amount back from the monitor for its contributions. Hence, the system would
then be ex-ante budget balanced.
2.11 Conclusion
We studied the problem of providing incentives for cooperation in large scale
multi-agent systems, using wireless streaming networks as an example. The objec-
tive was to incentivize truth telling about individual user states so that a system wide
cost minimizing allocation can be used. We showed how a mean field approxima-
tion for large systems yields a low-complexity framework under which to design the
mechanism. Finally, we implemented the system on Android devices and presented
results illustrating its viability using the current price of cellular data access as the
basis for transfers.
40
3. ENERGY COUPON: A MEAN FIELD GAME PERSPECTIVE ON
DEMAND RESPONSE IN SMART GRIDS
3.1 Introduction
There has recently been much interest in understanding societal networks, con-
sisting of interconnected communication, transportation, energy and other networks
that are important to the functioning of human society. These systems usually have
a shared resource component, and participants have to periodically take decisions on
when and how much to utilize such resources. Research into these networks often
takes the form of behavioral studies on decision making by the participants, and
whether it is possible to provide incentives to modify their behavior in such a way
that the society as a whole benefits [72, 78].
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Figure 3.1: Day-ahead electricity market prices in dollars per MWh on an hourly
basis between 12 AM to 12 PM, measured between June–August, 2013 in Austin,
TX. Standard deviations above and below the mean are indicated separately.
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Our candidate application in this section is that of a Load Serving Entity (LSE)
or a Load Aggregator (LA) (e.g., a utility company) trying to reduce its exposure to
daily electricity market volatility by incentivizing demand response in a Smart Grid
setting. The reason for our choice is the ready availability of data and reliable models
for the cost and payoff structure that enables a realistic study. For instance, consider
Figure 3.1, which shows the (wholesale) price of electricity at different hours of day
during the summer months in Texas. The data was obtained from the Electric Reli-
ability Council of Texas [1], an organization that manages the deregulated wholesale
energy market in the state. The price shows considerable variation during the day,
and peaks at about 5 PM, which is the time at which maximum demand occurs. A
major source of this demand in Texas is air conditioning, which in each home is of
the order of 30 kWh per day by [3]. Incentivizing customers to move a few kWh of
peak-time usage to the sides of the peak each day could lead to much reduced risks
of peak price borne by the LSE. When coupled with a reduction in energy usage,
such demand shaping could also have a positive effect on environmental impact of
power plant emissions.
As an example, we take the baseline temperature setpoint as 22.5◦C, and consider
a customer that every day increases the setpoint by 1◦C in 5− 6 PM and decreases
the setpoint by 0.5◦C in the off-peak times. We will see later that even such a
small change of the setpoint of AC can yield substantial savings of the order of a
hundred dollars per week to the LSE when conducted over a group of fifty homes.
This result is under the implicit assumption that the LSE in question is a price-taker
so that changes in its demand profile are assumed not to perturb the prices. The
shifting of daily energy usage could potentially cause a small increase in the mean
and deviation of the internal home temperature, which is a discomfort cost borne
by the customer. In our system (an actual system that we are currently developing,
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and using which we intend to conduct user trials soon), the LSE awards a number of
“Energy Coupons” to the customer in proportion to his usage at the non-peak times,
and these coupons are used as tickets at a lottery conducted by the LSE. A higher
number of coupons would be obtained by choosing an option that potentially entails
more discomfort, and would also imply a higher probability of winning at the lottery.
Since the customers do not observe the impact of day-ahead prices on a day-to-day
basis nor do they see the aggregate demand at the LSE, the lottery scheme serves as
a mechanism to transfer some of this information over to the customers by coupling
them.
In our analytical model, each agent has a set of actions that it can take in each
play of a repeated game, with each action having a corresponding cost. Higher
cost actions yield a higher number of coupons. At the end of each play, the agents
participate in a lottery in which they are randomly permuted into groups, and one
or more prizes are given in each group. The state of each agent is measured using
his surplus, which captures the history of plays experienced by the agent, and is
a proxy to capture his interest in participating in the incentive system. Each win
at the lottery increases the surplus, and each loss decreases it. Furthermore, we
assume that the agent has a prospect utility function that is increasing and concave
for positive surplus and convex for negative surplus. This prospect theory model
captures the decision making under risk and uncertainty for agents. Any agent could
depart from the system with a fixed probability, and a departing agent is replaced
by a new entrant with a randomly drawn surplus. The question we answer in this
section then is how would agents decide on what action to take at each play?
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3.1.1 Prospect Theory
Most previous studies account for uncertainty in agent payoffs by means of the
expected utility theory (EUT). Under EUT, the objective of the decision maker is to
maximize the probabilistically weighted average utilities under different outcomes.
However, EUT does not incorporate observed behavior of human agents, who can
take decisions deviating from this conventional norm. For example, empirical stud-
ies have shown that agents ascribe higher weights to rare, positive events (such as
winning at a lottery) [50].
Prospect theory (PT) [50, 51, 87, 88] is perhaps the most well-known alternative
theory to EUT. It was originally developed for binary lotteries [50] and later refined
to deal with issues related to multiple outcomes and valuations [88]. This Nobel-
prize-in-economics-winning theory has been observed to provide a more accurate
description of decision making under risk and uncertainty than EUT. There are
three key characteristics of PT. First, the value function is concave for gains, convex
for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. This feature is due to the observation
that most decision makers prefer avoiding losses to achieving gains. Thus, the value
function is usually S-shaped. Second, a nonlinear transformation of the probability
scale is in effect, i.e., decision makers will overweight low probability events and
underweight high probability events. The weighting function usually has an inverted
S-shape, i.e., it is steepest near endpoints and shallower in the middle of the range,
which captures the behaviors related to risk seeking and risk aversion. Finally the
third, the framing effect is accounted for, i.e., the decision maker takes into account
the relative gains or losses with respect to a reference point rather than the final asset
position. As PT fits better in reality than EUT based on many empirical studies, it
has been widely used in many contexts such as social sciences [32,39], communication
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networks [24, 65, 92] and smart grids [90, 91]. Since we study equilibria that arise
through agents’ repeated play in lotteries, we use prospect theory as opposed to
expected utility theory to account for agent-perceived value while taking decisions.
3.1.2 Mean Field Games
The problem described is an example of a dynamic Bayesian game with incom-
plete information, wherein each player has to estimate the actions of all his potential
opponents in the current lottery (and in the future) without knowing their surpluses,
play a best response, and update his beliefs about their states of surplus based on
the outcome of the lottery. However, since the set of agents is large and, from the
perspective of each agent, each lottery is conducted with a randomly drawn finite set
of opponents, an accurate approximation for any agent is to assume that the states of
his opponents (and hence actions) are independent of each other. This is the setting
of a Mean Field Game (MFG) [44,49,58], which we will use as a framework to study
equilibria in societal networks. Here, the system is viewed from the perspective of
a single agent, who assumes that each opponent’s action would be drawn indepen-
dently from an assumed distribution, and plays a best response action. We say that
the system is at a Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE) if this best response action turns
out to be a sample drawn from the assumed distribution. We will use such a MFG
model to model dynamics in societal networks.
In our analysis, we can prove that regardless of the exact form of the utility
function, a MFE exists in our system. In our numerical study, we use the prospect
utility function for study, we can observe further properties of the value function
based on this special utility function.
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3.1.3 Demand Response in Deregulated Markets
Demand Response is the term used to refer to the idea of customers being incen-
tivized in some manner to change their normal electricity usage patterns in response
to peaks in the wholesale price of electric power [5]. Many methods of achieving
demand response exist, including an extreme one of turning off power for short in-
tervals to customers a few times a year if the price is very high. In any method of
achieving demand response, customers expect a subsidy in return, often in terms of
a reduced electricity bill.
The idea is particularly relevant in deregulated electricity markets that exist in
several US states, such as in Texas, wherein the firm that serves customer demand
might have no infrastructure of its own, and merely buys on the wholesale market
and sells to the home consumer. Customers have a choice between many different
LSEs that they can obtain service from. For instance, many urban neighborhoods
in Texas are served by 5 − 10 LSEs and customers can periodically choose to sign
contracts of 1, 6 and 12 months with them.
3.1.4 Main Results
Our objective in this section is to design a system that would incentivize the
convergence of user action profiles to one that would result in large savings to the
LSE. Our contributions in this section towards such an objective are as follows:
1. We propose a mean field model to capture the dynamics in societal networks.
Our model is well suited to large scale systems in which any given subset of
agents interact only rarely. This kind of system satisfies a chaos hypothesis
that enables us to use the mean field approximation to accurately model agent
interactions. The state of the mean field agent is his surplus, which forms a
Markov process that increases by winning and decreases by losing at the lottery.
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Our mean field model of societal networks is quite general, and can be applied
to different incentive schemes that are currently being proposed in the field of
public transportation and communication network usage.
2. We develop a characterization of a lottery in which multiple rewards can be
distributed, but with each participant getting at most one by withdrawing the
winner in each round. Each lottery is played amongst a cluster of M agents
drawn from a random permutation of the set of all agents. While the exact
form of the lottery is not critical to our results, we present it for completeness.
3. We characterize the best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dy-
namic programming formulation. We find that under our assumptions the
value function is continuous in the action distribution. Further, we show us-
ing this result that given our ordering in which higher cost actions result in a
higher probability of winning the lottery (due to more coupons being given),
the choice of one action versus another depends on thresholds in the surplus,
i.e., we obtain a threshold policy for the action choices.
4. The probability of winning the lottery defines the transition kernel (along with
the regeneration distribution) of the Markov process of the surplus, and hence
maps an assumed distribution across competitors states to a resultant station-
ary distribution. We show the existence of a fixed point of this kernel, which is
the MFE, by using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Our proof of the existence
of MFE doesn’t depend on the shape of the utility function, which is quite
general. Since we have a discrete action and state space, showing a fixed point
in the space of stationary distributions is quite intricate.
5. We develop an accurate model of the daily usage of electricity in each hour,
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using available measurements over several months in Texas. We also use the
data on wholesale electricity prices during the interval to calculate what times
of day would yield the best returns to rewards. We show that if customers
are willing to change the setpoints of AC as small as 1◦C each day then each
week the LSE gains a benefit of the order of a $100 over a cluster of 50 homes.
Further, we show that such behavior can be incentivized by offering a weekly
prize of $40 at the lottery.
3.1.5 Related Work
In terms of the mean field game, our framework is based on work such as [46,60,
62,69]. In [46] the setting is that of advertisers bidding for spots on a webpage, and
the focus is on learning the value of winning (making a sale though the advertisement)
as time proceeds. In [69], apps on smart phones bid for service from a cellular base
station, and the goal is to ensure that the service regime that results has low per-
packet delays. In both works, the existence of an MFE with desired properties is
proved. In [60,62], even though the state-space and deficit dynamics are similar, the
reward structure is determined using a resource allocation problem necessitating a
different proof technique and the exploration of truthful dynamic mechanisms.
Nudge systems are typically designed and used to encourage socially beneficial
behaviors and individually beneficial behaviors. For instance, lottery schemes are
widely used in practice to incentivize good behavior, e.g., to combat (sales) tax
evasion in Brazil [76], Portugal [77], Taiwan [22], and for Internet congestion man-
agement [67]. Similarly, [72, 78] provide experimental results on designing lottery
based “nudge engines” to provide incentives to participants to modify their behav-
iors in the context of evenly distributing load on public transportation. In another
scheme, [6] study the impact of nudging on social welfare by sending one-year home
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energy reports to participants and using multiple price lists to determine participants’
willingness to stay in the system for the next year. Our system is a form of nudge
engine, but our focus is on analytical characterization of system behavior and at-
tained equilibria with large number of customers with repeated decision-making. We
aim to design incentive schemes to modify customer behavior such that the system
as the whole benefits from the attained equilibrium.
Our idea of offering coupons for electricity usage at certain times of day is based
on one presented in [94], which suggests offering such incentives to coincide with
the predicted realtime price peaks. An experimental trial based on a similar idea is
described in [15], in which the focus is on designing algorithms to coordinate demand
flexibility to enable the full utilization of variable renewable generation. In [38], this
kind of system is modeled as a Stackelberg game with two stages: setting the coupon
values followed by consumer choice. The decision making model in all the above
research is myopic. [83] study demand-response as trading off the cost of an action
(such as modifying energy usage) against the probability of winning at a lottery in
terms of a mean field game. However, the game is played in a single step according
to their model, and there is no evolution of state or dynamics based on repeated play.
Further, their conception of the mean field equilibrium is that the mean value of the
action distribution (not the distribution itself) is invariant. Unlike these models, we
are interested in characterizing repeated consumer choice with state evolution when
the number of customers is large, and identifying the action distribution and benefits
(if any) of the resulting equilibrium.
A rich literature studies lottery schemes, and here we can only hope to cover
a fraction of them that we see most relevant. In this section, we model lotteries
as choosing a random permutation of the M agents participating in it, and picking
the first K of them as winners, with the distribution on the symmetric group of
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permutations of {1, · · · ,M} being a function of the coupons assigned to the different
actions. Assuming that different actions yield different numbers of coupons, we will
choose the distribution such that more coupons results in a higher probability of
winning. There are various probabilistic models on permutations in the ranking
literature [68,81], Here we use the popular Plackett-Luce model [45] to implement our
lotteries. While the Plackett-Luce model is used for concreteness, other probabilistic
models on permutations such as the Thurstone model [68] can also be used with the
number of coupons as parameters of the distribution as long as more coupons results
in a higher probability of winning.
3.1.6 Organization
This section is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce our mean field
model. In Section 3.3 we develop a characterization of a lottery in which multiple
rewards can be distributed, but with each participant getting at most one by with-
drawing the winner in each round. We discuss the basic property of the optimal
value function in Section 3.4. The existence of MFE is considered in Section 3.5.
We characterize the best response policy of the mean field agent, using a dynamic
programming formulation in Section 3.6. We then conduct numerical studies in
Section 3.7, on utilizing our framework to the context of electricity markets. We
conclude in Section 3.8. To ease exposition of our results, all proofs are relegated to
the Appendix B.
3.2 Mean Field Model
We consider a general model of a societal network in which the number of agents
is large. Agents have a discrete set of actions available to them, and must take one of
these actions at each discrete time instant. The actions result in the agents receiving
coupons, with higher cost actions resulting in more coupons. The agents are then
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randomly permuted into clusters of size M and a lottery is held using the coupons to
win real rewards. Thus, agents must take their actions under some belief about the
likely actions, and hence the likely coupons held by their competitors in the auctions.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the mean field approximation of our model, which is an
accurate representation of the Bayesian system when the number of agents is large
[36,46]. The diagram is drawn from the perspective of a single agent (w.l.o.g, let this
be agent 1), who assumes that the actions played by each of his opponents would
be drawn independently of each other from the probability mass function ρ. In this
section, we will introduce the notation, costs and payoffs of the agent, and provide
a brief description of the policy space and equilibrium.
Figure 3.2: Mean field game.
Time: Time is discrete and indexed by k ∈ {0, 1, · · · }.
Agents: As discussed above, the total number of agents is infinite, and in the
MFG, we consider a generic agent 1 who in each lottery will be paired with M − 1
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other agents drawn randomly from the infinite population.
Actions: We suppose that each agent has the same action space denoted as
A = {1, 2, · · · , |A|}. Hence, the action that this agent takes at time k is a[k] ∈ A.
Under the mean field assumption, the actions of the other agents would be drawn
independently from the p.m.f. ρ = [b1, b2, · · · , b|A|], where ba is the probability mass
associated with action a. We call ρ as the assumed action distribution.
Costs: Each action a ∈ A taken at time k has a corresponding cost θa. This cost
is fixed and represents the discomfort suffered by the agent in having to take that
action.
Coupons: When agent takes an action a, it is awarded some fixed number of
coupons ra for playing that action. These coupons are then used by the agents as
lottery tickets.
Lottery: We suppose that there are only K rewards for agents in one cluster,
where K is a fixed number less than M . The probability of winning is based on the
number of coupons that each agent possesses. We model each lottery as choosing a
permutation of the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K of them as
winners.
States: The agent keeps track of his history of wins and losses in the lotteries
by means of his net surplus at time k, denoted x[k]. The value of surplus is the state
of the agent, and is updated in a Markovian fashion as follows:
x[k + 1] =

x[k] + w, if agent 1 wins the lottery
x[k]− l, if agent 1 loses the lottery
(3.1)
where w and l is the impact of winning or losing on surplus. Effectively, the as-
sumption is that the agent expects to win at least an amount l at each lottery. Not
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receiving this amount would decrease his surplus. Similarly, if the prize money at
the lottery is w + l, the increase in surplus due to winning is w. Surplus values are
discrete, and the set of possible values is given by a countable X, that ranges from
(−∞,+∞).
Value function for prospect: The impact of surplus on the agent’s happiness
is modeled by an S-shaped utility function u(x[k]), which is monotone increasing,
concave for a positive surplus and convex for a negative surplus. Moreover, the
impact of loss is usually larger than that of gain of the same absolute value. Following
[88], we use the value function for prospect
u(x) =

u+(x) = xγ, x ≥ 0
u−(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ, x < 0,
(3.2)
where ϕ > 1 is the loss penalty parameter and 0 < γ < 1 is the risk aversion
parameter. A larger ϕ means that the operator is more loss averse, while a smaller
γ (i.e., the value function is more concave) indicates that the operator is more risk
seeking. From past empirical studies [51, 88], realistic values are ϕ = 2.25 and
γ = 0.88.
Weighting function for prospect: In earlier studies [79], it has been observed
that people tend to subjectively weight uncertain outcomes in real-life decision mak-
ing. In the proposed game, this weighting factors capture the agent’s subjective
evaluation on the mixed strategy of its opponents. Thus, under PT, instead of ob-
jectively observing the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a, each user perceives a
weighted version of it, φ(pρ,a). Here, φ(·) is a nonlinear transformation that maps
the objective probability to a subjective one, which is monotonic increasing in prob-
ability. It has been shown in many PT studies that, people usually overweight low
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probability outcomes and underweight high probability outcomes. Following [79], we
use the weighting function
φ(p) = exp(−(− ln p)ξ), for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 (3.3)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the objective weight that characterizes the distortion between
subjective and objective probability. Note that under the extreme case of ξ = 1, (3.3)
reduces to the conventional EUT probability, i.e., φ(p) = p.
Regeneration: We assume that an agent may choose to quit the system at any
time. This event occurs with probability 1−β, where β ∈ (0, 1). When this happens,
a new agent takes the place of the old one, and his state is drawn from a probability
mass function Ψ.
Best Response Policy: The agent must choose an action at each time; we
including staying with the status-quo/baseline as an action too. The green/light tiles
in Figure 3.2 relate to the problem of the agent determining his best response policy.
The agent assumes that the actions taken by each of his M − 1 opponents are drawn
independently from probability mass function ρ. Given this assumption, the state of
his surplus is x and current utility is u(x), the agent must calculate the probability
of winning at the lottery pρ,a(x), if he were to take action a(x) ∈ A, incurring a cost
θa(x) and gaining ra(x) coupons. Since the agent must take this decision repeatedly, he
must solve a dynamic program to determine his optimal policy. There could be many
best response actions, and we assume that the agent chooses a randomized policy
σ(x) , [σ1(x), σ2(x), · · · , σa(x), · · · , σ|A|(x)], in which σa(x) specifies the probability
of playing action a when the agent’s surplus is x. The action taken by the agent is
a random variable A ∼ σ(x). The details of the lottery and how to calculate the
probability of success are given in Section 3.3. The properties of the best response
54
policy are described in detail in Section 3.6.
Stationary Surplus Distribution: The assumed action distribution ρ, and the
best-response randomized policy σ(x) yield the state transition kernel of the Markov
chain corresponding to the surplus, via the probability of winning the lottery pρ,a(x).
This is illustrated by means of the blue/dark tiles in Figure 3.2. The transition kernel
also is influenced by the regeneration distribution Ψ. The stationary distribution
of surplus associated with the transition kernel is denoted as ζρ. This stationary
distribution of the single mean field agent is equivalent to the one-step empirical state
distribution of infinite agents who all assume that the actions of their competitors
would be drawn from ρ.
Mean Field Equilibrium: The triple of an assumed action distribution ρ,
randomized policy σ and stationary surplus distribution ζ gets mapped into a triple
of action distribution ρ˜, best-response randomized policy σ˜ and a stationary surplus
distribution ζ˜ via the operations described above. A fixed point of the resulting map
is called an MFE. For a formal definition and details of the proof of existence see
Section 3.5.
3.3 Lottery Scheme
We first construct the lottery scheme that will be used in our mean field game.
We permute all the agents into clusters, where there are exactly M agents in each
cluster, and conduct a lottery in each such cluster. Suppose there are K rewards for
all agents in one cluster, where K is a fixed number less than M . When an agent
takes an action, he/she will receive the credit (number of coupons) associated with
that action. Then the probability of winning is based on the number of coupons
that each agent possesses. We will model the lotteries as choosing a permutation of
the M agents participating in it, and picking the first K of them as winners. Then
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different lottery schemes can be interpreted as choosing different distributions on the
symmetric group of permutations on M . In particular, we will use ideas from the
Plackett-Luce model to implement our lotteries.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the actions are ordered in decreasing
order of the costs so that θ1 ≥ · · · ≥ θA. In order to incentivize agents to take the
more costly actions we will insist that the vector of coupons obtained for each action
is also in decreasing order of the index, i.e., r1 ≥ · · · ≥ rA.
The specific lottery procedure we consider is the following: for every agent m that
takes action a[m] and receives coupons ra[m] > 0, we choose an exponential random
variable with mean 1/ra[m] and then pick the first K agents in increasing order of the
realizations of the exponentials. Note the abuse of notation only in this section to
use a[m] to refer to the action of agent m. Since we consider only one lottery, we do
not consider time k. Let the agent m = 1, . . . ,M receive ra[m] number of coupons.
The set of winners is a permutation over the agent indices, and we denote such a
permutation by σ = [σ1, σ2, · · · σM ]. We then have the probability of the permutation
σ given by
P(σ|ra[1], . . . , ra[M ]) =
M−1∏
n=1
ra[σn]∑M
j=n ra[σj ]
. (3.4)
Essentially, after each agent is chosen as a winner, he is removed and the next lottery
is conducted just as before but with fewer agents.
We now analyze the probability of winning in our lottery. For analysis under
the mean field assumption, it suffices to consider agent 1 with the coupons it gets
by taking action a being denoted as ra[1]. Let M := {2, . . . ,M}, which is the set
of opponents of agent 1. For these agents, suppose there are υn agents that choose
action n, where
∑
n∈A υn = M − 1. We denote the vector of these actions by
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~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA).
The conditional probability of agent 1 failing to obtain a reward is given by
pL1,~υ =
∑
κ1∈M1
· · ·
∑
κK∈MK
∏K
l=1 ra[κl]∏K
l=1(ra[1] +
∑
m∈Ml ra[m])
,
where L refers to the fact that agent 1 “loses,” M1 = M, and for l ≥ 2 we have
Ml = Ml−1 \ {κl−1}. Essentially, the above looks at the lottery process round by
round, and is a summation of the probabilities of all permutations in which agent 1
does not appear in the first spot in any round.
The above expression considerably simplifies if the summations are instead taken
over the actions κ˜l that the lottery winner κl at round l ∈ {1, . . . , K} can take. Note
that we assume that we can distinguish the actions based on the number of coupons
given out. If this were not true, then we could further simplify the expression by
summing over the coupon space. Given a coupon/action profile ~υ, let J (~υ) denote
the actions that have non-zero entries. Additionally, by ~υ − ~1κ˜ for κ˜ ∈ J (~υ) denote
the resulting coupon profile obtained by removing one entry at location κ˜, and by r~υ
the sum of all the coupons in profile ~υ, i.e.,
∑
κ˜∈J (~υ) rκ˜υκ˜. Then
pL1,~υ =
∑
κ˜1∈J (~υ1)
· · ·
∑
κ˜K∈J (~υK)
∏K
l=1 υ
l
κ˜l
rκ˜l∏K
l=1(ra[1] + r~υl)
, (3.5)
where ~υ1 = ~υ, for l = 2, . . . , K, ~υl = ~υl−1 − ~1κ˜l and υlκ˜ is the number of entries at
location κ˜ for coupon profile ~υl. Note that pL1,~υ is a decreasing function of ra[1] for
every ~υ. Therefore, agent 1 comparing two actions i and j that have r1,i > r1,j will
find pL1,~υ(i) < p
L
1,~υ(j) for all ~υ. Also by taking the limit of ra[1] going to 0, having an
action with 0 coupons results in a loss probability of 1 for every ~υ.
To determine the probability of winning in the lottery we need to account for
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the fact that the actions of the opponents are drawn from the distribution ρ (under
the mean field assumption). Hence, the probability of obtaining the coupon pro-
file (equivalently action profile) of the opponents ~υ = (υ1, . . . , υA) is given by the
multinomial formula, i.e.,
Pρ(~υ) =
(M − 1)!∏i∈A bυii∏
i∈A υi!
. (3.6)
Using (3.5) and (3.6), we obtain the winning probability for the mean field agent
1 when taking action a as
pρ,a = 1−
∑
~υ:|J (~υ)|=M−1
pL1,~υPρ(~υ). (3.7)
By lower bounding each term in the conditional probability of not obtaining a reward
we get pρ,a ≤ 1− M−KM ( rAr1 )K =: pW ∈ (0, 1). If we ran the lottery without removing
the winners (and any of their coupons), we obtain a lower bound on the probability
of winning that has a simpler expression. Using this simpler expression we can obtain
the lower bound pρ,1 ≥ 1− (1− rArA+(M−1)r1 )K =: pW ∈ (0, 1). Note that both bounds
are independent of ρ. If we allow an action that yields 0 coupons, then the above
bounds become trivial with pW = 1 and pW = 0.
An important feature of our lottery scheme is that the probability of winning
increases with the number of coupons given out. For simplicity we assumed a fixed
reward for any win. However, we can extend the lotteries to ones where different
rewards are given out at different stages, and also where the rewards are dependent
on the number of coupons of the winner. For the latter, we will insist on the rewards
being an increasing function of the number of coupons of the winner. Finally, we can
also extend to scenarios where we choose the number of stages K is an (exogenous)
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random fashion in {1, . . . ,M − 1}. Since the analysis carries through unchanged
except with more onerous notation, we only discuss the simplest setting.
3.4 Optimal Value Function
As discussed in Section 3.2, the mean field agent must determine the optimal
action to take, given his surplus x and the assumed action distribution ρ. We follow
the usual quasi-linear combination of prospect function and cost consistent with Von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and under which the impact of winning or
losing at a lottery is on the surplus of the agent (and not simply a one-step myopic
value change). Thus, the dynamic program that the agent in prospect theory needs
to solve is
Vρ(x) = max
a(x)∈A
{u(x)− θa(x) + β[φ(pρ,a(x))V (x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x))V (x− l)]}.
(3.8)
Note that pρ,a(x) is a result of a lottery that we described in detail in Section 3.3,
and φ(·) is the weighting function, which overweights small probabilities (win the
lottery) and underweights moderate an high probabilities (loss the lottery). Here we
use the weighting function defined in (3.3).
First, we need to define a set of functions as
Φ =
{
f : X→ R : sup
x∈X
∣∣∣∣ f(x)Ω(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞} ,
where Ω(x) = max{|u(x)|, 1}. Note that Φ is a Banach space with Ω−norm,
||f ||Ω = sup
x∈X
∣∣∣∣ f(x)Ω(x)
∣∣∣∣ <∞.
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Also define the Bellman operator Tρ as
Tρf(x) = max
a(x)∈A
{u(x)− θa(x) +β[φ(pρ,a(x))f(x+w),+φ(1−pρ,a(x))f(x− l)]}, (3.9)
where f ∈ Φ.
We now show that the optimal value function Vρ(x) exists and it is continuous in
ρ.
Lemma 7 1) There exists a unique f ∗ ∈ Φ, such that Tρf ∗(x) = f ∗(x) for every
x ∈ X, and given x ∈ X, for every f ∈ Φ, we have T nρ f(x)→ f ∗(x), as n→∞.
2) The fixed point f ∗ of operator Tρ is the unique solution of Equation (3.8), i.e.
f ∗ = V ∗ρ .
Lemma 8 The value function Vρ(·) is Lipschitz continuous in ρ.
3.4.1 Stationary Distributions
For a generic agent, w.l.o.g., say agent 1, we consider the state process {x1[k]}∞k=0.
It’s a Markov chain with countable state-space X, and it has an invariant transition
kernel given by a combination of the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus x for
any a(x) ∈ A, and the lottery scheme from Section 3.3. By following this Markov
policy, we get a process {W [k]}∞k=0 that takes values in {win, lose} with probability
pρ,a(x) for the win, drawn conditionally independent of the past (given x1[k]). Then
the transition kernel conditioned on W [k] is given by
P(x1[k] ∈ B|x1[k − 1] = x,W [k]) = β1{x+w1{W [k]=win}−l1{W [k]=lose}∈B} + (1− β)Ψ(B),
(3.10)
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where B ⊂ X and Ψ is the probability measure of the regeneration process for surplus.
The unconditioned transition kernel is then
P(x1[k] ∈ B|x1[k − 1] = x) = β
∑
a(x)∈A
σa(x)pρ,a(x)1x+w∈B
+ β
(
1−
∑
a(x)∈A
σa(x)pρ,a(x)
)
1x−l∈B + (1− β)Ψ(B).
(3.11)
Lemma 9 The Markov chain where the action policy is determined by σ(x) based on
the states of the users and the transition probabilities in (3.11) is positive recurrent
and has a unique stationary surplus distribution. We denote the unique stationary
surplus distribution as ζρ×σ. Let ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) be the surplus distribution at time k
induced by the transition kernel (3.11) conditioned on the event that X[0] = x and
there is no regeneration until time k. ζρ×σ(·) and ζ(k)ρ×σ(·) are related as follows:
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βk
∫
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x)dΨ(x).
(3.12)
Thus ζρ×σ(B) in terms of ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x) is simply based on the properties of the con-
ditional expectation. And note that in EΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
, the random variable X is
the initial condition of the surplus, generated by Ψ. For x ∈ X, the only possible
one-step updates are the increase of the surplus to x+ w or a decrease to x− l, i.e.
B = {x+ w, x− l}.
3.5 Mean Field Equilibrium
The action distribution ρ is a probability mass function on the action set A: let bi
be the probability of choosing action i. Note that ρ lives in the probability simplex
on R|A|, which is compact and convex, denote it as Γρ. Let ζ be the stationary
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surplus distribution and the set of all such possible surplus distributions is denoted
as Γζ , which is compact and convex. For a given surplus x, let σ(x) be the action
distribution at x. Denote Γσ as the set of all possible distributions over the action
space for each x, which is compact and convex. We further assume that ρ ∈ Γρ,
ζ ∈ Γρ and σ(x) ∈ Γσ for each x.
Definition 3 Consider the action distribution ρ, the randomized policy σ and the
stationary surplus distribution ζρ: (i), Given the action distribution ρ, determine the
success probabilities in the lottery scheme using (3.7) and then compute the value
function in (3.8). Taking the best response given by (3.8) results in an action distri-
bution σ˜; (ii), Given action distribution ρ, following the randomized policy σ yields
transition kernels for the surplus Markov chain and stationary surplus distribution
ζ˜ρ, (with each transition kernel having a unique stationary distribution); and (iii),
Given the stationary surplus distribution ζρ, applying the randomized policy σ(x) at
each surplus x yields the distribution of actions ρ˜. Define the best response mapping
Π∗ that maps Γρ ⊗ Γ|X|σ ⊗ Γζ into itself. Then we say that the assumed action dis-
tribution ρ, randomized policy σ and stationary surplus distribution ζρ constitute a
mean field equilibrium (MFE) if Π∗ : ρ⊗ σ⊗ ζρ 7→ ρ˜⊗ σ˜⊗ ζ˜ρ has (ρ, σ, ζρ) as a fixed
point.
3.5.1 Existence of MFE
Theorem 8 There exists an MFE of ρ, the randomized policy σ(x) at each surplus
x and ζ, such that ρ ∈ Γρ, σ(x) ∈ Γσ and ζ ∈ Γζ, ∀a ∈ A and ∀x ∈ X.
We will be specializing to the spaces Γρ,Γσ,Γζ and define the topologies being
used in the following proofs first.
1. For the assumed action distribution ρ ∈ Γρ on the finite set A, all norms are
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equivalent, we will consider the topology of uniform convergence, i.e., using the
l∞ norm given by ||ρ|| = maxa∈A ρ(a).
2. For the randomized policy σ ∈ Γ|X|σ , we enumerate the elements in X as
1, 2, · · · , and consider the topology with norm ||σ|| = ∑∞j=1 2−j|σ(xj)|, where
|σ(x)| = maxa∈A σ(x, a). We consider any sequence {σn}∞n=1 converges to σ in
this topology space.
3. For the surplus distribution ζ on the countable set X, we consider the topology
of pointwise convergence.
Note that from the definition of Γρ, Γσ and Γζ , they are already non-empty,
convex and compact. Furthermore, they are jointly convex. Then in order to show
that the mapping Π∗ satisfies the conditions of Kakutani fixed point theorem, we
only need to verify the following three lemmas.
Lemma 10 Given ρ, by taking the best response given by (3.8), we can obtain the
action distribution σ(x) for every x, which is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Lemma 11 Given ρ and σ(x), there exists a unique stationary surplus distribution
ζ(x), which is continuous in ρ and σ(x).
Lemma 12 Given ζ(x) and σ(x), there exists a stationary action distribution ρ,
which is continuous in ζ(x) and σ(x).
3.6 Characteristics of the Best Response Policy
In this section, we characterize the best response policy under the assumption
that Vρ in (3.8) has some properties. Then we discuss the relations between the
utility function u(x) and the optimal value function Vρ.
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3.6.1 Existence of Threshold Policy
We assume that given the action distribution ρ, Vρ(x) is increasing and submod-
ular in x when x ≤ −l; increasing and linear in x when −l ≤ x ≤ w; and increasing
and supermodular in x, when x ≥ w.
In Section 3.3, our lotteries will be constructed such that the probability of win-
ning monotonically increases with the cost of the action. This when combined with
the monotonicity, submodularity (decreasing differences) for positive argument and
supermodularlity (increasing differences) for negative argument of Vρ yields the fol-
lowing characterization of the best response policy.
Lemma 13 For any two action, say actions a1 and a2, suppose that θa1 > θa2, so
that pρ,a1 > pρ,a2, i.e., φ(pρ,a1) > φ(pρ,a2), then there is a threshold value of the
surplus queue for user such that preference order for the actions changes from one
side of the threshold to the other.
Similarly, if we simply assume that Vρ(x) is increasing and submodular in x ∈
(−∞,∞), or increasing and supermodular in x ∈ (−∞,∞), it will also yield the
existence of threshold policy.
3.6.2 Relations Between Utility Function u(x) and the Optimal Value Function Vρ
3.6.2.1 S-shaped Prospect Utility Function
Consider the S-shaped prospect utility function u(x), which satisfied the following
conditions: (i) u(x) is a concave increasing function of x when x ≥ w; (ii) u(x) is a
linear increasing function of x when −l ≤ x ≤ w; (iii) u(x) is a convex increasing
function of x when x ≤ −l; and (iv) u(x) is continuous on (−∞,∞).
From (3.9), it’s clear that the Bellman operator will take concave functions into
concave functions. Since the limit of any sequences of functions is the value function,
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all we need to prove is that the limit of a sequence of concave functions must be
concave because we start from our iterations with a concave function, but note that
our concave functions are defined by a weak inequality. Thus the set defining it must
be closed, so the value function is concave. However, in our case, that set is not a
closed set given x ≥ −l. It’s only closed for x ≥ 0.
Therefore, we cannot prove theoretically that Vρ(·) is increasing, convex in
(−∞,−l], linear in [−l, w] and concave in [w,∞), but intuitively Vρ(·) should also be
convex, linear and then concave as x increases from −∞ to ∞. Indeed, we observed
this property from the numerical studies in Section 3.7.
In other words, we conjecture that the optimal value function is supermodular,
linear and then submodular as x increases from−∞ to∞, which will yield an optimal
threshold policy.
3.6.2.2 Concave/Convex Utility Function
Now if we simply assume that the utility function u(x) is concave/convex and
monotone increasing in x, then we can obtain the following useful properties of the
optimal value functions, which we can use to characterize the optimal threshold
policy.
Next, we show that the value function Vρ(x) is increasing, submodular (i.e., de-
creasing differences) in x if u(x) is concave in x, and increasing, supermodular (i.e.,
increasing differences) in x if u(x) is convex in x.
Lemma 14 Given the distribution of action ρ, Vρ(x) is an increasing and submod-
ular function of x if u(x) is a concave function of x, supermodular function of x if
u(x) is a convex function of x.
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3.7 Numerical Study
We first conduct an empirical data-based simulation in the context of electricity
usage for home air conditioning to illustrate the performance our system. Besides
the data on electricity prices available from [1], we also used a data set from [3]
containing the ambient temperature over June–August, 2013, as well as customer
electricity usage with a 15 minute resolution for 40 homes in Austin, TX. The data-
set differentiates between air conditioning and other energy consumption, and hence
is a good resource to validate usage models. Our first step is to model the usage
of electricity for air conditioning by an average home in Texas over the course of
a day. While we present the case of homogeneous homes that all have identical
parameters and an identical baseline, it is straightforward to extend our results to
the case where there are a finite set of classes of homes, and the participating homes
are drawn randomly from these classes.
3.7.1 Home Model
A standard continuous time model [17, 37] for describing the evolution of the
internal temperature τ(t) at time t of an air conditioned home is
τ˙(t) =

− 1
RC
(τ(t)− τa)− η
C
Pm, if q(t) = 1,
− 1
RC
(τ(t)− τa), if q(t) = 0.
(3.13)
Here, τa is the ambient temperature (of the external environment), R is the thermal
resistance of the home, C is the thermal capacitance of the home, η is the efficiency,
and Pm is the rated electrical power of the AC unit. The state of the AC is described
by the binary signal q(t), where q(t) = 1 means AC is in the ON state at time t
and in the OFF state if q(t) = 0. The state is determined by the crossings of user
66
specified temperature thresholds as follows:
lim
→0
q(t+ ) =

q(t), |τ(t)− τr| < ∆,
1, τ(t) > τr + ∆,
0, τ(t) < τr −∆,
(3.14)
where τr is the temperature setpoint and ∆ is the temperature deadband.
Table 3.1: Parameters for a residential AC unit
Parameter Value
C, Thermal Capacitance 10 kWh/◦C
R, Thermal Resistance 2 ◦C/kW
Pm, Rated Electrical Power 6.8 kW
η, Coefficient of Performance 2.5
τr, Temperature Setpoint 22.5
◦C
∆, Temperature Deadband 0.3 ◦C
A number of studies investigate the thermal properties of typical homes. We
use the parameters shown in Table 3.1 for our simulations. These are based on the
derivations presented in [17] for conditioning a 250 m2 home (about 2700 square
feet), which is a common mid-size home in many Texas neighborhoods.
In order to determine the energy usage for AC in our typical home, we need to
have an estimate of how the ambient temperature varies over a day in Texas during
the summer months. These values are available in the Pecan Street data set, and we
plot the values of 3 days which are arbitrarily chosen over three months for Austin,
TX in Figure 3.3.
Next, we calculate the ON-OFF pattern of our typical air conditioner based on the
ambient temperature variation over the course of the day. We do this by simulating
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Figure 3.3: Ambient temperature of
3 arbitrary days from June–August,
2013 in Austin, TX. Measurements
are taken every 15 minutes from 12
AM to 12 PM.
0 4 8 12 16 20 2421
21.5
22
22.5
23
23.5
24
24.5
25
Time
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 (C
)
ON−OFF Pattern for AC
 
 
day 1
day 2
day 3
Figure 3.4: Simulated ON/OFF state
of AC over a 24 hour period in a home
and the corresponding interior tem-
perature. The interior temperature
falls when the AC comes on, and rises
when it is off.
the controller in (3.14) with the appropriate ambient temperature values taken from
Figure 3.3. The pattern is presented in Figure 3.4. We see that there is higher
energy usage during the hotter times of the day, as is to be expected. This also
corresponds to the peak in wholesale electricity prices shown for the same period in
Figure 3.1. The total energy used each day corresponding to our 5 ton AC (= 6.8
kW; see Table 3.1) is 32.83 kWh.
For comparison, we use the Pecan Street data set to provide the measured daily
average energy usage for AC during the same period for 4 homes that have parameters
in the same ballpark as our typical home. These values are shown in Table 3.2. The
table shows the close match of our home model with real AC usage patterns.
3.7.2 Actions and Costs
The customer action space in our problem consists of choosing when to turn ON
and OFF the AC, and is uncountably infinitely large. We need to pick a reasonable
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Table 3.2: Daily AC usage for four homes
ID Square feet Age AC (tons) Energy (kWh)
93 2934 20 5 28.2
545 2345 6 3.5 41.5
4767 2710 5 4 31.7
3967 2521 5 3.5 37.8
discrete subset of the action space for our study. From Figure 3.1 it is clear that the
consumption during maximum price period 5 − 6 PM has the maximum impact on
the overall energy cost of the LSE. The LSE would like to incentivize the shift of
some of this usage, without excessively affecting the internal home temperature. We
assume that the actions available to the customer involve setting different setpoints
during each period from 2−8 PM. We take the setpoint 22.5◦C as the baseline. Each
action can now be identified with a vector (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6), where yj indicates the
setpoint in the period j. Hence, the vector (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) would
indicate the baseline in which the customer does not change the original setpoint in
each period. This defines the action set A, and we define the action with index a = 0
to be the no-change action.
Our next step is to calculate the cost of taking each action a ∈ A, which corre-
sponds to the discomfort of having a potentially higher mean and standard deviation
in the home temperature, and higher energy consumption due to that action. We
measure the state of the home under action a ∈ A by the tuple consisting of the
mean temperature, the standard deviation and energy usage, denoted [τ¯a, σa,Ea].
The baseline state of these parameters is under action 0, denoted by [τ¯0, σ0,E0] Then
we define the cost of taking any action a as
θa = |τ¯0 − τ¯a|+ λ|σ0 − σa| − ς(E0 − Ea), (3.15)
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where we choose λ = 10 to make the numerical values of the mean and standard
deviation comparable to each other and ς = 10 cents/kWh as the fixed energy price.
Note that the calculation of cost for each action involves simulating the home under
that action to determine [τ¯a, σa,Ea]. However, this has to be done only once to create
a look-up table, which can be used thereafter.
3.7.3 Coupons, Lottery and Surplus
We now consider the incentives provided to the customers by the LSE, which
wishes to generate an MFE that has most of its mass on actions that are benefi-
cial to it. We measure the day-ahead price of electricity experienced by the LSE
in dollars/MWh and denote the price at time period j in day i as pii,j, where
i = {1, 2, · · · , 92} and j = {1, · · · , 6}. Each action vector of a customer would
impose a net price on the LSE in proportion to the usage. We define the differen-
tial price measured in dollars imposed by an action y = (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) versus
z = (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6) as
H(y, z) =
∑
j
(k(yi,j)− k(zi,j))pii,j, (3.16)
where k converts the setpoints into electricity usage in each period, which is measured
in MWh. Setting y as the baseline action (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) presents a
way of measuring the reduction/increase in hazard due to the incentive scheme. We
will use this metric to quantify the value of the MFE achieved.
Now, the baseline action a = 0 corresponds to a setpoint of 22.5◦C in period 3 at
which pii,3 is highest (Figure 3.1) for any day i. Hence, the LSE should incentivize
actions that are likely to reduce the risks of peak day-ahead price borne by the LSE
by offering Energy Coupons in proportion to the usage during the corresponding
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periods. The problem of optimally selecting these coupons is a hard one in general.
However, in the limited context of our simulation, it is intuitively clear that coupons
must be placed at periods of lower price. Our coupon choices are shown in Table 3.3,
where x1 and x6 are energy usage in the corresponding periods (measured in kWh)
and the day-ahead price shown is that of one day randomly drawn from the three
months. Note that the number of coupons are not necessarily integer, although
making them integer quantities will not have any impact on our results.
Table 3.3: Day-ahead price and energy coupons
Index Period Day-ahead Price/MWh Coupons/kWh
1 2− 3 PM $47 107 if x1 > 2.464; 1.8 otherwise
2 3− 4 PM $55 5.4
3 4− 5 PM $78 1.8
4 5− 6 PM $99.6 0
5 6− 7 PM $66.5 3.6
6 7− 8 PM $49.5 54 if x6 > 2.24; 1.8 otherwise
Given the coupon placement by the LSE, the customers need to determine the
costs and number of coupons resulting from each action, and use these values to
estimate the utility that they would attain. We identified 6 actions that appeared
to have the most promise of being used, and these shown in Table 3.4 with their
attendant costs and number of coupons received. Note that action 0 is the one in
which the customer does not participate in the system.
The LSE conducts an auction each week across clusters of M = 50 homes in each
auction. For each cluster, there is K = 1 prize for winning the lottery with a value of
$40 (we will show in the next subsection that this choice is viable). We assume that
the customers choose the same action on each day of the week, and then participate
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Table 3.4: Actions, costs and energy coupons
Index Action Vector Cost Coupons
0 (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) 0 37.4
1 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.75, 21.25) 3.68 715
2 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 21.75) 3.51 713
3 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 22) 3.50 704
4 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.25, 22.25) 3.146 693
5 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23, 22.5) 2.68 577
in the lottery.
The final few parameters of our simulated system need to be determined by
experiment, but in the absence of data until we conduct user trials, we make the
following reasonable assumptions. We assume that the customer expects to win at
least $1 on average by participating. Hence, the value of decrease in surplus due to
losing is l = 1, while the value of increase in surplus by winning is w = 40− 1 = 39.
The customer expects nothing if he does not participate (action 0), and there is no
change of surplus in this case. We assume that customers are likely to remain in
the system with probability 0.98, i.e., the average customer participates for 50 time
steps, which roughly parallels the fact that many home users sign a new contract
once a year. Further, a newly entering customer has a surplus that is an integer
uniformly drawn from [10, 30]. Finally, for the customer utility, which maps surplus
(in dollars) to utility units, we use the value function of prospect model, u(x) = xγ
if x ≥ 0 or u(x) = −ϕ(−x)γ if x < 0, where ϕ = 2.25 and γ = 0.88 according to the
empirical studies conducted in [51,88].
Under this model, we expect a user who has lost a number of lotteries to stop
participating in the system, since his surplus becomes negative and he is not receiving
enough of an incentive to stay, given the cost he bears each day. Similarly, a user
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who has won too many times would have a large surplus, and would also not be keen
on participating since the marginal utility he gets may not be high enough for him.
While we expect the latter event to occur very infrequently, the former is something
that we have to watch out for, since it would result in a poor customer response to
our system and potentially less savings to the LSE. In what follows, we will see that
our selected value of $40 reward appears to be sufficient to ensure a good level of
participation.
3.7.4 Mean Field Equilibrium
We now are ready to determine the properties of the MFE generated by our
system. We start with a uniform action distribution as the initial condition. We run
the system over 50 iterations, determining the steady state action distribution at each
step and using that as the input for the next iteration. We find that convergence
occurs quite quickly and reaches within 0.1% of the final value within 10 iterations.
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Figure 3.5 illustrates the convergence of the values associated with a few candidate
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states (surplus). Each point on the graph is obtained by value iteration over the
Bellman equation describing value, keeping the action distribution of other players
fixed. The value iteration converges within about 50 steps in each case. Figure 3.6
shows the convergence of the stationary probability of having certain surplus values
for a few examples. The eventual values to which they converge is the mean field
surplus distribution. The complete mean field distribution of surplus is shown in
Figure 3.7. It indicates that customers win at a lottery between 1 and 2 times over
an average lifetime of 50 time intervals, as is to be expected with a cluster size of 50
customers at each lottery.
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Finally, Figure 3.8 illustrates the mean field action distribution. For example, the
best action from the LSE’s perspective is action 5, which is chosen with probability
0.68. Figure 3.9 shows the interior temperature under actions 0, 4, 5 and mean field
action in a home in an arbitrary day. Figure 3.10 shows the comparison of energy
consumption between action 0 and the mean field action. We use the mean field
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Figure 3.9: Simulated ON/OFF state of AC over a 24 hour period in a home under
actions 0, 3 and the mean field action on an arbitrary day and the corresponding
interior temperature. The temperature graph is slightly offset for actions 4, 5 and
the mean field action for ease of visualization.
action distribution to find that the net reduction in price over 50 homes is $78 each
week. Thus, incentivizing customers by offering a prize of $40 each week is certainly
feasible. The MFE illustrates that even as small as 1◦C change of the setpoint of AC
each day over several homes can yield significant benefits.
3.7.5 Reward, Saving and Profit
We assumed in the above simulations that the customer expects to win at least
$1 on average by participating, and hence the decrease in surplus due to losing at
the lottery is l = 1, while the increase in surplus due to winning is w = 40− 1 = 39
(since the reward for winning the lottery is $40). We saw that the total net reduction
(savings to the LSE) over 50 homes is $78 each week, and hence $40 reward is
sustainable.
We now numerically determine the relation between the reward to customers,
savings to the LSE and profit to the LSE, shown in Figure 3.11 for l = $1 and $5.
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We plot the total savings to the LSE as well as its profit (savings minus reward)
as a function of the reward offered for winning the lottery. From the left figure
(l = 1), most of the savings can be achieved by giving a reward of $40. Also at this
point almost all the customers will participate in the system, i.e., the probability of
choosing action 0 is 0. The maximum profit at l = 1 is achieved when the reward is
$20. The break-even point is about $80 reward.
In the right figure (l = 5), the profit does not change much, but the savings
increases as we increase the offered reward. This is because with a large penalty
(decrease in surplus due to losing) more customers will participate in the system by
choosing actions 4 and 5 only if a large reward is offered. The break-even point is
about $70 reward. We also consider other cases like l = 3, which exhibit the same
trends and hence are omitted here. In all cases, the total rewards are bounded by
$80, and the mean field action distribution is similar to that in Figure 3.8. As we
increase the decrease in surplus due to losing l, the number of customers choosing
action 0 will increase if the reward is small, i.e., customers become less risk-seeking.
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Figure 3.11: The relation between offered reward, LSE savings and LSE profit. Left:
l = 1. Right: l = 5.
We also studied the impact of changing the mapping of actions to coupons that
we showed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, and conducted the above experiment with l = 1, 3, 5
again. We found that our results are robust to the mapping of actions to coupons.
For example, when we set l = 1, most savings can be achieved by giving a $40
reward and the break-even point is about $80, as was seen above. The total rewards
are bounded by $80 in all cases. We present details of other mappings and the
corresponding results in the Appendix B.4.
3.8 Conclusion
In this section we developed a general framework for analyzing incentive schemes
to promote desirable behavior in societal networks by posing the problem in the
form of a Mean Field Game (MFG). Our incentive scheme took the form of awarding
coupons in such that higher cost actions would correspond to more coupons, and
conducting a lottery periodically using these coupons as lottery tickets. Using this
framework, we developed results in the characteristics of the optimal policy and
showed the existence of the MFE.
We used the candidate setting of an LSE trying to promote demand-response in
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the form of setting high setpoints in higher price time of the day in order to transfer
energy usage from a higher to a lower price time of day for an air conditioning appli-
cation. We conducted data driven simulations that accurately account for electricity
prices, ambient temperature and home air conditioning usage. We showed how the
prospect of winning at a lottery could potentially motivate customers to change their
AC usage patterns sufficiently that the LSE can more than recoup the reward cost
through a likely reduced expenditure in electricity purchase.
Our setup is general enough to capture population behavior in other societal net-
works. For example, it applies in an essentially unchanged manner to an experiment
conducted on a bus transportation system of an IT firm in India, described in [72].
Here, employees have a choice of an early morning bus that experiences low traffic
congestion or a later one that experiences more. Providing incentives to employees
in the form of lottery tickets for taking the earlier bus was shown to increase its
attractiveness, while simultaneously reducing costs to the firm by running a smaller
number of buses at higher fuel efficiency.
In the future we intend to conduct user trails of the Energy Coupon system. This
is something that we are actively working on, and such trials would both validate the
idea of using incentive schemes to promote cooperation, as well as suport our ana-
lytical prediction of being able to run a viable societal system with desired behavior
using the MFE framework.
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4. DYNAMIC ADAPTABILITY PROPERTIES OF CACHING ALGORITHMS
4.1 Introduction
The dominant application in today’s Internet is streaming of content such as video
and music. This content is typically streamed by utilizing the services of a content
distribution network (CDN) provider such as Akamai or Amazon [48]. Streaming
applications often have stringent conditions on the acceptable latency between the
content source and the end-user, and CDNs use caching as a mean of reducing access
latency and bandwidth requirements at a central content repository. The fundamen-
tal idea behind caching is to improve performance by making information available
at a location close to the end-user. Managing a CDN requires policies to route re-
quests from end-users to near-by distributed caches, as well as algorithms to ensure
the availability of the requested content in the cache that is polled.
While the request routing policies are optimized over several economic and tech-
nical considerations, they end up creating a request arrival process at each cache.
Caching algorithms attempt to ensure content availability by trying to learn the
distribution of content requests in some manner. Typically, the requested content
is searched for in the cache, and if not available, a miss is declared, the content is
retrieved from the central repository (potentially at a high cost in terms of latency
and transit requirements), stored in the cache, and served to the requester. Since
the cache is of finite size, some content may need to be evicted in order to cache the
new content, and caching algorithms are typically described by the eviction method
employed.
Some well known content eviction policies are Least Recently Used (LRU) [34],
k-LRU [70], First In First Out (FIFO), RANDOM [25], CLIMB [25,85] and Adaptive
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Replacement Cache (ARC) [71]; these will be described in detail later on. Perfor-
mance analysis typically consists of determining the hit probability at the cache
under either a synthetic arrival process (usually with independent draws of content
requests following a fixed Zipf popularity distribution, referred to as the Independent
Reference Model (IRM)), or using a data trace of requests observed in a real system.
It has been noted that performance of an eviction algorithm under synthetic versus
real data traces can vary quite widely [70]. For instance, 2-LRU usually does better
than LRU when faced with synthetic traffic, but LRU often outperforms it with a
real data trace. The reason for this discrepancy is usually attributed to the fact that
while the popularity distribution in a synthetic trace is fixed, real content popularity
changes with time [18,95]. Thus, it is not sufficient for a caching algorithm to learn
a fixed popularity distribution accurately, it must also learn it quickly in order to
track the changes on popularity that might happen frequently.
Since each known caching algorithm generates a Markov process over the occu-
pancy states of the cache, the typical performance analysis approach is to determine
the stationary distribution of this process, and to use it to calculate the hit prob-
ability. However, this approach loses all notion of time and does not allow us to
compare the performance of each algorithm with the best possible. A major goal of
this section is to define function that accounts for both the error due to time lag of
learning, as well as the error due to the inaccuracy of learning. Such an error func-
tion would allow us to better understand the performance of existing algorithms, as
well as decide how to develop new ones.
Our first requirement to attain this goal is a refinement of the hit probability
metric to characterize the nearness of the stationary distribution of an algorithm to
the best-possible cache occupancy. If the statistics of the cache request process are
known, the obvious approach to maximizing the hit probability is to simply cache the
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most popular items as constrained by the cache size, creating a fixed vector of cached
content. How do we compare the stationary distribution generated by a caching
algorithm with this vector? A well known approach to comparing distributions is
to determine the Wasserstein distance between them [89]. However, since we are
dealing with distributions of permutations of vectors, we need to utilize a notion
of a cost that depends on the ordering of elements. Such a notion is provided by a
metric called the generalized Kendall’s tau [57]. Coupling these two notions together,
we define a new metric that we call the τ -distance, which correctly represents the
accuracy of learning the request distribution. The τ -distance can also be mapped
back to hit probability or any other performance measure that depends on learning
accuracy.
Our second requirement is to study the evolution of the Markov chain associated
with caching algorithm to understand its rate of convergence to stationarity. The
relevant concept here is that of mixing time, which is the time required for a Markov
process to reach within  distance (in Total Variation (TV) norm) of the eventual
stationary distribution. To our knowledge, no existing work has characterized the
mixing time of caching algorithms. However, this metric is crucial to understanding
caching algorithm performance, as it effectively characterizes the speed of learning.
Once we have both the τ -distance and the mixing time characterized for a caching
algorithm, we can determine how well algorithm would perform after it has learned
for a certain time interval. Using a triangle inequality bound and combining the
τ -distance and mixing time with appropriate normalization, we can come up with a
metric that provides an upper bound on this tradeoff at any given time, and we call
this metric as the learning error.
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Figure 4.1: Different dimensions of caching paradigms.
4.1.1 Structure of Caching Paradigms
A cache is fundamentally a block of memory that can be used to store data items
that are frequently requested. Over the years, different paradigms have evolved on
how best to utilize the available memory. Most conventional caching algorithms,
such as LRU, RANDOM and FIFO, have been designed and analyzed on an simple
(isolated) cache, as shown in Figure 4.1 (a). The model here is that any time a
request arrives, the corresponding data item is fetched and cached if it is not already
in the cache. Where to place this item, and which item to evict if needed determines
the nature of the caching algorithm. New caching algorithms have been proposed in
the past few years, which have been shown to have better performance than classical
model, often through numerical studies. The different dimensions that have been
explored are two fold. One the one hand, the memory block can be divided into
two or more levels, with a hierarchical algorithm attempting to ensure that more
popular content items get cached in the higher levels. For example, a simple 2-level
cache is shown in Figure 4.1 (b), and it has been empirically observed that under an
appropriate caching algorithm, it could display a higher hit probably than that of a
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simple cache of the same size. On the other hand, a meta-cache that simply stores
content identities an approach that can be used to better learn popularity without
wasting memory to cache the actual data item. The idea is illustrated in Figure 4.1
(c) with one level of meta caching. Meta-caches are an efficient way of ensuring
that only popular items are ever cached, and empirical observations suggest that
when coupled with an appropriate caching algorithm, they too are quite effective at
increasing the hit rate. However, in both cases, it is not clear how the multi-level
caches and meta-caches enhance the hit probability, and what impact they have
on the convergence to stationarity of the caching scheme. In this section, we first
characterize the performance of an isolated cache through τ -distance and mixing
time to study the adaptability of these algorithms. In the next section, we use this
technique to study how the number of cache levels and cache partitions impact the
performance. Finally, we use the insights gained in this process to design a new
caching paradigm algorithm that combines ideas from using multi-level cache and
meta-caches, as shown in Figure 4.1 (d). We design an algorithm to be applied to
this cache structure, and name the resulting algorithm as Adaptive-LRU (A-LRU).
4.1.2 Related Work
Caching algorithms have mostly been analytically studied under the IRM Model.
Explicit results for stationary distribution and hit probability for LRU, FIFO, RAN-
DOM, CLIMB [9,25,35,55,85] have been derived under IRM, however, these results
are only useful for small caches due to the computational complexity of solving for
the stationary distribution. Several approximations have been proposed to analyze
cache of a reasonably large size [27,82], and a notable one is the Time-To-Live (TTL)
approximation, which was first introduced for LRU under IRM [20]. It has been fur-
ther generalized to other situations [12, 30, 34, 70, 82]. Theoretical support on the
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accuracy of TTL approximation was presented in [12]. A rich literature also studies
the performance of caching algorithms in terms of hit probability based on real trace
simulations, e.g., [63,70,71,95], and we do not attempt to provide an overview here.
4.1.3 Organization
The next section contains some technical preliminaries and representative caching
algorithms. We derive the steady state distributions of the algorithms in Section 4.3
and identify hit probabilities in Section 4.4. We consider our new notion of τ -distance
in Section 4.5 and mixing time in Section 4.6. We join the two notions and investigate
the learning error in Section 4.7. We conclude in Section 4.8.
4.2 Technical Preliminaries
4.2.1 Traffic Model
To compare various caching algorithms, it is necessary to define a model of how we
specify the reference items first. For most of our analysis, we consider the simplest
and most widely used stochastic model which is called the Independent Reference
Model (IRM) [25]. In our numerical investigations, we will also consider three more
realistic request processes: a Markov-modulated request process, a YouTube request
trace [95], and one request trace from the IRCache project [13]. In IRM, the request
process {r1, r2, · · · } is given by a sequence of independent, identically distributed
random variables with a fixed probability distribution
P(rt = i) = pi, i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, t ∈ {1, 2, · · · }, (4.1)
where rt is the item referenced by the t-th request, and there are n different items.
Without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), we assume that the reference items are numbered
so that the probabilities are in a non-increasing order, i.e., p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pn.
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4.2.2 Popularity Law
Whereas our analytical results are not for any specific popularity law, for our
numerical investigations we will use a Zipf-like distribution as this family has been
frequently observed in real traffic measurements, and is widely used in performance
evaluation studies in the literature [19]. For a Zipf-like distribution, the probability
to request the i-th most popular item is pi = A/i
α, where α is the Zipf parameter
that depends on the application considered [31], and A is the normalization constant
so that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 if there are totally n unique items to be considered in the system.
4.2.3 Caching Algorithms
There exist a large number of caching algorithms, with the difference being in
their choice of insertion or eviction rules. In this section, we consider the following
representative algorithms.
LRU: [34] When there is a request for item i, there are two cases: (1) i is not in
the cache (cache miss), then i is inserted in the first position in the cache, all other
items move back one position, and the item that was in the last position of the cache
is evicted; (2) i is in position j of the cache (cache hit), then i moves to the first
position of the cache, and all other items that were in positions 1 to j− 1 move back
one position.
FIFO: The difference between FIFO and LRU is when a cache hit occurs on an item
that was in position j. In FIFO, this item does not change its position.
RANDOM: The difference between RANDOM and FIFO is when a cache miss
occurs, the item is inserted in a random position, and the item that was in this
randomly selected position is evicted.
CLIMB: [25,85] The difference between CLIMB and LRU is when a cache hit occurs
on an item that was in position j. In CLIMB, this item is inserted in position j + 1,
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and the item that was in position j + 1 moves to position j.
Remark 1 LRU has been widely used due to its good performance and ease of imple-
mentation. FIFO and RANDOM have been used to replace LRU in some scenarios
since they are easier to implement with a reasonable good performance. CLIMB has
been numerically shown to have a higher hit ratio than LRU, at the expense of longer
time to reach this steady state than LRU.
4.3 Steady State Distribution
We first consider the question of determining the stationary distribution of the
contents of a cache based on the caching algorithm used. Each (known) caching
algorithm A under any Markov modulated request arrival process (including IRM)
results in a Markov process over the occupancy states of the cache. Suppose there
are a total of n content items in a library, and the cache size is m < n. Then each
state x is a vector of size m indicating the content in each cache spot; we call the
state space of all such vectors S. Then one can potentially determine the stationary
distribution of this algorithm, denoted pi∗A. This procedure is well established in the
literature [25], but results for the algorithms of interest are not available in the desired
form (viewed in terms of permutations), and we first derive these as as a foundation
for novel performance metrics in the following sections.
For simplicity, we denote xj as the identity of the item at position j in the cache,
i.e., x = (x1, · · · , xm). Next we present the steady state probabilities of this Markov
chain for FIFO, RANDOM, CLIMB, and LRU.
Theorem 9 Under the IRM, the steady state probabilities pi∗FIFO(x), pi
∗
RANDOM(x),
pi∗CLIMB(x), and pi
∗
LRU(x), with x ∈ S are as follows:
pi∗FIFO(x) =
Πmi=1pxi∑
x∈S Π
m
i=1pxi
,
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pi∗RANDOM(x) =
Πmi=1pxi∑
x∈S′ Π
m
i=1pxi
,
pi∗CLIMB(x) =
Πmi=1p
m−i+1
xi∑
x∈S Π
m
i=1p
m−i+1
xi
,
pi∗LRU(x) =
Πmi=1pxi
(1− px1)(1− px1 − px2) · · · (1− px1 − · · · − pxm−1)
, (4.2)
where S ′ denotes the set of all combinations of elements of {1, · · · , n} taken m at
a time. Note that elements of S ′ are subsets of {1, · · · , n}, while elements of S are
ordered subset of {1, · · · , n}, satisfying ∑x∈S Πmj=1pxj = m!∑x∈S′ Πmj=1pxj .
The proofs for FIFO, RANDOM and CLIMB follow directly by constructing an
auxiliary Markov chain on the set S and verifying that pi∗FIFO(x), pi∗RANDOM(x) and
pi∗CLIMB(x) satisfy detailed balance equations (and reversibility [53]). The result for
LRU is obtained by using a probabilistic argument following [40], we present the
details of this proof in Appendix C for completeness. These are the well-known
steady state probabilities for FIFO, RANDOM, CLIMB and LRU [9,25,35,55,85].
4.4 Hit Probability
A primary performance measure in caching systems is the hit probability. One
can derive the hit probability once we have the stationary distribution. We illustrate
how to compute this standard performance measure in this section, and will present
hit probability as a special case of our new more general metrics that we will develop
in the next few sections.
Denote the hit probability of algorithm A as HAm and let F
A
m = 1 − HAm be the
miss probability under IRM.
By the ergodic theorem, the miss probability FAm is equal to the stationary prob-
ability of a miss,
FAm =
∑
x
pi∗A(x)
∑
x′
q(x,x′), (4.3)
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where summation in the outer sum is with respect to all the states in S, and the inner
summation denotes a summation only over those states x′ satisfying the condition
|x′ \ x| = 1, i.e., differ from x in precisely one element, and q(·, ·) is the transition
probability.
Theorem 10 Under IRM, we have
FAm =
∑
x∈S
(
1−
m∑
j=1
pxj
)
pi∗A(x), (4.4)
where pi∗A(x) is given in (4.2).
4.5 Permutation Distance
The hit probability does not immediately allow us to compare the performance
of an algorithm with the best possible. We seek a refinement that would allow
us to determine “how close” the stationary performance of an algorithm is to the
best-possible.
If we have full knowledge of the popularity distribution at any time, we could
simply cache the most popular items in the available cache spots, placing the most
popular element in first cache spot, and then proceeding onwards until the m-th spot.
This approach would maximize the hit probability, as well as any other metric that
yields better performance when more popular items are cached. We denote this ideal
occupancy vector as c∗. We first need a method of comparing the distance between
this occupancy vector and any other permutation over the possible cache occupancy
states.
4.5.1 Generalized Kendall’s Tau Distance
Let [n] = {1, · · · , n} be a library of items and [n]m be the set of m items randomly
chosen from [n]. Let Smn be the set of permutations on [n]m. Consider a permutation
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σ ∈ Smn , we interpret σ(i) as the position of item i in σ, and we say that i is ahead
of j in σ if σ(i) < σ(j). W.l.o.g, we take σ(i) = 0 for i ∈ [n]/[n]m.
The classical Kendall’s tau distance [29] 1 is given by
K(σ1, σ2) =
∑
(i,j):σ1(i)>σ1(j)
1{σ2(i)<σ2(j)}, (4.5)
where 1A is the indicator function and 1A = 1 if the condition A holds true, otherwise
1A = 0.
However, this conventional definition does not take into account the item rele-
vance and positional information, which are crucial to evaluating the distance metric
in a permutation. Since we wish to compare with c∗, in which the most popular
items are placed in lower positions, the errors in lower positions in the permutation
need to be penalized more heavily than those in higher positions. There are several
alternative distance measures which have been proposed to address the above short-
comings of the conventional distance. In the following, we consider the generalized
Kendall’s tau distance proposed in [57] that captures the importance of each item as
well as the positions of the errors.
Let wi > 0 be the element weight for i ∈ [n]. For simplicity, we assume that
wi ∈ Z+; all the following results hold for non-integral weights as well. In addition
to the element weight, as discussed earlier, we wish to penalize inversions early in
the permutation more than inversions later in the permutations. In order to achieve
this, we define the position weights to differentiate the importances of positions in the
permutation. We first consider the cost of swapping between two adjacent positions.
1We consider p = 0 for the definition given in [29], which is an “optimistic approach” that
corresponds to the intuition that we assign a nonzero penalty to the pair {i, j} only if we have
enough information to know that i and j are in the opposite order in the two permutations σ1 and
σ2.
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Let ζj ≥ 0 be the cost of swapping an item at position j− 1 with an item at position
j, and let p1 = 1 and pj = pj−1 + ζj for 1 < j ≤ m. Define p¯iσ1,σ2 =
pσ1(i)−pσ2(i)
σ1(i)−σ2(i) to be
the average cost that item i encountered in moving from position σ1(i) to position
σ2(i). In particular, p¯i = 1 if σ1(i) = σ2(i). Similarly for p¯
j
σ1,σ2
. Now, we are ready
to define the generalized Kendall’s tau distance:
Kw,ζ(σ1, σ2) =
∑
σ1(i)<σ1(j)
wiwj p¯
i
σ1,σ2
p¯jσ1,σ21{σ2(i)>σ2(j)}. (4.6)
4.5.2 Wasserstein Distance
While the generalized Kendall’s tau is a way of comparing two permutations,
the algorithms that we are interested in do not converge to a single permutation,
but yield stationary distributions over permutations. Hence, we should compare
the stationary distribution pi∗A of an algorithm A, with c
∗ using a distance function
that accounts for the ordering of content in each state vector. A general way of
comparing distributions on permutations, given a distance function between any two
permutations is the Wasserstein distance.
Let (S, d) be a Polish space, and consider any two probability measures µ and ν
on S, then the Wasserstein distance [89] 2 between µ and ν is defined as
W (µ, ν) = inf
PX,Y (·,·)
{
E[d(X, Y )], PX(·) = µ, PY (·) = ν
}
, (4.7)
which is the minimal cost between µ and ν induced by the cost function d.
2W.l.o.g., we are interested in the L1-Wasserstein distance, which is also commonly called the
Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance [89]. For convenience, we express Wasserstein distance by means
of couplings between random variables.
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4.5.3 τ -distance
We are now ready to define the specific form of Wasserstein distance between
distributions on permutations that is appropriate to our problem. We define the τ -
distance as the Wasserstein distance taking the generalized Kendall’s distance in (4.6)
as the cost function in (4.7).
Since the ideal occupancy vector c∗ is unique and fixed, the infimum in (4.7) over
all the couplings is trivial. Therefore, we have
|pi∗A − c∗|τ =
∑
x
Kw,ζ(x, c
∗)pi∗A(x), (4.8)
where Kw,ζ(·, ·) is the generalized Kendall’s tau distance defined in (4.6).
4.5.4 Model Validation and Insights
Since the τ -distance characterizes how accurately an algorithm learns the popu-
larity distribution, a smaller τ -distance should correspond to a larger hit probability.
Computation of the τ -distance is complex, since it is a function of all possible per-
mutations over the content items. But we can illustrate how different algorithms
perform using a content library size of n = 20. Figure 4.2 compares the τ -distance
and hit probabilities of various caching algorithms. The points on each curve cor-
respond to cache size of 2, 3, 4, 5 from left to right. From Figures 4.2, we can see
that the τ -distance and hit probability follow the same rule, i.e., a smaller τ -distance
corresponds to a larger hit probability, which is as expected. We also observe that
the hit probabilities of the different algorithms are consistent with established results
that indicate that the hit probability of CLIMB is superior to LRU, which in turn is
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Figure 4.2: τ -distance vs. hit probability for various caching algorithms with IRM
arrivals.
superior to FIFO and RANDOM. In summary, in terms of hit probability
HCLIMBm ≥ HLRUm ≥ H(FIFO, RANDOM)m .
Remark 2 For the parameters in (4.6), we consider a Zipf-like popularity distribu-
tion with α = 0.8. For simplicity, we set the element weights as wi = n − i + 1,
and the swapping cost ζi = log i for i > 1, and ζ1 = 0.1. Different choices of the
parameters result in different values of the τ -distance, therefore, the y-axis value in
Figure 4.2 is only used to show the relative difference between different algorithms.
4.6 Mixing Time
While identifying the τ -distance does provide some insight into the algorithm’s
accuracy of learning, it says nothing about how quickly the algorithm can respond
to changes in the request distribution—a critical shortcoming in developing and
characterizing the ideal algorithm for a given setting. How does one come up with
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a metric that accounts for both accuracy and speed of learning? It seems clear that
one ought to study the evolution of the caching process with time to understand how
quickly the distribution evolves. The metric of relevance in this context is called
mixing time, which is the time required for a Markov process to reach within 
distance (in Total Variation (TV) norm) of the eventual stationary distribution. If
we denote the row corresponding to state x ∈ S of the t-step transition matrix of
algorithm A by piA(x, t), then the mixing time is the smallest value of t such that
sup
x∈S
|piA(x, t)− pi∗A|TV ≤ ,
for a given  > 0 [59]. Denote it as tmix(). As mentioned earlier, we will also think
of piA(x, t) and pi
∗
A as distributions on permutations of the n objects.
Mixing time can be characterized from different perspectives. Here, we use con-
ductance to characterize rapid mixing, which also builds bounds on the mixing time
through Cheeger’s inequality. In the rest of this section, we first introduce these
techniques and then characterize the mixing time of various caching algorithms.
4.6.1 Spectral Gap and Mixing Time
Let γ∗ be the spectral gap of a Markov chain with transition matrix P , and denote
pi∗P as its corresponding stationary distribution. We first define the spectral gap of a
Markov chain through Rayleigh quotient and Dirichlet form.
Definition 4 [23, 75] For f, g : S → R, let E(f, g) = EP (f, g) denote the Dirichlet
form,
E(f, g) = 〈f, (I − P )g〉pi∗P =
∑
x,y
f(x)(g(x)− g(y))P (x,y)pi∗P (x). (4.9)
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If f = g, then
E(f, f) = 1
2
∑
x,y
(f(x)− f(y))2P (x,y)pi∗P (x). (4.10)
The Rayleigh quotient for any f : S → R, is defined as follows [23],
R(f) =
E(f, f)∑
x |f(x)|2pi∗P (x)
. (4.11)
The spectral gap of the Markov chain with transition matrix P is defined as [23]
γ∗ = inf
f∑
x f(x)pi
∗
P (x)=0
R(f)
2
. (4.12)
Then the upper bound of mixing time in terms of spectral gap and the stationary
distribution of the chain is given as follows [59,75]:
tmix() < 1 + trel ln
(
1
pimin
)
, (4.13)
where trel = 1/γ
∗ is the relaxation time of the Markov chain with transition matrix
P , and pimin = minx∈S pi∗P (x).
4.6.2 Reversibility and Mixing Time
Reversibility is a significant concept in studying the properties of Markov chains.
Many current results of mixing time are shown in the context of a reversible Markov
chain. However, a recent survey [75] shows that some of these results hold even
without reversibility. In this subsection, we discuss the difference between reversible
and non-reversible Markov chains, and then show how to bound the mixing time of
a non-reversible Markov chain through constructing a reversible Markov chain. We
will use the result later to obtain a bound on the mixing time of the LRU algorithm,
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which is associated with a non-reversible Markov chain.
Suppose that P is the transition matrix of a non-reversible chain, and pi∗P is
its corresponding stationary distribution. Consider the time-reversal P ∗, which is
defined by
pi∗P (x)P
∗(x,y) = pi∗P (y)P (y,x), (4.14)
where x,y ∈ S.
Then it is easy to check that the additive Markov chain with transition matrix
P+P ∗
2
is reversible [75]. From Kelly [54], we know ∀x ∈ S, pi∗P (x) = pi∗P ∗(x), where pi∗P ∗
is the stationary distribution of Markov chain with transition matrix P ∗. Therefore,
we obtain
pi∗P (x) = pi
∗
P ∗(x) = pi
∗
P+P∗
2
(x). (4.15)
From Equation (4.10), we immediately have
EP (f, f) = EP ∗(f, f) = EP+P∗
2
(f, f), (4.16)
Furthermore, by the definition of Rayleigh quotient in Equation (4.11) and the spec-
tral gap of a Markov chain in Equation (4.12), we have
γ∗P = γ
∗
P ∗ = γ
∗
P+P∗
2
. (4.17)
Therefore, for any non-reversible Markov chain with transition matrix P , we can
construct a reversible Markov chain with transition matrix P+P
∗
2
. Since these two
Markov chains have the same stationary distribution (4.15) and spectral gap (4.17),
by (4.13), we can equivalently use the reversible Markov chain P+P
∗
2
to bound the
mixing time of the non-reversible Markov chain P through applying the existing
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results on reversible Markov chains. This procedure will be discussed in the following
subsections.
4.6.3 Conductance and Mixing Time
For a pair of states x,y ∈ S, we define the transition rate Q(x,y) = pi(x)P (x,y).
Let Q(S1, S2) =
∑
x∈S1
∑
y∈S2 Q(x,y), for two sets S1, S2 ∈ S. Now, for a given
subset S ∈ S, we define its conductance as Φ(S) = Q(S,S¯)
pi(S)
, where pi(S) =
∑
i∈S pii.
Note that Q(S, S¯) represents the “ergodic flow” from S to S¯. Finally, we define the
conductance of the chain P to capture the conductance of the “worst” set as
Φ = min
S⊂S,pi(S)≤ 1
2
Φ(S), (4.18)
The relationship between the conductance and the mixing time of a Markov chain
(the spectral gap) is given by the Cheeger inequality [21]:
Φ2
2
≤ γ∗ ≤ 2Φ. (4.19)
Combining (4.19) with the previous result in (4.13), we can relate the conductance
directly to the mixing time as follows:
tmix() ≤ 2
Φ2
(
ln
1
pimin
+ ln
1

)
. (4.20)
While the spectral gap and conductance of a Markov chain can provide close
bounds on the mixing time of the chain, these values are often difficult to calculate.
If we are more interested in proving rapid mixing3, we can provide a lower bound
3A family of ergodic, reversible Markov chain with state space of size |S| and conductance Φ|S|
is rapidly mixing if and only if Φ|S| ≥ 1P(|S|) for some polynomial P [74]. This result is commonly
used to show rapid mixing of Markov chains.
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on the conductance. Canonical path and congestion can be useful in this regard as
they are easier to compute, and can be used to bound the conductance from below.
For any pair x,y ∈ S, we can define a canonical path ψxy = (x = x0, · · · ,xl = y)
running from x to y through adjacent states in the state space S of the Markov
chain. Let Ψ = {ψxy} be the family of canonical paths running between all pairs of
states. The congestion of the Markov chain is then defined as
ρ = ρ(Ψ) = max
(u,v)

1
pi(u)Puv
∑
x,y∈S
ψxyuses(u,v)
pi(x)pi(y)
 , (4.21)
where the maximum runs over all pairs of states in the state space. . Therefore, high
congestion corresponds to a lower conductance, as demonstrated in [84]
Φ ≥ 1
2ρ
. (4.22)
Note that the above result applies to all possible choices of canonical paths, for
example, no requirement was ever made that the shortest path between two states
has be chosen.
4.6.4 Analysis of Mixing Time
In this subsection, we characterize the mixing time of LRU, FIFO, RANDOM, and
CLIMB. To ease exposition of our results, all proofs are relegated to the Appendix C.
4.6.4.1 Mixing Time of LRU
We consider the IRM arrival process and denote the probability of requesting
item i by pi. It is easy to verify that the Markov chain associated with the LRU
algorithm is non-reversible, for instance using the Kolmogorov condition. Hence, as
discussed in Section 4.6.2, we first need to construct the time reversal P LRU,∗ satis-
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fying Equation (4.14), given the transition matrix P LRU of LRU. Then the Markov
chain with transition matrix P
LRU+PLRU,∗
2
is reversible. Therefore, we can adapt the
results of mixing time of reversible Markov chain to show that the Markov chain
of LRU is rapidly mixing, i.e., we can show that the congestion of P
LRU+PLRU,∗
2
is
polynomial in the size of state space. We have the following result.
Theorem 11 The Markov chain of LRU is rapidly mixing.
Once we have characterized the congestion, we consider the reversible Markov
chain with transition matrix P
LRU+PLRU,∗
2
and use a conductance argument to give an
upper bound on the mixing time of LRU.
Theorem 12 The mixing time of LRU satisfies
tLRUmix () = O(n
4αm+2 lnn).
4.6.4.2 Mixing Time of RANDOM and FIFO
We next show that the congestion of RANDOM/FIFO are polynomial in the
size of state space, i.e., they are rapidly mixing. Since is easy to verify that these
two algorithms have reversible Markov chains, we can use the traditional approach
of using a conductance argument on the transition matrix P to bound the mixing
times.
Theorem 13 The Markov chains of RANDOM and FIFO are rapidly mixing.
We then derive a bound on the mixing time of both algorithms.
Theorem 14 The mixing times of RANDOM and FIFO satisfy
tRANDOMmix () = O(n
6αm+2 lnn).
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4.6.4.3 Mixing Time of CLIMB
We now turn to the CLIMB algorithm. It is easy to verify that it too generates
a reversible Markov chain. We show that the congestion of CLIMB is polynomial in
the size of the state space, i.e., it is rapidly mixing.
Theorem 15 The Markov chain of CLIMB is rapidly mixing.
We now have the following bound on the mixing time of CLIMB.
Theorem 16 The mixing time of CLIMB satisfies
tCLIMBmix () = O(n
3αm(m+1)+2 lnn).
4.6.5 Comparison of Mixing Times
We are now in a position to compare the bounds on mixing times of all our
candidate algorithms for the simple cache system. While the results are all upper
bounds on mixing time, they should allow us to make a judgement on the worst case
behaviors of each algorithm, and are a conservative estimate on likely performance
in practice. From Theorems 12 and 14, the upper bound of the mixing time of
LRU is smaller than the upper bound of the mixing time of RANDOM. Similar
results hold for FIFO. Thus, LRU mixes faster than RANDOM or FIFO. Similarly,
by Theorems 12 and 16, the upper bound of the mixing times of LRU, FIFO and
RANDOM are all smaller than the upper bound of the mixing time of CLIMB. Thus,
they are all likely to mix faster than CLIMB. The phenomenon of LRU mixing faster
than CLIMB has been numerically observed in [41]. In summary, the expected
ordering in mixing times from smallest to largest is likely to be
tLRUmix ≤ t(RANDOM, FIFO)mix ≤ tCLIMBmix .
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4.7 Learning Error
Although we have succeeded in deriving the mixing time of a caching algorithm,
how do we combine it with the notion of τ -distance to obtain a figure of merit for an
algorithm’s performance? What we really desire is a notion of error that accounts
for the tradeoff between accuracy and speed of learning. Clearly, a figure of merit
of this kind is the distance δ(t) = supx∈S |piA(x, t) − c∗|τ for some given time t. We
could then argue that if the time constant of the change in the request distribution is
t, the caching algorithm A would have attained some fraction of optimality by that
time.
Fortunately, since the space of all permutations on n objects is finite, it has a
finite diameter in terms of the generalized Kendall’s tau distance. Let this diameter
be denoted κ. Therefore, using the coupling definition of both the Total Variation
distance and the Wasserstein metric, the product of the diameter and the Total
Variation distance bounds the τ -distance [89]. In this context both are variants of
the Wasserstein distance [89], and are therefore equivalent ways of measuring distance
between distributions. Thus, we may use the triangle inequality to obtain
δA(t) = sup
x∈S
|piA(x, t)− c∗|τ
≤ sup
x∈S
|piA(x, t)− pi∗A|τ + |pi∗A − c∗|τ
≤ κ sup
x∈S
|piA(x, t)− pi∗A|TV + |pi∗A − c∗|τ
, eA(t). (4.23)
The first term above indicates the error due to time lag of learning, while the second
indicates the error due to (eventual) accuracy of learning. Hence, we refer to eA(t)
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as the learning error of algorithm A at time t.
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Figure 4.3: Learning error of various
caching algorithms under the IRM ar-
rival process.
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Figure 4.4: Hit probability of various
caching algorithms under the IRM ar-
rival process.
4.7.1 Model Validation and Insights
We illustrate the learning error of different caching algorithms in Figure 4.3. We
use a small cache size for these simulations, since computing all permutations be-
comes prohibitively complex quickly. However, (n = 20,m = 4) serves to illustrate
the main insights. The learning error of various algorithms as a function of the num-
ber of requests received is shown in Figure 4.3, where the y-axis is shown with a
logarithmic scale. We see immediately that FIFO and RANDOM have higher learn-
ing errors than the other algorithms, regardless of the number of requests. This shows
why their performance is poor however long they are trained. LRU decreases fast
initially and then levels off, but with a larger learning error than CLIMB. CLIMB has
a good performance eventually, but it has the slowest decay rate. This corresponds
to the slowest mixing of CLIMB, which is consistent with our analysis above.
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The same effects are visible in Figure 4.4, where the x-axis is shown with a
logarithmic scale.
4.8 Conclusion
In this section, we attempted to characterize the adaptability properties of dif-
ferent caching algorithms when confronted with non-stationary request arrivals. To
begin with, we first considered the stationary distributions of various caching algo-
rithms under a stationary request process, and computed the τ -distance between
each one and the optimal content placement in the cache. We then analyzed the
mixing time of each algorithm with stationary arrivals, to determine how long each
one takes to attain stationarity. By combining both of these metrics, we constructed
the learning error, which characterizes the tradeoff between speed and accuracy of
learning. The learning error provides insight into the likely performance of each al-
gorithm under non-stationary requests. In terms of prescriptive solutions, our result
was that LRU achieves a good tradeoff between accuracy of learning versus the speed
of learning the arrival process. However, the only parameter in all these algorithms
is the cache size m, which is a constant. Hence, none of the algorithms described can
be parametrically modified based on the application (how quickly the arrival distri-
bution changes). In the next section, we consider using the dimensions of layering
and addition of meta-caches to provide parameters that can be adjusted to obtain a
desired tradeoff between learning rate and accuracy.
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5. ACCURACY VS. LEARNING RATE OF MULTI-LEVEL CACHING
ALGORITHMS
5.1 Introduction
In Section 4, we characterized the performance of caching algorithms on an iso-
lated cache using the τ -distance and mixing time. As discussed earlier, the ideas
of using multi-level caches have been explored to improve the performance of an
isolated cache through numerical studies. However, it is not clear how the number
of levels and the partition of total cache size across these levels will impact perfor-
mance. In this section, we first characterize the performance of multi-level caches
and then combine the insights we obtained to design new caching algorithm, which
outperforms all the conventional algorithms we have considered.
First, we focus on the particular topology of multi-level cache network: a linear
cache network. As the name suggests, such a cache network consists of a stack
of caches, potentially of different sizes and at possibly different distances from the
content requesting site. Linear stacks of caches can be used at a single node, such as
a CDN content node, where they could have a higher hit probability than a single
cache, or in a microprocessor where the delay of the cache responses increases with
increasing distance from the core. Linear cache networks are also a basic building
block of more complex cache hierarchies across a CDN [30], and hence can be thought
of as the simplest CDN graph.
In a linear cache network, a content item enters the cache network via the first
cache and is advanced to a higher index cache whenever there is a cache hit on
it. An advancement could necessitate an eviction if the target cache is full, and
a replacement algorithm determines the item to be evicted. We are particularly
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interested in replacement algorithms that operate on a total available cache of size
m, partitioned into h levels represented by m = (m1, · · · ,mh). In particular, we
focus on well known policies such as RANDOM(m), First-in-First-Out (FIFO(m))
and Least-Recently-Used (LRU(m)); these will be described in detail later on.
Our first objective in this section is to derive a fundamental characterization of
the accuracy versus convergence tradeoff across different caching algorithms in the
case of a linear cache network. We wish to explore this tradeoff as parametrized by
(i) the number of cache levels, and (ii) the partitioning of the total cache space across
these levels. Towards this goal, we first characterize the stationary distributions of
our candidate replacement algorithms in the linear cache network under the IRM
model. Based on these stationary distributions, we derive explicit expressions for
the hit probabilities. We then use the “τ -distance” to study the accuracy of learning
the request distribution in the context of cache networks. We find that under IRM
requests, the accuracy of an algorithm increases both with the number of cache levels
and the space allocated to higher caches. Essentially, accuracy lies in favoring higher
level caches.
Next, we characterize the mixing time of cache replacement algorithms in cache
networks. We show that under IRM requests, the mixing time of an algorithm
increases both with the number of cache levels and the space allocated to higher
caches. Hence, learning accuracy and speed are exactly at odds with each other. We
provide a numerical study on how to partition the available cache space in a linear
cache network using both synthetic traces under the IRM model and trace-based
simulations using traces from YouTube. These results provide guidelines on how
to select a caching algorithm among these candidate replacement algorithms such
that a good tradeoff is obtained between the cache size, the number of caches in the
network and the request characteristics.
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Final, motived by our analysis, we propose a novel hybrid algorithm which com-
bines the ideas from LRU and 2-LRU in such a way that the learning error is mini-
mized for a dynamic arrival process. We name the resulting algorithm as Adaptive-
LRU (A-LRU), and are able to ensure that its learning error at a given time can
be made less than either LRU or 2-LRU. We also show that it has the highest hit
probability over a class of algorithms that we compare it with using both synthetic
requests generated using a Markov-modulated process, as well as trace-based simu-
lations using traces from YouTube and the IRCache project.
5.1.1 Organization
This section is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we study the multi-level
caching algorithms in the context of linear cache networks. Some technical prelimi-
naries and representative replacement algorithms are introduced in Section 5.2.1. We
derive the steady-state distributions of these algorithms in Section 5.2.2, and identify
hit probabilities in Section 5.2.3. We consider the τ -distance in Section 5.2.4, and
mixing time in Section 5.2.5. We provide trace-based numerical results of multi-level
caching algorithms in Section 5.2.6. Finally, we propose A-LRU and analyze its
performance in Section 5.3. We conclude in Section 5.4.
5.2 Performance of Multi-level Caching Algorithms
5.2.1 Preliminaries
Traffic Model and Popularity Law
We consider the Independent Reference model (IRM) [25] and Zipf-like law for
content popularity for most of our analysis. Details are given in Section 4.2 of
Section 4 and hence are omitted here.
Linear Cache Network
We consider a general linear cache network, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, which
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Figure 5.1: Linear cache network: “S” and “U” stands for the server and user,
respectively.
is composed of h caches labeled as 1, · · · , h, each with size mi ∈ Z+, i = 1, · · · , h.
The total cache size is denoted as m =
∑h
i=1 mi. There are no exogenous requests at
caches 2, · · · , h. An item enters the cache network via cache 1, and will be promoted
to a higher index cache whenever there is a cache hit on it.
Replacement Algorithms
We consider a class of replacement algorithms based on the linear cache network
in Figure 5.1. We denote the members of these classes as RANDOM(m), FIFO(m),
and LRU(m), where m = (m1, · · · ,mh).
RANDOM(m): When item k is requested, there are three cases: (1) k is not in
the cache network (cache miss), then k is inserted in a random position in cache 1,
and this randomly selected item is evicted; (2) k is in position j of cache i < h (cache
hit), then k is inserted in a random position in cache i+1, while the item that was in
this randomly selected position moves to position j of cache i; and (3) k is in cache
h (cache hit), no change is made.
FIFO(m): The differences between FIFO(m) and RANDOM(m) are from two per-
spectives. First, when a cache miss happens, item k is inserted into the first position
of cache 1, items in higher position move back one position, and the last item is
evicted. Second, when there is a cache hit on item k in cache i < h, say in position
j of cache i, item k moves to the first position of cache i+ 1, all other items in cache
i+1 move back one position. The last item that was in cache i+1 moves to position
j of cache i.
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LRU(m): The differences between LRU(m) and FIFO(m) are from two perspec-
tives. First, when there is a cache hit on item k that was in position j of cache i < h,
as before, k moves to the first position of cache i + 1, and all other items in cache
i+ 1 move back one position, with the difference that the last item that was in cache
i+ 1 moves to the first position of cache i, and all items that were in positions 1 to
j−1 of cache i move back one position. Second, when there is a cache hit in position
j of cache h, item k moves to the first position of cache h and all other items move
back one position.
Remark 3 We obtain RANDOM(m), FIFO(m), and LRU(m), described above,
by slightly modifying the algorithms introduced in [9, 71].
5.2.2 Steady State Distribution
Our first objective is to determine the stationary distributions of various replace-
ment algorithms in the linear cache network. Suppose there are a total of n content
items in a library, the total cache size is m < n, and there are h caches in the network.
Let S contain all the vectors of m distinct integers taken from the set {1, · · · , n}. It is
easy to see that each replacement algorithm A under any Markov modulated request
arrival process (which includes IRM as well) results in a Markov process on the state
space S. Denote pi∗A(x) as the stationary probability of state x = (x1, · · · , xm).
For simplicity, we denote x(i, j) as the identity of the item at position j in cache i,
where i = 1, · · · , h and j = 1, · · · ,mi. Next, we present the steady state probabilities
of this Markov chain for FIFO(m) and RANDOM(m).
Theorem 17 Under the IRM, the steady state probabilities pi∗FIFO(m)(x) and
107
pi∗RANDOM(m)(x), with x ∈ S are as follows
pi∗FIFO(m)(x) = Z(m)
−1
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
,
pi∗RANDOM(m)(x) = G(m)
−1
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
,
where Z(m), and G(m) are the normalizing constants, satisfying
Z(m) =
∑
x∈S
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
,
G(m) =
∑
x∈S′
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
, (5.1)
where S ′ denotes the set of all combinations of the elements of {1, · · · , n} taken m
at a time. Note that the elements of S ′ are subsets of {1, · · · , n}, while elements of
S are ordered subsets of {1, · · · , n}, satisfying
∑
x∈S
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
= m!
∑
x∈S′
h∏
i=1
(
mi∏
j=1
px(i,j)
)i
.
This result indicates a small inaccuracy in [33] (Theorem 1), which ignores the differ-
ence between S ′ and S. Our results contain the well-known steady state probabilities
for FIFO and RANDOM on an isolated cache (i.e. h = 1) [9, 25,35,55].
5.2.3 Hit Probability
Once we have the stationary distribution, we can easily characterize the hit prob-
ability of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m) using Equation (4.4) in Section 4.4 of Sec-
tion 4.
We then compare the hit probability of RANDOM(m), FIFO(m) and LRU(m)
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Figure 5.2: Hit probability of LRU(m) with mi+1 = 0.5mi for i = 1, · · · , h− 1 and∑
imi = m.
via simulations. Unless otherwise specified, we will always simulate a request ar-
rival process using the IRM with a Zipf-like popularity distribution with expo-
nent α = 0.8. We consider a large linear cache network, where the tuple (n,m)
is comparable to real cache networks. We illustrate how different algorithms per-
form using a content library size of n = 3, 000 with sufficiently long runs (i.e.,
enough number of requests to make sure that the system has reach steady state,
e.g., about 6× 106 requests). The hit probability of the algorithms are calculated as
Hit probability = Total No. of Hit Counts/Total No. of Request Counts.
We first study how hit probability varies with the total cache size and the number
of cache levels. Figure 5.2 shows the hit probabilities achieved by LRU(m), where
we assume that mi+1 = 0.5mi for i = 2, · · · , h, satisfying
∑h
i=1mi = m. The hit
probabilities increase with total cache size m, as well as the number of caches in the
linear cache network. However, the gain becomes limited when h ≥ 5. In other words,
most caching gain can be obtained by using a small number of cache levels. Similar
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RANDOM(m):h=1
FIFO(m):h=1
LRU(m):h=1
Figure 5.3: Hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with mi+1 = 0.5mi
for i = 1, · · · , h− 1 and ∑imi = m: h = 1.
RANDOM(m):h=3
FIFO(m):h=3
LRU(m):h=3
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Figure 5.4: Hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with mi+1 = 0.5mi
for i = 1, · · · , h− 1 and ∑imi = m: h = 3.
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Figure 5.5: Hit probabilities of LRU(m) with mi = (m−m1)/(h−1) for i = 2, · · · , h
and
∑
imi = m.
trends hold for RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m), and we omit them here. Figures 5.3
and 5.4 compare the performance of different algorithms under the same setting; here
we omitted the cases for h = 2, 5. We note that LRU(m) outperforms FIFO(m) and
RANDOM(m). Again, the gain decreases as we further increase h.
We next consider the impact of the cache partitioning policy on performance.
In particular, we focus on the division between cache 1 and all the others. Hence,
we vary m1 and divide the remaining cache size evenly among the remaining h − 1
caches, given a fixed total cache size m = 900. Figure 5.5 shows the hit probabilities
of LRU(m) as a function of the cache partitions (decreasing value of m1). Similarly,
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 compare the performance of the different candidate algorithms.
We see that the hit probability increases as the higher level caches are assigned more
space. In summary, the hit probability of a caching policy increases by favoring more
levels and assigning more resources to higher level caches.
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Figure 5.6: Hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with mi = (m −
m1)/(h− 1) for i = 2, · · · , h: h = 2.
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Figure 5.7: Hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with mi = (m −
m1)/(h− 1) for i = 2, · · · , h and
∑
imi = m: h = 5.
112
5.2.4 Permutation Distance
While we observed above using the hit probability metric that most of the caching
gain can be obtained by using a small number of cache levels, what we really desire is
to know “how close” the stationary performance of a replacement algorithm is to the
best-possible one. In order to do this, we need to refine the hit probability metric to
a measure of distance. We utilize the τ -distance defined in Section 4.5 of Section 4
to characterize the performance of replacement algorithms in the context of linear
cache networks.
5.2.4.1 Model Validation and Insights
As the τ -distance is a metric that characterizes the accuracy of an algorithm
learning the popularity distribution, a lager hit probability is expected for an algo-
rithm with a smaller τ -distance. The computational complexity of the τ -distance is
high, due to the explosion of the state space as the cache size and number of items
increases. However, we can still shed light on how different algorithms perform using
a relatively small content library size of n = 15.
We explore the impact of the number of cache levels h on the performance when
using a small cache size m = 5 to illustrate the main insights. Since the cache size
should be an integer, we explore a range of cache partitions under each h. We compare
the lower envelope of achievable τ -distance of various replacement algorithms, shown
in Figure 5.8, while the corresponding upper envelope of achievable hit probabilities
are shown in Figure 5.9. We observe that given a total cache size, increasing the
number of caches in the linear network can improve the performance, however, most
gain can be obtained with a small number of caches in the linear cache network. This
observation can be confirmed from the synthetic request data simulations shown in
Section 5.2.3, and trace based simulations that will be presented in Section 5.2.6.
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Figure 5.8: τ -distance vs. number of caches h for various replacement algorithms
with IRM arrivals.
Figure 5.9: Hit probability vs. cache number h for various replacement algorithms
with IRM arrivals.
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Figure 5.10: Hit probability vs. number of requests for RANDOM(m) replacement
algorithm with IRM arrivals.
These effects become more pronounced as the cache size and the size of content
library become large. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show that the τ -distance and hit probability
follow the same rule, i.e., a smaller τ -distance corresponds to a larger hit probability,
which is as expected.
Remark 4 The parameters that we used in (4.6) are as follows. We consider a Zipf-
like popularity distribution with exponent α = 0.8. For the ease of calculations, we
take wi = n− i+ 1 as the element weights, and ζi = log i for i > 1, and ζ1 = 0.1, as
the swapping cost. Different values of τ -distance can be obtained by different choices
of the parameters, hence, the y-axis value in Figure 5.8 only represents the relative
difference between different algorithms.
5.2.5 Mixing Time of Multi-level Caching Algorithms
While the τ -distance allowed us to obtain insights on how the number of levels
in a linear cache network impact the algorithm’s accuracy of learning, it does not
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indicate how long it takes to reach this eventual accuracy. In this section, we wish to
understand how quickly a replacement algorithm can respond to external changes:
changes in the number of caches, as well as the change in the request distribution.
In other words, we need to study how a caching process evolves with respect to time
to understand the evolution of the distribution. The relevant metric here is called
“mixing time,” which is defined in Section 4.6 of Section 4. In this section, we utilize
the same techniques introduced in Section 4.6 of Section 4 to characterize the mixing
time of cache placement algorithms in linear cache networks.
5.2.5.1 Analysis of Mixing Time
We are now ready to characterize the mixing time of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m).
We show that RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m) are rapid mixing by the conductance
argument, which results in an explicit form of the upper bound of the mixing time.
Details of the proof are available in Appendix D.
Rapid mixing of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m)
We show that the congestion of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m) are polynomial in
the size of state space, i.e., they are rapidly mixing.
Theorem 18 The Markov chains of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m) are rapid mixing.
Theorem 19 The mixing time of RANDOM(m) satisfies
t
RANDOM(m)
mix () = O(n
6α(m1+2m2+···+hmh)+2 lnn), (5.2)
where m = m1 +m2 + · · ·+mh.
Similar results hold for FIFO(m).
Remark 5 For a given total cache size m, we can determine the impact of multiple
cache levels and partitions by analyzing the term in the exponent in (5.2), which we
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define as µ(m) , m1+2m2+· · ·+hmh. Now, suppose we choose a harmonic sequence
of integers q1 = q, q2 = q/2, q3 = q/3, · · · qh = q/h, where q = m/
∑h
i=1
1
i
. Suppose
that we partition the total cache space m into levels as mA = {m1 = q1,m2 =
q2, · · ·mh = qh}, then we have a decreasing sequence of partitions, and µ(mA) = hq.
We see immediately that the mixing time bound is increasing in the number of levels
h.
Now, to determine how the cache partitions themselves impact the mixing time, we
instead choose mB = {m1 = qh,m2 = qh−1, · · ·mh = q1}. Then we have an increasing
sequence of partitions and the value of µ(mB) = q/h + 2q/(h− 1) + · · · + hq. Since
µ(mA) < µ(mB), the mixing time bound is smaller for a decreasing sequence of
cache sizes than for an increasing sequence, with the sequences identified yielding the
minimum and maximum values.
We noted in Section 5.2.4 that learning accuracy favors more cache levels with
more space allocated to higher levels. However, we have just seen that mixing time
favors exactly the complementary case. Figure 5.10 illustrates this tradeoff between
learning accuracy and speed by depicting the hit probability as a function of the num-
ber of requests, where we take (n,m) = (100, 15). Note that the x-axis is plotted in a
logarithmic scale. We see that increasing the number of caching levels promotes accu-
racy at the expense of a longer time to attain that accuracy. The results of FIFO(m)
exhibit similar trends, and hence are omitted here.
5.2.6 Trace-based Simulations Using Youtube Traces
The analytical insights that we have obtained thus far on learning rate and accu-
racy were obtained under a fixed IRM request model. We next consider arrivals that
follow a dynamic request process by conducting trace-based simulations. The trace
that we use is publicly available [95] and was extracted from a 2-week YouTube re-
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Figure 5.11: Trace-based hit probabilities of LRU(m) with mi+1 = 0.5mi for i =
1, · · · , h− 1 and ∑imi = m.
quest traffic dump between June 2007 and March 2008. There are a total of 611, 968
requests for 303, 331 different videos in this trace. About 75% of those videos were
requested only once during the trace. There is no information on the video sizes. We
therefore assume that the cache size is expressed as the number of videos that can
be stored in it. This assumption should have a low impact if the correlation between
video popularity and video size is low.
We first compare the performance of different replacement algorithms with the
total cache size m and the number of levels h. We make use of the ratio m/n =
5%, 10%, · · · under a different number of cache levels h in the linear cache network.
We still consider mi+1 = 0.5mi and
∑
imi = m for i = 1, · · · , h; we will explore other
partitions later in this section. Figure 5.11 reports the hit probabilities of LRU(m)
as a function of total cache size m. We observe that under the selected partitioning
scheme, increasing the number of caching levels can improve performance. This is
consistent with the observations under the synthetic simulation in IRM model. In
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RANDOM(m):h=1
LRU(m):h=1
FIFO(m):h=1
Figure 5.12: Trace-based hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with
mi+1 = 0.5mi for i = 1, · · · , h− 1 and
∑
imi = m: h = 1.
RANDOM(m):h=3
FIFO(m):h=3
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Figure 5.13: Trace-based hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with
mi+1 = 0.5mi for i = 1, · · · , h− 1 and
∑
imi = m: h = 3.
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Figure 5.14: Trace-based hit probabilities of LRU(m) with mi = (m−m1)/(h− 1)
for i = 2, · · · , h.
fact, most of the gain can be obtained with a small number of caches in the linear
cache network. The performance of RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m) exhibit similar
trends to LRU(m), and are omitted here.
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 compares hit probabilities between different algorithms,
we omit the cases for h = 2, 5. We note that LRU(m) does outperform FIFO(m)
and RANDOM(m) in all cases, but the gain becomes very limited when h is large.
Furthermore, although FIFO(m) and RANDOM(m) have the same performance
under the IRM model, FIFO(m) outperforms RANDOM(m) when confronted with
a real data trace.
Next, we investigate the impact of the cache partitions on performance. We fix
the total cache size m = 2, 000, and vary m1, and evenly divide the remaining cache
size among the remaining h − 1 caches. Hence, mi = m−m1h−1 for i = 2, · · · , h and∑h
i=1mi = m. Figure 5.14 depicts the hit probability of LRU(m) as a function
of the cache size assigned to m1, and we illustrate the cases where h = 1, 2, 3, 5.
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RANDOM(m):h=3
FIFO(m):h=3
LRU(m):h=3
Figure 5.15: Trace-based hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with
mi = (m−m1)/(h− 1) for i = 2, · · · , h: h = 3.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 compare the performance of different algorithms. These three
figures clearly illustrate the tradeoff between accuracy and speed of learning. As we
increase the caching resources allocated to the higher levels, the hit probability first
rises due to increased accuracy of learning, and then falls due to increasing learning
time. The observation remains consistent with an increase in the number of caching
levels, as well as across the different algorithms. Secondary observations are that
LRU(m) has a better performance than the other two, and that the enhanced hit
probability obtained through using multiple levels tapers off quite quickly.
5.3 A-LRU Algorithm
From the analysis of multi-level caching algorithm in the context of linear cache
networks in Section 5.2, we find that under IRM requests, the accuracy and mixing
time of an algorithm increases with both the number of cache levels and the space
allocated to higher caches. In this section, we numerically study the functionality
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Figure 5.16: Trace-based hit probabilities of various replacement algorithms with
mi = (m−m1)/(h− 1) for i = 2, · · · , h: h = 5.
of meta-cache through the analysis of 2-LRU, we find that under IRM model, meta
cache would improve hit probability at the expense of longer time to achieve the
stationarity. Then a natural question arises: can we design a new caching algorithms
that combine the ideas from meta-cache and multi-level caches which will achieve a
better tradeoff between the accuracy of learning items’ popularity and the speed of
learning? We combine the ideas from the analysis of LRU and 2-LRU to design a
new caching algorithm, A-LRU. We characterize its performance in this section.
5.3.1 Caching Algorithms
Adaptive Replacement Cache: ARC [71] uses the history of recently evicted
items to change its recency or frequency preferences. Specifically, ARC splits the
cache into two parts, T1 and T2, which cache items that only have been accessed
once, and many times, respectively. Furthermore, ARC maintains two additional
lists, B1 and B2, to record (LRU-based) eviction history of T1 and T2, respectively.
Recency or frequency preferences are adjusted by dynamically changing target sizes
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of T1 and T2 according to eviction histories recorded in B1 and B2. In this way, ARC
traces changes in traffic patterns and adjusts the replacement policy to emphasize
frequency or recency accordingly.
k-LRU: k-LRU [70] manages a cache of size m by making use of k−1 virtual caches,
which only store meta-data. Each cache is ordered such that the item in the j-th
position of cache l is the j-th most-recently-used item among all items in cache l.
When item i is requested, two events occur: (1) For each cache l in which item i
appears, say in position j for cache l, then item i moves to the first position of cache
l and items in positions 1 to j − 1 move back one position; (2) For each cache l in
which item i does not appear but appears in cache l − 1, item i is inserted in the
first position of cache l, all other items of cache l move back one position, and the
last item is evicted.
Adaptive-LRU (A-LRU): We define the quantities c1 = min(1, b(1− β)mc), c2 =
b(1−β)mc, c3 = b(1−β)mc+1 and c4 = max(m, b(1−β)mc+1), where β ∈ [0, 1] is
a parameter. We partition the cache into two parts with C2 defined as the positions
from c1 · · · c2 and C1 as the positions from c3 · · · c4. We also define the quantities
m1 = min(1, bβmc), m2 = bβmc, m3 = bβmc+ 1 and m4 = max(m, bβmc+ 1). We
associate positions m1 · · ·m2 with meta cache M2 and m3 · · ·m4 with meta cache
M1. Note that value m1 = m2 = 0 is an extreme point that yields behavior similar
to 2-LRU, while m3 = m4 = m + 1 yields LRU. The cache partitions are shown in
Figure 5.17.
Let us denote the meta data associated with a generic item i by M(i). The
operation of A-LRU is as follows if item i is requested. Different cases are illustrated
in Figure 5.17. There are two possibilities:
(1) Cache miss, then there are three cases to consider:
(1a) M(i) 6∈M1∪M2 : If c3 6= m+ 1, i is inserted into cache position l = c3, else
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(extreme case similar to 2-LRU) M(i) is inserted into meta cache position l = m3.
Cache/meta cache items in positions greater than l move back one position, and the
last meta-data is evicted;
(1b) M(i) ∈ M1 : Item i is inserted into position c1, all other items in C2 move
back one position, the meta data of item in cache position c2 is placed in position
m1, all other meta-data items move back one position, and the meta data in position
m2 moves to position m3;
(1c) M(i) ∈ M2 : If c1 = 1, item i is inserted into position l = c1. All other
items in C2 move back one position, and the meta data of item in cache position c2
is placed in position m1. Note that this situation cannot occur in the extreme case
of LRU, since M2 is always empty for LRU;
(2) Cache hit, then there are two cases to consider:
(2a) i ∈ C1 (suppose in position j): If c1 = 1, then item i moves to cache position
l = c1, else (extreme case of LRU) item i moves to cache position l = c3. If l = c1, all
other items in C2 move back one position, the item in cache position c2 is placed in
position c3, all other items in C1 upto position j move back one position. If l = c3
(extreme case of LRU), all other items in C1 upto position j move back one position.
(2b) i ∈ C2 (suppose in position j): Item i moves to cache position c1, and all
other items in positions min(2, c2) to j − 1 move back one position.
Remark 6 Note that the A-LRU setup can be generalized to as many levels as desired
by simply “stacking up” sets of real and meta caches, and following the same caching
and eviction policy outlined above (where (1a) would apply to the top level, while
(1c) and (2b) would apply to the bottom level). Since most of the possible cache gain
has already been achieved by 2-level cache network, here, we focus on analysis the
two-level A-LRU algorithm, shown in Figure 5.17. These results can be generalized
124
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
(1a)
(1b)
(1c)
(2a)
(2b)
Cache 2
Cache 1
Meta 2
Meta 1
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
cache partitions
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
m3 m4
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
m3 m4
c1 c2
c3 c4
m1 m2
m3 m4
m3 m4
m3 m4
m3 m4
Figure 5.17: Operation of the A-LRU algorithm.
to multi-level A-LRU.
Remark 7 ARC is an online algorithm with a self-tuning parameter, which has a
good performance in some real systems but the implementation is complex. k-LRU
has a relatively low complexity, which requires just one parameter, i.e., the number
of meta caches k − 1. We will see that these meta caches will provide a significant
improvement over LRU even for small number k. In fact, most of the gain can be
achieved by k = 2. A-LRU captures advantages of LRU and 2-LRU, i.e., learns both
faster and better about the changes in the popularity.
Now we are ready to characterize the performance of A-LRU with respect to τ -
distance and mixing time. We studied the performance of LRU, RAMDOM, FIFO
and CLIMB in Section 4, where we only provided a partial comparison between these
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Figure 5.18: τ -distance vs. hit probability for various caching algorithms with IRM
arrivals.
algorithms on a single cache. In this section, we provide a comprehensive comparison
between A-LRU and these algorithms.
5.3.2 Hit Probability and Permutation Distance
Since the τ -distance characterizes how accurately an algorithm learns the popu-
larity distribution, a smaller τ -distance should correspond to a larger hit probability.
Computation of the τ -distance is complex, since it is a function of all possible per-
mutations over the content items. But we can illustrate how different algorithms
perform using a content library size of n = 20. Figure 5.18 compares the τ -distance
and hit probabilities of various caching algorithms. The points on each curve corre-
spond to cache size of 2, 3, 4, 5 from left to right. Since the cache size should be an
integer, we partition the cache for A-LRU such that the size of cache 1 is always 1,
and the remaining cache size is allocated to cache 2. From Figure 5.18, we can see
that the τ -distance and hit probability follow the same rule, i.e., a smaller τ -distance
corresponds to a larger hit probability, which is as expected.
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Figure 5.19: Learning error of various
caching algorithms under the IRM ar-
rival process.
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Figure 5.20: Hit probability of various
caching algorithms under the IRM ar-
rival process.
5.3.3 Learning Error
We use the learning error defined in Equation (4.23) of Section 4.7 in Section 4 to
compare the performance of different caching algorithms, as illustrated in Figure 5.19.
We use a small cache size for these simulations, since computing all permutations
becomes prohibitively complex quickly. However, (n = 20,m = 4) serves to illustrate
the main insights. The learning error of various algorithms as a function of the
number of requests received is shown in Figure 5.19, where the y-axis is shown with
a logarithmic scale. Note also that the result in Figure 5.19 used a version of the
A-LRU algorithm with a time-dependent selection of cache divisions that is discussed
fully under the heading “Dynamic A-LRU” below. We see that LRU decreases fast
initially and then levels off, whereas 2-LRU has a slower decay rate, but the eventual
error is lower than that of LRU. This corresponds to faster mixing of LRU but a
poorer eventual accuracy (τ -distance) as compared to 2-LRU. The ARC algorithm
has a good performance initially, but it too levels off to an error larger than 2-LRU.
The A-LRU algorithm with cache partitions (1, 3) picks a combination of accurate
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learning and fast mixing, and is able to attain a low learning error quickly.
The effects seen in Figure 5.19 are also visible in the evolution of hit probabilities
shown in Figure 5.20, where the x-axis is on a logarithmic scale. Here, we choose
(n = 150,m = 30) in order to explore a range of cache partitions for A-LRU from
(0, 30)–(30, 0). We compare the upper envelope of achievable hit probability by A-
LRU with various other caching algorithms. We find that for any given learning
time (requests), there is a cache partition such that A-LRU will attain a higher hit
probability after learning for that time. These effects become more pronounced as
the partition space (cache size) available for A-LRU increases.
Dynamic A-LRU: Whereas in our description of A-LRU, we use a fixed parti-
tioning parameter β, the algorithm (and an implementation of it) can easily consider
time-varying β values. For the sake of argument, we consider a k levels A-LRU with
a sequence of χs such that χ1, χ2, · · · , χk becomes 0 as the number of requests go to
infinity, satisfying (i)
∑
t χi(t)→∞; (ii)
∑
t χ
2
i (t) <∞; and (iii) χi(t)/χi+1(t)→ 0.
Here, χ1 stands for the proportion of LRU to the rest, χ2 stands for the proportion
between 2-LRU and 3-LRU to the rest, etc. A typical choice of sequences will be
χi(t) = m/(m + t
i+1
2i /ci), where t counts the number of requests and ci > 0 is a pa-
rameter to be varied. Under such setting, the βs in the previous definition of A-LRU
satisfy that (i) at level i ≤ k− 1, it is (1−χ1(t))(1−χ2(t)) · · · (1−χi−1(t))χi(t), and
(ii) at level k, it is (1− χ1(t))(1− χ2(t)) · · · (1− χk(t)).
In particular, we consider the 2-level A-LRU shown in Figure 5.17. Here, the βs
are β1(t) = m/(m+ t/c) and β2(t) = 1− β1(t), where we take a common constant c
for simplicity. With such a sequence of βs, A-LRU will start at 1 (LRU) and (slowly)
decrease to 0 (2-LRU). Under the setting (n = 150,m = 30), we choose different val-
ues of the constant c = 3, 10, 15 for illustration, as shown in Figure 5.21. We observe
that the resulting algorithm will learn fast initially, and then smoothly transition
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to learning accurately. Finally, we note that the results for A-LRU presented in
Figure 5.19 used c = 600.
If the popularity distribution changes with time (in the next section), we should
only consider constant β algorithms. These two distinctions follow from stochastic
approximation ideas where while decreasing step-size algorithms can converge to
optimal solutions in stationary settings, constant step-size algorithms provide good
tracking performance for non-stationary settings.
A-LRU-c3
LRU
2-LRU
A-LRU
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A-LRU-c15
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Figure 5.21: Hit probability for A-
LRU with time-varying β under IRM
arrival process.
ratio=cache size/total number of unique items
Figure 5.22: Hit probabilities under
Markov-modulated arrivals with ξ =
0.1.
5.3.4 Markov Modulated Requests
While requests drawn from IRM allow us to study the accuracy of learning a
fixed popularity distribution over time, a real arrival process would have a changing
popularity distribution. Hence, we desire to construct an arrival process that contin-
ually changes the popularity distribution in order to understand how well different
caching algorithms are able to track the arrival process.
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A simple model that possesses the desired changeability property is a Markov
modulated request process. Under this model, we have an underlying two-state
Markov chain, in which each state corresponds to one popularity distribution. Re-
quests are drawn from the distribution corresponding to the current state. Define a
Markov Chain {Bh}h≥0 with state space {0, 1}, each corresponding to one popularity
distribution. We say Bh = 0 if the system is at state 0 and the popularity follows
one Zipf-like distribution, and Bh = 1 if the system is at state 1 and follows another
Zipf-like distribution. W.l.o.g., we consider two Zipf-like distributions over n unique
items, one with increasing order of ranking, i.e., pi = A/i
α, the other with decreasing
order of ranking, i.e., pj = A/(n− j + 1)α, where i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
In our model, we assume that if the Markov chain is in some particular state, a
fixed number of requests, r, will be drawn according to the distribution corresponding
to that state. After that, a possible state transition can take place. For example,
if Bh = 0, then with probability ξ, the system will stay in state 0 after r requests,
otherwise, the system will switch to state 1. Similarly for Bh = 1.
Since the expected time in one state is 1
1−ξ , the expected request rate is
r
1
1−ξ
=
r(1− ξ). A larger ξ means the rate of change of popularity is low, i.e., an algorithm
that has accurate learning is desirable. This situation corresponds to a higher weight
on 2-LRU-like behavior, and we choose a smaller β for A-LRU. The extreme case is
ξ = 1, which the system stays in one state and follows a fixed Zipf-like popularity
distribution. Here, we choose β = 0, i.e., A-LRU is equivalent to 2-LRU. The
complementary argument applies if ξ is small. Here, the popularity changes quickly,
and hence fast mixing is desirable at the cost of losing accuracy. Thus, LRU-like
behavior is desirable and we choose β large.
Figure 5.22 compares the hit probability of A-LRU with LRU, 2-LRU and ARC
under Markov Modulated requests, where we take n = 1000 and r = 1000. We see
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Table 5.1: Relation between ξ and β.
ξ 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Optimal β 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0
LRU
FIFO
RANDOM
CLIMB
2-LRU
ARC
A-LRU-0.2
Figure 5.23: Hit probability vs. cache size, for various caching algorithms with
two-week long YouTube trace [95].
that A-LRU is able to outperform all other algorithms for an appropriate choice of
β. The relation between ξ and the optimal β for A-LRU is given in Table 5.1, which
verifies the conclusion that β should decrease with increasing ξ.
5.3.5 Trace-based Simulations
The ideas presented thus far have been based on the hypothesis that the request
distribution changes dynamically, and hence an optimal caching algorithm should
track the changes at a time scale consistent with the time scale of change.
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Figure 5.24: Hit probability vs. cache size, for various caching algorithms with one
particular day YouTube trace [95].
5.3.5.1 YouTube Trace
We use the same data trace [95] that was used in Section 5.2.6. We find that α =
0.605 is the best fit for a Zipf-like distribution. However, a detailed inspection shows
that this trace exhibits significant non-stationarity, i.e., the popularity distribution
is time-varying.
We compare the hit performance of different algorithms by varying cache size.
Figure 5.23 depicts the hit probability as a function of the cache size when the
total number of unique videos is n = 303, 331, and we make the use of the ratio
m/n = 0.01, · · · , 0.10. For ease of visualization, we only depict A-LRU with the
optimal β, which outperforms all the other caching algorithms.
We also conduct experiments on an one-day YouTube trace We randomly pick
one day from the two-week traces, in which the total number of uniques videos is
3×105 and the Zipf-like distribution parameter α = 0.48 (but popularity varies with
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Table 5.2: SD network trace overview [13]
Date # Obj # Req 1-timers α
02/18 854241 3571125 68.30% 0.817
02/19 993711 4121865 68.66% 0.815
02/20 871565 3593373 69.27% 0.814
02/21 811827 3416817 67.61% 0.821
time). Figure 5.24 depicts the hit probability as a function of the cache ratio.
5.3.5.2 ICN Traces
We run similar experiments using the traces from the IRCache project [13], with
attention on data gathered from the SD Network Proxy (the most loaded proxy to
which end-users can connect) in Feb. 2013. A detailed study shows that such traces
capture regional traffic and exhibit significant non stationaries due to daily traffic
fluctuations. We only considered the traces in the 4 hours peak traffic periods in
order to measure the performance expected in the busy hour. The characteristics of
the traces are shown in Table 5.2.
We consider a basic cache network hierarchy [13], in which there is a core cache
that serves 4 edge caches, which are loaded by the real traces of the same four hours
of four consecutive days, i.e., Feb. 18 + i trace loads the i-th edge cache, where
i = 0, · · · , 3. For simplicity, we assume that the size of edge caches are identical
and equal to 1/10 of the core cache size. Figure 5.25 shows the overall cache hit
probability versus the core cache size.
5.4 Conclusion
In this section, we first investigated the performance of a class of cache replace-
ment algorithms in linear cache networks. We studied the stationary distributions of
various replacement algorithms under the IRM model, and computed the τ -distance
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Figure 5.25: Hit probability vs cache size for various caching algorithms with SD
network trace [13] for ICN.
between the stationary distributions and the best possible, which provided the in-
sight that multiple caching levels with a cache partition that favors the higher levels
promotes accuracy. We then analyzed the mixing time of each algorithm under a
fixed popularity distribution to determine how long it would take to converge to the
stationary distribution. We found that a larger number of caching levels and more
resources allocated to higher level caches increases the mixing time, i.e, the two ob-
jectives of learning accuracy and speed are at odds with each other. We conducted
a YouTube trace-based simulations to test the performance of these algorithms with
real-word inputs. We observed the tradeoff between accuracy and speed in this real-
istic setting, showing that cache network selection should be done with a clear idea
of the time constants in the system in order to obtain optimal performance.
We then combined the ideas of our analysis to develop a new hybrid algorithm,
A-LRU, that can be adapted to different non-stationary request processes and con-
sequently has a higher hit probability than any of the standard algorithms that we
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compared against under both synthetic and trace-based evaluation.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we explored equilibria in large scale networked systems from two
areas: mean field games in large scale societal networks and dynamic adaptability of
replacement algorithms in cache networks. More specifically, in each of the four pre-
ceding sections, we have analyzed and designed incentives and algorithms to achieve
the desirable equilibria which benefits the system as a whole. However, several ques-
tions still remain. To conclude this thesis, we go back to each section and give a
discussion on the possible directions for future research.
Mean Field Games in societal networks :
The two problems discussed in Section 2 and Section 3 indicate the value of
the mean field game approach towards modeling and analysis of large scale societal
networks. In both problems, the desire was to steer the system towards an equi-
librium that benefits society. However, fundamental questions remain on both the
convergence to and selection of the MFE.
• Convergence to MFE : In both the results presented, we used a fixed point
approach to show the existence of an MFE. However, we have not characterized
the convergence of the state distribution of agents to the mean field equilibrium.
In our simulations, we presented an intuitive set of dynamics that appear to
have the right properties for convergence. The dynamics took the form of
providing the empirical distribution of state to each agent, which then takes a
best response assuming that distribution would apply for all future time. The
empirical distribution is updated and the cycle begins again. Such dynamics
are simple, and appear to converge quickly to an MFE. We would like to show
analytically that such dynamics would indeed possess convergence properties.
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• Selection of MFE : In the problem of providing incentives for demand-response
in the smart grid setting, we chose to provide coupons at different times of day
to encourage customers to utilize energy at certain times of day. This selection
was done heuristically, and we showed numerically that the resulting MFE is
desirable form the perspective fo the LSE due to reduced hazard. However, the
question arises as to how to steer MFE in a given direction, and the cost of doing
so. In other words, the question is whether we can determine the difference in
overall utility at MFE as a function of the structure of the incentives provided,
hence characterizing the tradeoff between the cost of such incentives and the
value of the MFE attained.
Dynamic adaptability of caching algorithms :
For the problems discussed in Section 4 and Section 5, we observe that allowing for
multiple levels with sizes determined using a probability distribution, appropriately
projected to yield integer allocations, A-LRU yields a suite of caching algorithms
that can smoothly transition from LRU to LFU1, which is ∞-LRU. We conjecture
that given any finite number of requests t, within this suite of algorithms we can find
at least one that will yield the lowest possible learning error at t over all possible
caching algorithms; we also expect that it would be sufficient to consider a finite
number of levels, possibly O(log(t)). Furthermore, we believe that it would be pos-
sible to find a sequence of finite level algorithms going from LRU to LFU that has
performance arbitrarily close to the best possible learning error (infimum over all
possible algorithms). Establishing these conjectures will be our future goal.
1 [70] the Least Frequently Used policy statically stores the most popular m items in the cache
(assuming their popularity is known). LFU is known to be optimal under IRM.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FROM SECTION 2
A.1 Properties of Allocation Scheme
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Given the B2D arrivals (e1[k], ..., eM [k]), we partition the set of devices {1, ...,M}
into sets S and Sc = {1, ...,M}\S, based on whether ei[k]+T −N ≥ 0 or not. Those
agents that satisfy this condition can potentially receive enough chunks during the
D2D phase that they can decode the block, whereas the others cannot. Hence, all
members of Sc can potentially transmit their chunks in the allocation solving (2.13).
Let T1 = min{
∑
i∈Sc ei[k], T}. So we can devote the first T1 slots of the current
frame to transmissions from the devices in Sc.
Let the number of transmissions made by agent i in allocation a be denoted by
xi[k]. We can write down the constraints that any feasible allocation a must satisfy
as
0 ≤ xi[k] ≤ ei[k] ∀ i ∈ S∑
i∈S xi[k] = T − T1
(A.1)
Observe that each agent can transmit ei[k] + T − N chunks without affecting the
above constraints (i.e., it does not change its chances of being able to decode the
block, as there is enough time left for it to receive chunks that it requires). We call
these as “extra” chunks. Suppose that all extra chunks have been transmitted by
time T2 < T, and no device has yet reached full rank. At this point, all agents in the
system need the same number of chunks, and any agent that transmits a chunk will
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not be able to receive enough chunks to decode the block. In other words, agents
now have to “sacrifice” themselves one at a time, and transmit all their chunks. The
question is, what is the order in which such sacrifices should take place?
Compare two agents i and j, with deficits di > dj. Also, let χ ∈ {0, 1}. Now, for
either value of χ
di − (di − χ)+ ≥ dj − (dj − χ)+.
Hence, since c(.) is convex and monotone increasing,
∫ di
(di−χ)+
c′(z)dz ≥
∫ dj
(dj−χ)+
c′(z)dz ≥ 0 (A.2)
⇒ c(di)− c((di − χ)+) ≥ c(dj)− c((dj − χ)+) ≥ 0. (A.3)
Now, consider the following problem with χi, χj ∈ {0, 1} under the constraint
χi + χj = 1 :
min
χi,χj
c(di − χi) + c(dj − χj). (A.4)
⇔ max
χi,χj
c(di)− c(di − χi) + c(dj)− c(dj − χj). (A.5)
Then, from the above discussion, the solution is to set χi = 1 and χj = 0. Thus,
comparing (A.4) and (2.13), the final stage of the allocation should be for agents to
sacrifice themselves according to a min-deficit-first type policy. Algorithm 1 describes
the final allocation rule.
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A.2 Properties of Mechanisms
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The net-cost in frame k for agent i when reporting θi[k] versus ri[k] is given by
V (a∗(θˆsji[k] [k]), θi[k])− p∗(θi[k], θˆ−i[k])
= W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))−H(θˆ−i[k])
≤ W˜ (i, (ri[k], θˆ−i[k]))−H(θˆ−i[k])
= V (a∗((ri[k], θˆ−i[k])), θi[k])− p∗(ri[k], θˆ−i[k]), (A.6)
where θi is the true type and ri is an arbitrary type; the equalities hold true due
to the definition of value function and transfer; the last inequality follows by the
optimality of allocation a˜(θi, θˆ−i) in cluster sji[k] maximizes the system utility from
the perspective of agent i. Therefore, in every frame it is best for agent i to report
truthfully and this holds irrespective of the reports of the other agents.
A.3 Nature of Transfers
A.3.1 Proof of Lemma 2
From (2.11), we have
p∗(θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]) = V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k]) +H(θˆ−i[k])− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))
+ W˜−i(i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))
(a)
≥ V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k])− V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θˆi[k])
(b)
≥ 0,
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where (a) follows from the definition of allocation a˜ and the inequality (b) is true by
the monotonicity argument below.
We assume that under both systems (with the allocations a−i and a∗), the deficits
are initialized with the same value. Also note that all the agents follow the same
reporting strategy in frame k, and hence, χ(a∗) and χ(a−i) can be compared. Under
allocation a−i, agent i never transmits and will pick up free chunks from other agents’
transmissions. However, agent i may have to transmit under allocation a∗. Thus,
we have
χi(a
∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k]) ≤ χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]), (A.7)
as ei[k] + gi(a
∗(θˆ[k])) ≤ ei[k] + gi(a−i(θˆ−i[k])) is true for every k.
Using this we can compare the two deficits by considering the same allocation
policy. For k ≥ 0, we have
di(a
∗(θˆ[k])) =
(
di(a
∗(θˆ[k − 1])) + η − χi(a∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k])
)+
, (A.8)
di(a−i(θˆ−i[k])) =
(
di(a−i(θˆ−i[k − 1])) + η − χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k])
)+
,
with χi(a
∗(θˆ[k]), θi[k]) ≤ χi(a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]) for all k, which implies that di(a∗(θˆ[k]))
≥ di(a−i(θˆ−i[k])). Since the function V (·, ·) in (2.10) can be obtained by value iter-
ation starting with v(·), then by the definition of value function v(·) and the mono-
tonicity of holding cost function c(·) in d, we have V (·, ·) being an increasing function
in d. Then it directly follows that
V (a∗(θˆ[k]), θˆi[k]) ≥ V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θˆi[k]), (A.9)
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which completes our proof.
A.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3
The net-cost in frame k for agent i is given by
V (a∗(θˆsji[k] [k]), θi[k])− p∗(θi[k], θˆ−i[k]) = V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k])
− [W˜−i(i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))− W˜ (i, (θˆi[k], θˆ−i[k]))]
≤ V (a−i(θˆ−i[k]), θi[k]),
(A.10)
where we use the same logic as point (a) in (A.7).
A.4 Properties of the Optimal Value Function
A.4.1 Proof of Theorem 2
First, we consider statement 1). The proof follows by applying Theorem 6.10.4 in
Puterman [80], and verifying the Assumptions 6.10.1, 6.10.2 and Propositions 6.10.1,
6.10.3.
Define the set of functions
Φ =
{
w : (K, T )M → R+ : sup
θ∈(K,T )M
∣∣∣∣w(θ)α(θ)
∣∣∣∣ <∞
}
, (A.11)
where α(θ) = max{∑Mi vi(a∗(θ), θi), 1}. Note that Φ is a Banach space with α-norm,
||w||α = sup
θ∈(K,T )M
∣∣∣∣w(θ)α(θ)
∣∣∣∣ <∞. (A.12)
Also define the operation T1 as
T1w(θ) =
M∑
i=1
vi(a
∗(θ), θi) + δE {w(Θ)} , (A.13)
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where w ∈ Φ.
First, we need to show that for ∀w ∈ Φ, T1w ∈ Φ. From Equation (A.13) and
the definition of value functions, we know the sum of all users’ values are bounded,
say
∑M
i=1 vi(a
∗(θ), θi) ≤ A. Then we have
||T1w||α ≤ A+ δE {w(Θ)} , (A.14)
where the rightside expression is bounded by the sum of A and some multiple of
||w||α. Hence, T1w ∈ Φ.
Next, we need to verify Assumptions 6.10.1 and 6.10.2 in Puterman [80]. Our
theorem requires the verification of the following three conditions. Let Θ[k] be the
random variable denoting the current system state at frame k, where Θ[k] = (d[k−
1], e[k]). Then we must show that ∀θ ∈ (K, T )M , for some constants 0 < γ1 < ∞,
0 < γ2 <∞ and 0 < γ3 < 1,
sup
a∈A
|
M∑
i
vi(a
∗(θ), θi)| ≤ γ1α(θ), (A.15)
Eθ[1][w(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ γ2α(θ), ∀w ∈ Φ (A.16)
βkEθ[k][α(θ[k])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ γ3α(θ), for some k (A.17)
(B.1) holds from the definition of α(θ) = max{∑Mi vi(a∗(θ), θi), 1}.
(B.2) holds true since
Eθ[1][w(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ] ≤ ||w||α × Eθ[1][α(θ[1])|θ[0] = θ]
≤ ||w||α × γ′2α(θ), for some large enough γ′2
= γ2 × α(θ),
(A.18)
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as we know in our mean field model, θ[1] are all drawn i.i.d. from the given distri-
bution [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to the deficit, and ζ pertaining to the B2D
transmissions received by that agent, so the first inequality holds in (A.18).
Finally, we have (B.3) since,
βkEθ[k][α(θ[k])|θ[0] = θ] = βkEθ[k][
M∑
i
vi(a
∗(θ[k]), θi)|θ[0] = θ]
≤ βj × γ′3α(θ)
= γ3α(θ).
(A.19)
The first equality holds from the definition of α(θ), and the first inequality holds
true is because in our mean field mode, θ[j] are all drawn i.i.d. from the given
distribution [⊗ρM ,⊗ζM ], with ρ pertaining to the deficit, and ζ pertaining to the
B2D transmissions received by that agent, so it’s identical for all k.
Since we have verified all the three conditions required by Theorem 6.10.4 in
Puterman, Statement 1) holds true.
For statement 2), we can use the same argument as the above proof to show the
existence of fix point. We omit the details here. The last part of Theorem 2 follows
from the discussion before the statement of this theorem.
A.5 The Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Surplus Distribution
A.5.1 Proof of Lemma 4
First, from (2.16), we note the Doeblin condition, namely,
P(di[k] ∈ B|di[k − 1] = d, ei[k] = e, a) ≥ (1− δ)Ψ(B), (A.20)
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where 0 < δ < 1 and Ψ is a probability measure. Then following the results in
Chapter 12 of [73], the Markov chain with transition probabilities in (2.16) is positive
Harris recurrent and has a unique stationary distribution.
Next, let −τ be the last time before 0 that regeneration happened. We have
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
P(B|τ = k)P(τ = k).
(A.21)
Since the regeneration happens independently of the deficit queue with inter re-
generation times geometrically distributed with parameter (1 − δ), it follows that
P(τ = k) = (1− δ)δk. Hence
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkP(D[0] ∈ B|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkE(E(1{D[0]∈B}|τ = k,D−k = D,E)|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkE(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)),
(A.22)
where the last equality holds since D−k ∼ Ψ given τ = k.
A.6 Existence of MFE
A.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5
We will establish the second property first. We’re given a sequence {σn}n∈N ⊂ C
that converges point-wise to σ; it obviously follows that σ ∈ C even with point-
wise convergence so that we are, in fact, showing that C is closed in l∞ too. Since
155
limn→∞ bn = 0, given  > 0, there exists 1 N such that for all n > N , bn ≤ /2 so that
supk∈N |σkn| ≤ bn ≤ /2 too. Since limk→∞ σkn = σn for all n = 1, . . . , N , we can find
Nn such that for all k > Nn, |σkn−σn| ≤ . Therefore, for k > max(N,maxn=1,...,N Nn)
|σkn − σn| ≤

, n = 1, . . . , N
|σkn|+ |σn| ≤ , n > N
(A.23)
so that ‖σk − σ‖ ≤ .
Since we have already established that C is closed in l∞, it is sufficient to prove
that it is totally bounded as well. Here we first find N such that for all n > N , bn ≤ 
so that supk∈N |σkn| ≤ bn ≤  too. Then from the compactness of
∏N
n=1[−bn, bn] ∈ RN ,
we can find a finite number of points {v1, v2, . . . , vL} ⊂ ∏Nn=1[−bn, bn] such that∏N
n=1[−bn, bn] is covered by balls of radius  around vl, l = 1, . . . , L. Now we construct
{vˆ1, . . . , vˆL} ∈ C as follows for l = 1, . . . , L
vˆln =

vln, if n ≤ N
0, otherwise.
(A.24)
By our choice of N , {vˆ1, . . . , vˆL} is a finite cover of C with balls of radius , proving
that C is totally bounded too.
A.6.2 Proof of Lemma 6
The proof will involve three steps. The first is to establish that Πρ×ζ is indeed
a probability distribution, which is obvious. The second is to establish that Πρ×ζ ∈
M1(K), which will be carried out using induction by analyzing the properties of the
Markov transition kernel of the deficit process without any regenerations. Finally,
1Note the abuse of notation only in this section to use N to represent a positive integer.
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using stochastic dominance we will show that Πp×ζ ∈ P(F ).
From earlier Lemma 4, we know that
Πρ×ζ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δkEΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)). (A.25)
Therefore, for our proof we will show that EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|D,E)) ∈M1(K). Since
EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(B|D,E)) =
∫
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(B|d, e)dΨ(d)dζ(e), (A.26)
and Ψ ∈ M1(K) and ζ ∈ M1(T ), it is sufficient to show that Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) ∈ M1(K)
for every (d, e) ∈ (K, T ).
Since Υ
(0)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) is a point-mass at d, the initial condition is satisfied. We now
make the induction assumption that Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) ∈M1(K) and show that this implies
that Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e) ∈ M1(K). Since Υ(k+1)ρ×ζ (·|d, e) is a probability measure, we only
need to show that its support is K. By the definition of the Markov transition kernel
without regenerations, we have
Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (B|d, e) =
∫ 1∑
j=0
1{(d′+η−j)+∈B}pj(d
′, e′)dΥ(k)(d′|d, e)dζ(e′), (A.27)
for some measurable functions {pj(d′, e′)}j=0,1 that account for the states of the other
users being chosen independently using distribution ρ × ζ and the greedy optimal
allocation function a∗(·). The assertion that Υ(k+1)ρ×ζ (·|d, e) ∈ M1(K) follows since
d′ ∈ K and the only possible updates are an increase of the deficit to d′ + η or a
decrease to either 0 or d′ + η − 1 (depending on value of d′).
The deficit process for any given user is stochastically dominated by the fictitious
process where the user is never allowed to decode the contents of a frame during his
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lifetime, this is irrespective of his state or the state of the other users. Denote this
process by {D˜k}k∈N; it is easily discerned that the process takes values in K. The
transition kernel for this process is given by
P(D˜k+1 = d|D˜k = d′) = δ1{d=d′+η} + (1− δ)Ψ(d). (A.28)
Using the same proof as in Lemma 4, the invariant distribution Π˜ of the {D˜k}k∈N
process is given by
Π˜(d) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δk
∑
d′∈K
Ψ(d′)1{d′+kη=d}. (A.29)
By the stochastic ordering property, the proof follows by noting that
EΠρ×ζ [D] ≤ EΠ˜[D]
≤
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)δk
∑
d′∈K
Ψ(d′)(d′ + kη)
< F ′ +
δη
1− δ .
(A.30)
A.6.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We will start by showing that Π∗ is continuous in the topology of point-wise con-
vergence. For this we will use the coupling from Theorem 5 to establish convergence
in total variation norm of the Markov transition kernels of the deficit process without
any regenerations. Then using Lemma 5 we can strengthen the topology to complete
the proof of the first part. The fixed point result then follows from the Schauder
fixed point theorem after noting both the convexity and compactness of P(F ).
To establish the continuity of Π∗ in the topology of point-wise convergence,
we will start by proving that the Markov transition kernels without regeneration
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{Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e)}∞k=0 are continuous in the topology of point-wise convergence. Since
Υ
(0)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) is a point-mass at d irrespective of ρ ∈ P(F ), the continuity asser-
tion holds. In fact, for all n ≥ 1 and d′ ∈ K, Υ(0)ρn×ζ(d′|d, e) = Υ
(0)
ρ×ζ(d
′|d, e). Let
{ρn}n∈N ⊂ P(F ) be a sequence converging point-wise 2 to ρ ∈ P(F ). We will show
that Υ
(k)
ρn×ζ(·|d, e) converges point-wise to Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for all k ∈ N. We will prove
this by induction.
We will refer to any measures and random variables corresponding to ρn as coming
from the nth system and those corresponding to ρ as coming from the limiting system.
We will prove the point-wise convergence of Υ
(k)
ρn×ζ(·|d, e) converges point-wise to
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for all k ∈ N using the metric given by the total variation norm. Following
Lindvall [66], the total variation norm distance between two probability measures µ
and ν on a countable measurable probability space Ω is given by
dTV (µ, ν) =
1
2
∑
ω∈Ω
∣∣µ(ω)− ν(ω)∣∣
= inf{P(X 6= Y ) : r.v.s X, Y s.t. X ∼ µ and Y ∼ ν},
(A.31)
where the infimum is over all couplings or joint distributions such that the marginals
are given by µ and ν, respectively; the second definition applies more generally while
the first is restricted to countable spaces.
For ease of exposition we will denote by 1 the user whose deficit varies as per
the Markov transition kernel Υ
(k)
•×ζ(·|d, e) and the remaining users in the cluster by
indices {2, 3, . . . ,M}. For the nth system and in the limiting system, in every frame
the B2D component of the state of every user (including 1) is chosen i.i.d. with
distribution ζ. We will couple all the systems under consideration such that the
B2D component of the state is exactly the same; denote the random vector by E
2By Lemma 5, this convergence also holds in l∞.
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with components El for l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. For users l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M} the deficit is
chosen independently via distribution ρn in the n
th system and via distribution ρ in
the limit system. Since ρn converges to ρ point-wise, using Theorem 5 we can find
a coupling {X˜ ln}n∈N, X˜ l and an a.s. finite random integer N˜l for l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M}
such that for n ≥ N˜ l, X˜ ln = X˜ l.
Next by the induction hypothesis let Υ
(k)
ρn×ζ(·|d, e) converge point-wise to
Υ
(k)
ρ×ζ(·|d, e) for some k ∈ N, once again by Theorem 5, there exists a coupling
{Xn}n∈N, X and an a.s. finite random variable Nk ∈ N such that Xn ∼ Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|d, e)
for all n ∈ N, X ∼ Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|d, e) and Xn = X for all n ≥ Nk.
With these definitions in place, further define the following
Dk+1n =
(
Xn + η − χ1
(
a∗
((
(Xn, E1), (X˜
2
n, E2), . . . , (X˜
M
n , EM)
))
,
((
(Xn, E1), (X˜
2
n, E2), . . . , (X˜
M
n , EM)
))))
+
(A.32)
Dk+1 =
(
X + η − χ1
(
a∗
((
(X,E1), (X˜
2, E2), . . . , (X˜
M , EM)
))
,
((
(X,E1), (X˜
2, E2), . . . , (X˜
M , EM)
))))
+
,
(A.33)
where we have taken care to explicitly spell out the states of all the users involved.
Then Dk+1n is a random variable distributed as Υ
(k+1)
ρn×ζ (·|d, e) and Dk+1 is a random
variable distributed as Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e).
Furthermore, for n ≥ Nˆ := max(Nk, N˜2, . . . , N˜M), we have Xn = X, X˜ ln = X˜ l
for l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,M}. The last statement then implies that Dk+1n = Dk+1 for n ≥ Nˆ .
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Therefore, it follows that
{ω : Dk+1n 6= Dk+1} ⊂ {w : Nˆ > n}, (A.34)
so that
dTV
(
Υ
(k+1)
ρn×ζ (·|d, e),Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e)
)
≤ P(Dk+1n 6= Dk+1)
≤ P(Nˆ > n),
(A.35)
which converges 3 to 0 as n → ∞ by the a.s. finiteness of Nˆ . From the definition
of the metric dTV (·, ·), it is follows that Υ(k+1)ρn×ζ (·|d, e) converges to Υ
(k+1)
ρ×ζ (·|d, e) in l1,
and so both in l∞ and point-wise also.
Having established the basic convergence result, EΨ(Υ(k)ρn×ζ(·|D,E)) converges
point-wise to EΨ(Υ(k)ρ×ζ(·|D,E)) for every k ∈ {0} ∪ N by using the bounded conver-
gence theorem since we are averaging probability distributions. Additionally, again
using the bounded convergence theorem, Πρn×ζ(·) converges point-wise to Πρ×ζ(·).
A.6.4 Proof of Theorem 7
Suppose there exist two MFE, namely ρ1 and ρ2. Consider a generic agent 1.
Agent 1 has a belief that the other agents in the same cluster will draw their states
from ρ1 or ρ2 for deficits and ζ for B2D transmissions in an i.i.d. fashion. We assume
that each agent has the same realization of B2D packets received under these two
deficit distributions. Given this belief and our incentive compatible mechanism (that
determines transfers as a fucntion of the belief), all the agents in this cluster will
truthfully reveal their states, i.e., the B2D term will be the same no matter whether
the belief is ρ1 or ρ2. By Algorithm 1, this will result in the same deficit update
for agent 1. Therefore, given the truth-telling mechanism and the unique policy, we
3Note that this yields a rate of convergence result as well.
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achieve a unique MFE, i.e., ρ1 = ρ2.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FROM SECTION 3
B.1 Properties of the Optimal Value Function
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 7
We first show that Tρf ∈ Φ for ∀f ∈ Φ. The proof then follows through a
verification of the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [80]. From the definition of Tρ
in (3.9), we have
|Tρf(x)| ≤ |u(x)|+ max
a(x)∈A
θa(x) + βmax(|f(x+ w)|, |f(x− l)|).
From this it follows that
sup
x∈X
|Tρf(x)|
Ω(x)
≤ sup
x∈X
|u(x)|
Ω(x)
+ sup
x∈X
maxa(x)∈A θa(x)
Ω(x)
+ βmax
(
sup
x∈X
|f(x+ w)|
Ω(x)
, sup
x∈X
|f(x− l)|
Ω(x)
)
.
Let x+ be the unique positive surplus such that u(x+) = 1 and x− be the unique
negative surplus such that u(x−) = −1. Note that Ω(x) is non-decreasing for x ≥
x− and non-increasing for x ≤ x+. To avoid cumbersome algebra we will assume
x+ − w > 0 and x− + l > 0. Since Ω(x) ≥ |u(x)| ≥ 0 and Ω(x) ≥ 1, the first two
terms are bounded by 1 and maxa(x)∈A θa(x). For the last term we have
sup
x∈X
|f(x+ w)|
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω sup
x∈X
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
.
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We have the following
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
=

u(x+w)
max(u(x),1)
≤ u(x+w)
u(x)
, if x ≥ x+
u(x+w)
max(u(x),1)
≤ u(x+w)
u(x+)
, if x ∈ [x+ − w, x+]
1, if x ∈ [x−, x+ − w]
1
|u(x)| ≤ 1, if x ∈ [x− − w, x−]
u(x+w)
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ≤ x− − w.
For x ≥ x+, we know using monotonicity of u(·)
u(x+ w)
u(x)
= 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(w)
w
w
u(x)
≤ 1 + u(x+ w)− u(w)
w
w.
Additionally, for x ∈ [x+ − w, x+] we have
u(x+ w)
u(x+)
= 1 +
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ (x+ w − x+)
≤ 1 + u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ w.
For the analysis we assume that u(·) is Lipschitz such that supx∈X u′(x) < +∞.
Therefore, by the mean value theorem
u(x+ w)− u(x)
w
= u′(ξ1) ≤ sup
x≥x+
u′(x), ∀ξ1, x ∈ [x+,∞)
u(x+ w)− u(x+)
x+ w − x+ = u
′(ξ2) ≤ sup
x∈[x+−w,x+]
u′(x), ∀ξ2, x ∈ [x+ − w, x+]
sup
x∈X
Ω(x+ w)
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + w sup
x≥x+−w
u′(x)), ∀x ∈ [x+ − w,∞).
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Similarly, we have
sup
x∈X
|f(x− l)|
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω sup
x∈X
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
.
Now we have the following
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
=

u(x−l)
min(u(x),−1) ≤ u(x−l)u(x) , if x ≤ x−
u(x−l)
max(u(x),−1) ≤ u(x−l)u(x−) , if x ∈ [x−, x− + l]
1, if x ∈ [x− + l, x+]
1
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ∈ [x+, x+ + l]
u(x−l)
u(x)
≤ 1, if x ≤ x+l
Using the same logic as before, we get
sup
x∈X
Ω(x− l)
Ω(x)
≤ ‖f‖Ω(1 + l sup
x∈X:x≤x−
u′(x)).
Since u(·) is Lipschitz, thus, there exists an α0 ∈ (0,+∞) such that ‖Tρf‖Ω ≤ α0.
Next, we need to verify the conditions of Theorem 6.10.4 in [80]. The lemma
requires verification of the following three conditions. We set x[k] to be the state
variable denoting the surplus at time k. We need to show that ∀x ∈ X, for some
constants (independent of ρ) α1 > 0, α2 > 0 and 0 < α3 < 1,
sup
a(x)∈A
|u(x)− θa(x)| ≤ α1Ω(x), (B.1)
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] ≤ α2Ω(x), ∀a0 ∈ A, (B.2)
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with the distribution of x[1] chosen based on action a0, and
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ α3Ω(x), (B.3)
for some J > 0 and all possible action sequences, i.e., aj ∈ A for all j = 0, 1, . . . , J−1
with the distribution of x[J ] chosen based on the action sequence (a0, a1, . . . , aJ−1)
chosen.
First consider (B.1). Since Ω(x) = max(|u(x)|, 1), using the earlier analysis in
Section 3.3, (B.1) is true with α1 = 1 + maxa∈A θa. Now consider (B.2). We have
Ex[1],a0 [Ω(x[1])|x[0] = x] = Eρ[φ(pρ,a(x))Ω(x+ w) + φ(1− pρ,a(x)),Ω(x− l)]
≤ max(Ω(x+ w),Ω(x− l)),
which is bounded by α2Ω(x) using our analysis from before.
Finally, (B.3) holds true using the properties of Ω(·), the bounds on the proba-
bility of winning and losing (from Section 3.3) and our analysis from earlier in the
proof as follows:
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x]
≤ βJ max(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))J max(Ω(x+ Jw),Ω(x− Jl))
≤ (βmax(φ(pW ), φ(1− pW ))Jα4(J)Ω(x),
for some affine α4(J) > 0 using our analysis from before. It now follows that take J
large enough we obtain an α3 < 1 that is also independent of ρ. Note that we can
get a simpler bound of
βJEx[J ],a0,a1,...,aJ−1 [Ω(x[J ])|x[0] = x] ≤ βJα4(J)Ω(x),
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using just the properties of Ω(·). Again we can take J large enough to obtain a
α3 < 1 that is independent of ρ. This bound is useful when there is an action for
which the probability of winning or losing is 1. Since all the conditions of Theorem
6.10.4 of [80] are met, then the first result in the lemma holds true. The second then
follows immediately from (3.8).
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 8
For any given ρ, from Lemma 7 we know that there is a unique Vρ(·). Furthermore,
it is the unique fixed point of operator Tρ where T
J
ρ is a contraction mapping with
constant α3 that is independent of ρ. From (3.9), it follows that T
J
ρ is a continuous
in ρ: computing derivatives using the envelope theorem and the expressions from
Section 3.3, it is easily established that T Jρ is, in fact, Lipschitz with constant (M−1)J
when the uniform norm is used for ρ.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two population/action profiles such that ‖ρ1−ρ2‖ ≤  (the choice
of norm is irrelevant as all are equivalent for finite dimensional Euclidean spaces).
As T Jρ is continuous in ρ, there exists a δ > 0 such that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − T Jρ2Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ.
However, since T Jρ2Vρ2 = Vρ2 , we have shown that ‖T Jρ1Vρ2 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤ δ. Applying T Jρ1
n times and using the contraction property of T Jρ1 , we get
‖T (n+1)Jρ1 Vρ2 − T nJρ1 Vρ2‖Ω ≤ αn3δ.
The proof then follows since limn→∞ ‖T nJρ1 Vρ2 − Vρ1‖Ω = 0 so that
‖Vρ1 − Vρ2‖Ω ≤
∞∑
n=0
‖T (n+1)Jρ1 Vρ2 − T nJρ1 Vρ2‖Ω ≤
δ
1− α3 .
Furthermore, using the comment from above we can show that Vρ is Lipschitz con-
tinuous in ρ.
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B.2 The Existence and Uniqueness of Stationary Surplus Distribution
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 9
First, from the transition kernel (3.11), we satisfy the Doeblin condition as
P(x[k] ∈ B|x[k − 1] = x) ≥ (1− β)Ψ(B),
where 0 < β < 1, and Ψ is a probability measure for the regeneration process. Then
from results in [73, Chapter 12], we have a unique stationary surplus distribution.
Next, let −τ be the last time before 0 that the surplus has a regeneration. Then
we have
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
P(B, τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
P(B|τ = k) · P(τ = k).
(B.4)
Since the regeneration process happens independently of the surplus with inter-
regeneration times geometrically distributed with parameter (1 − β), then P(τ =
k) = (1− β)βk. Also given τ = k, we have X−k ∼ Ψ. Therefore
ζρ×σ(B) =
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkP(B|τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE (E (1x[0]∈B|τ = k,X−k = X) |τ = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkE
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)|τ = k
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βk
∫
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x)dΨ(x).
(B.5)
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B.2.2 Existence of MFE
B.2.2.1 Proof of Lemma 10
Define the increasing and piecewise linear convex function
gρ(y) = max
a∈A
φ(pρ,a)y − θa
= max
σ∈∆(|A|)
∑
a∈A
σa
(
φ(pρ,a)y − θa
)
,
(B.6)
where ∆(A) is the probability simplex on A = |A| elements. By the properties of the
lottery and the weight function φ(·), φ(pρ,a) is continuous in ρ for all a ∈ A. Using
Berge’s maximum theorem, we have
arg max
σ∈∆(|A|)
∑
a∈A
σa (φ(pρ,a)y − θa) (B.7)
is upper semicontinuous in ρ.
Now let
A(y) := arg max g(y) = arg max
a∈A
φ(pρ,a)y − θa, (B.8)
then set-valued function above is exactly ∆(|A(y)|).
Hence, the optimal randomized policies at surplus x are a set-valued function
∆(|A(y)|) = ∆(|A(Vρ(x + w) − Vρ(x − l))|), which is upper semicontinuous due to
the Lipschitz continuity of Vρ(·) in ρ and the u.s.c. of φ(pρ,a) in ρ, i.e., for every state
x, the action distribution σ(x) is (pointwise) upper semicontinuous in ρ.
B.2.2.2 Proof of Lemma 11
The existence and uniqueness of ζ(x) for a given ρ and σ(x), and the relationship
between ζ(·) and ζ(k)(·) are shown in Lemma 9. Now, we will prove the continuity of
ζρ×σ in ρ and σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X. For the assumed action distribution ρ on
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the finite setA, we consider the topology of pointwise convergence which is equivalent
to the uniform convergence by the strong coupling results. For the randomized
action distribution σ(x) at each surplus x, we consider the topology with norm
||σ|| = ∑∞j=1 2−jσa(xj).
First, we will show that the surplus distribution ζ
(k)
ρ×σ is continuous in ρ and σ.
By Portmanteau theorem, we only need to show that for any sequence ρn → ρ in
uniform, σn → σ in pointwise, and any open set B ,we have lim infn→∞ ζ(k)ρn×σn(B|x) ≥
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x).
Lemma 15 lim infn→∞ ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) ≥ ζ(k)ρ×σ(B|x).
Proof of Lemma 15
We proceed the proof by induction on k. For k = 0, ζ
(0)
ρn×σn(B|x) = 1(x∈B) is
a point-mass at x irrespective of ρn × σn, and in fact, for any n ∈ N+, we have
ζ
(0)
ρn×σn(B|x) = ζ(0)ρ×σ(B|x). Let ρn → ρ uniform, and σn(x) → σ(x) pointwise for
every surplus x. We will show that ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) converges pointwise to ζ(k)ρ×σ(B|x).
We will refer to the measure and random variables corresponding to ρn × σn for
the nth system and those corresponding to ρ×σ as coming from the limiting system.
We will prove that ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) converges to ζ(k)ρ×σ(B|x) pointwise using the metrics
given above.
Suppose that the hypothesis holds true for k − 1 where k > 1, i.e., ζ(k−1)ρn×σn(B|x)
converges pointwise to ζ
(k−1)
ρ×σ (B|x). To prove this lemma, we only need to show
that the hypothesis holds for k. Let Pρ×σ,x(·) be the one-step transition probability
measure of the surplus dynamics conditioned on the initial state of the surplus being
x, and there is no regeneration. Then we have Pρn×σn,x(x + w) =
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a,
Pρn×σn,x(x− l) = 1−
∑
a∈σn(x) pρn×σn,a and Pρ×σ,x(x+w) =
∑
a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a, Pρ×σ,x(x−
l) = 1−∑a∈σ(x) pρ×σ,a. By the properties of the lottery, pρ×σ,a is continuous in ρ×σ
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for all a ∈ A, thus we have pρn×σn,a converges to pρ×σ,a pointwise, i.e., Pρn×σn,x(·)
converges to Pρ×σ,x(·) pointwise. By the Skorokhod representation theorem [14],
there exist random variables Xn and X on common probability space and a random
integer N such that Xn ∼ Pρn×σn,x(·) for all n ∈ N, and X ∼ Pρ×σ,x(·) , and Xn = X
for n ≥ N .
Then we have,
lim inf
n→∞
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) = lim infn→∞ E
(
ζ
(k−1)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥ E
(
lim inf
n→∞
ζ
(k−1)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥ E
(
ζ
(k−1)
ρ×σ (B|X)
)
= ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|x),
(B.9)
where the second and third inequality hold due to Fatou’s lemma and the induction
hypothesis. Hence, for a given ρ and randomized policies σ(x), the unique stationary
surplus distribution ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|x) converges pointwise to ζ(k)ρ×σ(B|x).
Now by Lemma 9 and Equation (3.12), we need to show that lim infn→∞ ζρn×σn(B)
≥ ζρ×σ(B). By Fatou’s lemma, we have
lim inf
n→∞
ζρn×σn(B) = lim inf
n→∞
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
lim inf
n→∞
ζ
(k)
ρn×σn(B|Xn)
)
≥
∞∑
k=0
(1− β)βkEΨ
(
ζ
(k)
ρ×σ(B|X)
)
= ζρ×σ(B).
(B.10)
Thus, for a given ρ and the randomize policies σ(x), the unique stationary surplus
distribution ζρn×σn converges pointwise to ζρ×σ. Then the stationary surplus distri-
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bution ζρ×σ is continuous in ρ and σ(x) for every surplus x ∈ X.
B.2.2.3 Proof of Lemma 12
Given the stationary surplus distribution ζ(x) and the action distribution σ(x)
at every surplus x, those will introduce a population profile based on the actions
chosen at each point x, denoted that action distribution as ρ, and we have ρa =∑
x ζ(x) · σa(x), where x ∈ X, a ∈ A, X is a countable set and A is a finite set.
To show that ρ is continuous in ζ(x) and σ(x), we only need to show that for
any sequence {ζn}∞n=1 converging to ζ in uniform norm, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converging to
σ(x) pointwise, we have {ρn}∞n=1 converges to ρ pointwise, which is equivalent to
convergence in uniform for the topology on a finite set A.
Since ζn → ζ uniformly, we have ∀1 > 0, ∃N1 ∈ N, so that ∀n ≥ N1, ∀x ∈ X,
|ζn(x) − ζ(x)| < 1. Similarly, {σn(x)}∞n=1 converges to σ(x) pointwise, we have
∀x ∈ X, and ∀2 > 0, ∃N2 ∈ N so that ∀n ≥ N2, , |σn(x) − σ(x)| < 2. Now
consider ∀ = max(1, 2), we can find an all but finite subset X1 of X, such that∑
x∈X1 ζ(x) <

2
. Let N = max(N1, N2), for ∀x ∈ X \X1, ∃n > N large enough, such
that |σn,a(x)− σa(x)| < 2 . Then ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, we have
|ρn,a − ρa| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x) +
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σn,a(x)−
∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
ζn(x)σa(x)−
∑
x
ζ(x)σa(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|+
∑
x
σa(x)|ζn(x)− ζ(x)|
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=
∑
x∈X1
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|+
∑
x∈X\X1
ζn(x)|σn,a(x)− σa(x)|
+
∑
x
σa(x)|ζn(x)− ζ(x)|
(a)
≤
∑
x∈X1
ζn(x) · 1 +
∑
x∈X\X1
ζn(x) · 
2
+
∑
x
σa(x) · 1
(b)
≤ 
2
· 1 + 1 · 
2
+ 1 · 1
≤  · 1 +  · 1
= 2, (B.11)
where (a) follows from the fact that |σn,a(x)− σa(x)| < 1 for ∀x ∈ X, and |σn,a(x)−
σa(x)| < 2 , for x ∈ X \ X1 given  > 0 and n large enough, and the convergence of
ζn. (b) follows from that
∑
x∈X1 ζ(x) <

2
for x ∈ X1.
Therefore, |ρn,a − ρa| < 2 for all a ∈ A and ∀n ≥ N , hence ρn → ρ pointwise,
which is equivalent to uniform convergence for the topology on finite set A.
B.3 Characteristics of the Best Response Policy
B.3.1 Proof of Lemma 13
First, we consider x ∈ X and x ≥ 0. We have
u(x)− θa2(x) + β[pρ,a2(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x− l)]
≷ u(x)− θa1(x) + β[pρ,a1(x)Vρ(x+ w) + (1− pρ,a1(x))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x)
≷ β[(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))Vρ(x+ w) + ((1− pρ,a1(x))− (1− pρ,a2(x)))Vρ(x− l)]
⇔ θa1(x) − θa2(x) ≷ β(pρ,a1(x)− pρ,a2(x))[Vρ(x+ w)− Vρ(x− l)].
(B.12)
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As we assumed θa1(x) > θa2(x), it follows that pρ,a1(x) > pρ,a2(x). Also, since w+ l > 0
and Vρ(x) is increasing in x, so both sides of the above inequality are non-negative.
Since Vρ(x) is submodular when x ≥ −l, the RHS is a decreasing function of x.
Let x∗a1,a2 ∈ X be the smallest value such that LHS ≥ RHS, then for all x > x∗a1,a2
action a2(x) is preferred to action a1(x), for all x < x
∗
a1,a2
action a1(x) is preferred to
action a2(x), and finally, if at x
∗
a1,a2
LHS=RHS, then at x∗a1,a2 the agent is indifferent
between the two actions, and if instead LHS > RHS, then action a2(x) is preferred
to action a1(x). We call x
∗
a1,a2
the threshold value of surplus for actions a1(x) and
a2(x).
Similarly, for x ∈ X and x ≤ 0, Vρ(x) is supermodular when x ≤ w, which implies
the existence of a threshold policy.
B.3.2 Proof of Lemma 14
First, let f ∈ Φ, suppose that f is an increasing and submodular function. First
we prove that Tρf is increasing and submodular too. Let a
∗(x) be an optimal action
in the definition of Tρf(x) when the surplus is x, i.e., one of the maximizers from
(3.9). Let x1 > x2, then
Tρf(x1)− Tρf(x2) = u(x1)− u(x2)− θa∗(x1) + θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x1)(x1)f(x1 + w)+
(1− pρ,a∗(x1)(x1))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
≥ u(x1)− u(x2)− θa∗(x2) + θa∗(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x1 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x1 − l)− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)− (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
= u(x1)− u(x2) + β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + w + a)− f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))(f(x1 − l)− f(x2 − l))
] ≥ 0.
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The first inequality holds because a∗(x2) need not be an optimal action when the
surplus is x1.
Again, let x1 > x2 and let x > 0. Since u(·) is a concave function, it follows that
it is submodular, i.e.,
u(x1 + x)− u(x1) ≤ u(x2 + x)− u(x2)⇔ u(x1 + x) + u(x2) ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1).
Assuming that f ∈ Φ is submodular, we will now show that Tρf is also submodular.
Consider
Tρf(x1 + x) + Tρf(x2) = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2)
+ β
[
pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x)f(x1 + x+ w) + pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 + x− l) + (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 − l)
]
.
We assume without loss of generality that pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x) ≥ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2) and let δ
be the difference; if pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 +x) ≤ pρ,a∗(x2)(x2), then a similar proof establishes
the result. Using this we have the RHS (denoted by d) being
d = u(x1 + x) + u(x2)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2)
+ β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w))
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))(f(x1 + x− l) + f(x2 − l))
+ δ(f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 − l))
]
.
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By submodularity of f(·) we have
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 + w) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w),
f(x1 + x− l) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l),
f(x1 + x+ w) + f(x2 − l) ≤ f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l).
With these and using the submodularity of u(·) we get
d ≤ u(x2 + x) + u(x1)− θa∗(x1+x) − θa∗(x2)
+ β
[
pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 + w))
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))(f(x2 + x− l) + f(x1 − l))
+ δ(f(x2 + x+ w) + f(x1 − l))
]
= u(x2 + x)− θa∗(x1+x) + β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x2 + x+ w)
+ (1− pρ,a∗(x2)(x2))f(x2 + x− l)] + u(x1)− θa∗(x2)
+ β[pρ,a∗(x2)(x2)f(x1 + w) + (1− pρ,a∗(x1+x)(x1 + x))f(x1 − l)]
≤ Tρf(x2 + x) + Tρf(x1),
where the last inequality holds as using the optimal actions (a∗(x2 +x), a∗(x1)) yields
a higher value as opposed to the sub-optimal actions (a∗(x1 + x), a∗(x2)) when the
surplus is x2 + x and x1.
Since both the monotonicity and submodularity properties are preserved when
taking pointwise limits, choosing f(·) ≡ 0 (or u(·)) to start the value iteration proves
that the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and submodular.
Similarly, if f ∈ Φ is an increasing and supermodular function, following the same
argument, we can prove that the value function Vρ(·) is increasing and supermodular.
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B.4 Numerical Study: Reward, Saving and Profit
Here we present two mappings of actions to coupons that are different from that
shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, and conduct the experiment with l = 1, 3, 5. We find
that our results are robust to the mapping of actions to coupons. For example, when
we set l = 1, most savings can be achieved by giving a $40 reward and the break-even
point is about $80 as observed earlier. The total rewards are bounded by $80 in all
cases.
B.4.1 Case 1
Our coupon choices are shown in Table B.1, where x1 and x6 are energy usage in
the corresponding periods (measured in kWh) and the day-ahead price is of one day
randomly drawn from the three months.
Table B.1: Day-ahead price and energy coupons
Index Period Day-ahead Price/MWh Coupons/kWh
1 2− 3 PM $47 90 if x1 > 2.464; 1.8 otherwise
2 3− 4 PM $55 5.4
3 4− 5 PM $78 1.8
4 5− 6 PM $99.6 0
5 6− 7 PM $66.5 3.6
6 7− 8 PM $49.5 36 if x6 > 2.24; 1.8 otherwise
We identified 6 actions as before, and computed the number of coupons received
under the new coupon awarding policy shown in Table B.1. These values are shown
in Table B.2.
Figure B.1 indicates results quite similar to those presented earlier in Figure 3.11.
The breakeven point and maximum profit are much the same.
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Table B.2: Actions, costs and energy coupons
Index Action Vector Cost Coupons
0 (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) 0 37.4
1 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.75, 21.25) 3.68 560
2 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 21.75) 3.51 559
3 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 22) 3.50 553
4 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.25, 22.25) 3.146 547
5 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23, 22.5) 2.68 471
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Figure B.1: The relation between customer reward, LSE savings and LSE profit.
Left: l = 1. Right: l = 5.
B.4.2 Case 2
Our coupon choices are shown in Table B.3, where x1 and x6 are energy usage
in the corresponding periods ( measured in kWh) and the day-ahead price is of one
day randomly drawn from the three months.
We identified 6 actions as before, and compute the number of coupons received
under the awarding policy shown in Table B.3. These values are shown in Table B.4.
Figure B.2 indicates results quite similar to those presented earlier in Figure 3.11.
The breakeven point and maximum profit are much the same.
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Table B.3: Day-ahead price and energy coupons
Index Period Day-ahead Price/MWh Coupons/kWh
1 2− 3 PM $47 144 if x1 > 2.464; 1.8 otherwise
2 3− 4 PM $55 5.4
3 4− 5 PM $78 1.8
4 5− 6 PM $99.6 0
5 6− 7 PM $66.5 3.6
6 7− 8 PM $49.5 72 if x6 > 2.24; 1.8 otherwise
Table B.4: Actions, costs and energy coupons
Index Action Vector Cost Coupons
0 (22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5, 22.5) 0 37.4
1 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.75, 21.25) 3.68 947
2 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 21.75) 3.51 944
3 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23.5, 22) 3.50 933
4 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 23.5, 23.25, 22.25) 3.146 916
5 (21.5, 21.5, 22.25, 24, 23, 22.5) 2.68 760
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Figure B.2: The relation between customer reward, LSE savings and LSE profit.
Left: l = 1. Right: l = 5.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FROM SECTION 4
C.1 Steady State Distribution
C.1.1 Proof of Theorem 9
We provide the proof for the steady state probability pi∗LRU(x) by using a prob-
abilistic argument, following [40]. We consider the current state x, and attempt to
reconstruct the past history by looking backwards in time. In order to achieve the
current state x = (x1, · · · , xm), the past history of requests, listed from the most
remote to the most recent, must be ordered as follows:
(2m): A last request for item xm is made;
(2m− 1): Requests for item (x1, x2, · · · , xm−1) are made;
(2m− 2): A last request for item xm−1 is made;
(2m− 3): Requests for item (x1, x2, · · · , xm−2) are made;
(2m− 4): A last request for item xm−2 is made;
(2m− 5): Requests for item (x1, x2, · · · , xm−3) are made;
. . .
(2): A last request for item x2 is made;
(1): At least one request for item x1 is made.
The probability that step 2j (2 ≤ j ≤ m) occurs with probability pxj , and the
probability steps 2j and 2j − 1 together is given by
pxj
∞∑
k=0
(
j−1∑
l=1
pxl
)k
=
pxj
1−∑j−1l=1 pxl . (C.1)
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Note that the last two steps occur with probability px2
∑
k=1 p
k
x1
= px2 · px11−px1 . Comb-
ing them together, we get the steady state probability of state x as
pi∗LRU(x) =
Πmi=1pxi
(1− px1)(1− px1 − px2) · · · (1− px1 − · · · − pxm−1)
, (C.2)
which gives us the desirable result.
C.2 Characteristics of Mixing Time
C.2.1 Proof of Theorem 11
Since the transition matrix PLRU of LRU is non-reversible, we consider the con-
structive reversible Markov chain with transition matrix P
LRU+PLRU,∗
2
, where PLRU,∗ is
the time reversal chain of PLRU, and pi∗PLRU = pi
∗
PLRU+PLRU,∗
2
.
In order to show that the Markov chain associated with LRU is rapid mixing, we
only need to show that the conductance is greater than some polynomial in the size
of state space. Furthermore, from the relations between conductance and congestion
in (4.22), we only need to show that the congestion is polynomial in the size of state
space.
Based on the definition of congestion in (4.21), we will focus on achieving the
maximum over the RHS. We first consider the term 1
pi(u)Puv
. By the policy of LRU
and the steady state probability given in (4.2), we only need to consider the minimal
steady state probabilities with the minimum transition probability. It is obvious
that the state that achieves minimal steady state probability should be c = (n, n−
1, · · · , n−m+ 1), in other words, the least m popular items are stored in the cache
in a decreasing order from the most recently used position to the least recently used
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position, hence we have
piLRUmin =
pnpn−1 · · · pn−m+1
(1− pn) · · · (1− pn − · · · − pn−m+1) . (C.3)
For the Zipf-like distribution, the normalization factor is given asymptotically by
A ≈ (1−α)/n1−α, where n is the total number of unique items in the system. Since
pi = A/i
α, (1 − pn)(1 − pn − pn−1) · · · (1 − pn − pn−m+1) → 1 as n becomes large,
then we have piLRUmin ' pnpn−1 · · · pn−m+1 = Anα A(n−1)α · · · A(n−m+1)α . For the minimal
transition probability, we can consider Puv = arg mini pi = θ(1/n). Hence, we have
1
piLRUmin Puv
=
[n(n− 1) · · · (n−m+ 1)]α · n
Am
= O(nm+1) (C.4)
Next we consider the summation part in (4.21), which can be upper bounded by
∑
i,j∈Ω,γijuses(u,v)
pi(i)pi(j) ≤ Γ(piLRUmax )2, (C.5)
where Γ is the number of states and piLRUmax is maximal steady state probabilities.
From the steady state probability of LRU given in (4.2), it is clear that the state that
achieves the maximal steady state probability is c = (1, 2, · · · ,m). Hence, piLRUmax =
p1···pm
(1−p1)···(1−p1−···−pm−1) = O(
1
n2(1−α)m ). The number of states Γ = O(n
m). Therefore, we
have
∑
i,j∈Ω,γijuses(u,v)
pi(i)pi(j) = O(n−2(1−α)m) ·O(nm) = O(n(2α−1)m). (C.6)
Therefore, the congestion of LRU is upper bounded by
ρLRU = O(nm+1) ·O(n(2α−1)m) = O(n2αm+1), (C.7)
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which is polynomial in the size of the state space, i.e., the Markov chain associated
with LRU is rapidly mixing.
C.2.2 Proof of Theorem 12
By Cheeger inequality (4.19) and the relation of congestion and conductance (4.22),
we have
trel ≤ 2
Φ2
ln
1
pimin
≤ 8ρ2 ln 1
pimin
. (C.8)
By Theorem 11, we have ρLRU = O(n2αm+1), and piLRUmin = Θ(n
−m), then we obtain
tLRUmix () = O(n
4αm+2 lnn). (C.9)
C.2.3 Proof of Theorem 13
In order to show that the Markov chain associated with RANDOM is rapid mix-
ing, we only need to show that the conductance is greater than some polynomial in
the size of state space. Furthermore, from the relations between conductance and
congestion in (4.22), we only need to show that the congestion is polynomial in the
size of state space.
Based on the definition of congestion in (4.21), we will focus on achieving the
maximum over the RHS. We first consider the term 1
pi(u)Puv
, by the eviction and
insertion policies of RANDOM and the steady state probability given in (4.2), we
can take state u as the minimum state with pi(u) = pnpn−1···pn−m+1∑
c∈Λ′n,m
∏
pci
, pnpn−1···pn−m+1
Υ
,
where Υ =
∑
c∈Λ′n,m
∏
pci , and consider state v as one state such that the (n−m)-th
popular item is requested when we are in state u, hence we can achieve a minimum
transition probability Puv = pn−m/m. Then, we have
1
pi(u)Puv
=
[n(n− 1) · · · (n−m+ 1)]αΥ
Am
· (n−m)
αm
A
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=
m[n(n− 1) · · · (n−m)]αΥ
Am+1
(a)
≤ m[n(n− 1) · · · (n−m)]
α
Am+1
· n(n− 1) · · · (n−m+ 1)
m!
· A
m
[1 · 2 · · ·m]α
(b)
≤ n
m(α+1)+1
(m!)α+1
= O(n(α+1)m+1), (C.10)
where (a) follows from that Υ is upper bounded by the total number of states
n(n−1)···(n−m+1)
m!
multiply the largest steady state probability A
m
[1·2···m]α , and (b) follows
from that A ≈ (1− α)/n1−α.
The summation part in (4.21) can be upper bounded by
∑
i,j∈Ω,γijuses(u,v)
pi(i)pi(j) ≤
(
(p1p2 · · · pm)2
Υ
)
· Γ
(c)
≤ (p1p2 · · · pm)
2
n(n−1)···(n−m+1)
m!
pn · · · pn−m+1
=
(
Am
(m!)α
)2
n(n−1)···(n−m+1)
m!
Am
[n(n−1)···(n−m+1)]α
= Am[n(n− 1) · · · (n−m+ 1)]α−1(m!)1−2α
(d)
= O(n(2α−1)m), (C.11)
where (c) and (d) follow the same arguments as (a) and (b), respectively. Therefore,
the congestion of RANDOM is upper bounded as
ρRANDOM = O(n(α+1)m+1) ·O(n(2α−1)m) = O(n3αm+1). (C.12)
which is polynomial in the size of state space
(
n
m
) ·m!, then from (4.22), we know that
the mixing process of Markov chain associated with RANDOM is rapidly mixing. A
similar argument holds true for FIFO, therefore, both RANDOM and FIFO are
rapidly mixing.
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C.2.4 Proof of Theorem 14
From Theorem 13, we have ρRANDOM = O(n3αm+1), and piRANDOMmin = Θ(n
−m).
Given the relation between mixing time and congestion in (C.8), we obtain
tRANDOMmix () = O(n
6αm+2 lnn). (C.13)
C.2.5 Proofs of Theorem 15 and Theorem 16
We follow the same arguments as we did in the proof of Theorem 11 and The-
orem 13 to show that CLIMB is rapidly mixing, we omit the details here and only
give a closed form of the upper bound on the congestions.
ρCLIMB = O(n
3αm(m+1)
2
+1). (C.14)
Similarly, by the relation between mixing time and congestion defined in (C.8),
we have
tCLIMBmix () = O(n
3αm(m+1)+2 lnn). (C.15)
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APPENDIX D
PROOFS FROM SECTION 5
D.1 Characteristics of Mixing Time
D.1.1 Proof of Theorem 18:
Here, we show that the Markov chain associate with RANDOM(m) is rapid
mixing. In order to achieve this, we need to show that its conductance is great than
some polynomial in the size of state space. Furthermore, from Equation (4.22), we
only need show that its congestion is polynomial in the size of state space.
From the definition of congestion in Equation (4.21), we aim to achieve the supre-
mum over the right hand side (RHS). First, we consider the term 1
pi(u)Puv
. Given the
eviction and insertion rules of RANDOM(m) and stationary distribution given in
Equation (5.1), we can take the state u that achieve the minimal stationary proba-
bility, and consider state v as one state such that the last spot (the spot in cache 1)
is different from v, hence, the minimal transition probability Puv = pn−m/m1. Then
we have
1
pi(u)Puv
= G(m)
(
[n(n− 1) · · · (n−mh + 1)]α
Amh
)h
·
(
[(n−mh) · · · (n−mh −mh−1 + 1)]α
Amh−1
)h−1
. . .
·
(
[(n−∑hi=2 mi) · · · (n−m+ 1)]α
Am1
)1
=
G(m)m1
pn−mAm1+2m2+···+hmh
· (n(n− 1) · · · (n−mh + 1))αh
· ((n−mh) · · · (n−mh −mh−1 + 1))α(h−1) . . .
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·
(
(n−
h∑
i=2
mi) · · · (n−m+ 1)
)α
= O(n(1+α)(m1+2m2+···+hmh)+1). (D.1)
Next, we give an upper bound on the summation part in (4.21)
∑
i,j∈Λ,γijuses(u,v)
pi(i)pi(j)
(a)
≤ [pi(x∗)]2 ·Υ
=
1
G(m)
(p1 · · · pm1)2 ·
(
[pm1+1 · · · pm1+m2 ]2
)2 · · · ·([p∑h−1
j=1 mj+1
· · · pm
]h)2
·Υ
=
A2(m1+2m2+···+hmh) ·Υ
G(m)
· 1
([1 · · ·m1]α)2
· 1
([(m1 + 1) · · · (m1 +m2)]2α)2
· · · 1(
[(
∑h−1
j=1 mj + 1) ·m]hα
)2 , (D.2)
= O(n(2α−1)(m1+2m2+···+hmh)), (D.3)
where (c) follow that pi(x∗) achieves the largest stationary probability and Υ is the
number of total states, i.e., Υ = O(nm). Furthermore, for the normalization factor A,
we have A = O(1/n1−α). Therefore, plugging (D.1) and (D.2) into Equation (4.21),
we have that the congestion of RANDOM is upper bounded as
ρ = O(n3α(m1+2m2+···+hmh)+1), (D.4)
which is polynomial in the size of state space, then from (4.22), we know that the
mixing process of Markov chain associated with RANDOM(m) is rapidly mixing. A
similar argument holds true for FIFO(m). Therefore, RANDOM(m) and FIFO(m)
are rapidly mixing.
187
D.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2:
By Cheeger inequality (4.19) and the relation of congestion and conductance (4.22),
we have
trel ≤ 2
Φ2
ln
1
pimin
≤ 8ρ2 ln 1
pimin
. (D.5)
By Theorem 18, we have
t
RANDOM(m)
mix () = O(n
6α(m1+2m2+···+hmh)+2 lnn), (D.6)
where m = m1 +m2 + · · ·+mh.
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